UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: David G. DeLano and Mary Ann DeLano

Chapter 13 case, dkt. no: 04-20280

Notice of Motion to request that Judge John C. Ninfo, II recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. §455(a) due to his lack of impartiality

Madam or Sir,

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that Dr. Richard Cordero, Creditor, will move this Court at the U.S. Courthouse on 100 State Street, Rochester, New York, 14614, at 1:30 p.m. on March 1, 2005, or as soon thereafter as he can be heard, to request that Judge John C. Ninfo, II, recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. §455 from the DeLano case above-captioned and the related case Pfuntner v. Gordon et al., docket no. 02-2230, WBNY, due to his lack of impartiality and remove them to another district where fair and impartial process for all parties can be had.

Dated: February 17, 2005

Dr. Richard Cordero

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Brooklyn, NY 11208

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: David G. DeLano and Mary Ann DeLano

Chapter 13 case, docket no: 04-20280

Motion
to request that
Judge John C. Ninfo, II
recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. §455(a)
due to his lack of impartiality

Dr. Richard Cordero, Creditor, states under penalty of perjury as follows:

I. The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is the appearance, not the reality, of bias and prejudice

1. Section 455(a) of 28 U.S.C. provides as follows:

> Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States ***shall*** disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality ***might*** reasonably be questioned. (emphasis added)

2. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in *Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (REHNQUIST, C. J.)* the standard for interpreting and applying this section thus:

> As this Court has stated, what matters under §455(a) "is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance." *Liteky v. United States, 510 U. S. 540, 548 (1994).* This inquiry is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. *See ibid.; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F. 2d 1307, 1309 (CA2 1988).*

3. Those surrounding facts and circumstances are to be assessed by "the "reasonable person" standard which [§455(a)] embraces", *Microsoft Corp.* at 1303.

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2. Judge Ninfo denied having received the proposed order despite the fact that Dr. Cordero faxed it to him, Dr. Cordero's phone bill reflects that, and his clerks acknowledged that it was in his chambers, just as in Pfuntner v. Gordon et al. he denied that Dr. Cordero's motion to extend time to file notice of appeal from his decision had arrived timely although Trustee Gordon had in writing admitted against his interest that it had arrived at a timely date, whereby trust in the Judge's word has been shattered 369

C. Judge Ninfo is protecting the DeLanos by reaching the biased conclusion, before they ever took the stand, or complied with his order of document production, or were examined by the creditors, that Dr. Cordero is wrong in his contention that the DeLanos moved untimely to disallow his claim for the single purpose of eliminating the only creditor that has examined their petition, found evidence of fraud, and is objecting to the confirmation of their debt repayment plan 370

1. Judge Ninfo disregarded the incontrovertible evidence that the DeLanos had documents that they had been requested to produce by Trustee Reiber, by Dr. Cordero, and even by his own Order of July 26; which he allowed them to disobey with impunity 373
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II. The facts and circumstances surrounding Judge Ninfo's handling of the DeLano case have the appearance of bias and prejudice

A. Judge Ninfo has given precedence to what he calls "local practice" over the law and rules, to protect the local parties to the detriment of non-local Dr. Cordero

4. On January 27, 2004, Mr. David DeLano and Mrs. Mary Ann DeLano filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. Mr. DeLano is far from an average debtor: Interestingly enough, he has worked as a bank officer at different banks for 32 year! Actually, he is not only a veteran bank officer, still working for a large bank, namely, Manufacturers & Traders Trust Bank (M&T), but rather he is a bank *loan* officer. As such, he qualifies as an expert in how to assess creditworthiness and remain solvent to be able to repay bank loans. Thus, he is a member of a

class of people who should know better than to go bankrupt and that because of their experience with borrowers that use or abuse the bankruptcy system know how to petition successfully for bankruptcy relief. Consequently, his petition warranted to be examined with the equivalent of strict scrutiny. But Judge Ninfo would have none of such common sense approach.

5. On the contrary, Judge Ninfo excused the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee George Reiber and his attorney, James Weidman, Esq., who unlawfully prevented any examination of the DeLanos even by the only creditor, Dr. Cordero, who showed up at the meeting of creditors held on March 8, 2004. Convened under 11 U.S.C. §341, that meeting had the purpose, as provided under §343, of enabling the creditors to meet the "debtor [who] shall appear and submit to examination under oath…". What is more, FRBkrP Rule 2004(b) includes no fewer than 12 areas appropriate for creditors to examine the debtor at the §341 meeting, even one worded in the catchall terms of "any other matter relevant to the case". Consequently, given the breath of questioning, §341(c) makes allowance, not just for a few questions, but rather for an indefinite series of meetings until "the final meeting of creditors".
6. It should be noted that none of the other 20 creditors of the DeLanos, all institutional, attended the meeting, of which notice is officially given by the court. This is the normal occurrence, as Mr. DeLano must know and have counted on for an unobjected, smooth sailing of his petition. This imputed intention is reasonably supported by the fact that he distributed his unsecured credit card debt of $98,092 over 18 credit cards so that none of the issuers would have a stake high enough to make it cost-effective to send an attorney to examine the DeLanos.
7. Their examination was not conducted by Trustee Reiber because contrary to the Code -11 U.S.C. §341(a)- the rules –FRBkrP Rule 2003(b)(1)- and regulations -C.F.R. §58.6(a)(10)-, he had Att. Weidman do so. At the meeting, Dr. Cordero submitted his written objections to the DeLanos' debt repayment plan. But no sooner had he asked Mr. DeLano to state his occupation than Att. Weidman asked Dr. Cordero in rapid succession some three times to state his evidence that the DeLanos had committed fraud. Dr. Cordero had to insist that Mr. Weidman take notice that he was not accusing them of fraud. To no avail. Mr. Weidman alleged that there was no time for such questions and put an end to the examination despite the fact that there was more than ample time to continue it since Dr. Cordero was only at his second question! In so doing, he violated Dr. Cordero's statutory right to examine the DeLanos. Why could Att. Weidman not risk exposing the DeLanos to have to answer under oath Dr. Cordero's question before finding

out how much Dr. Cordero already knew about fraud committed by them?

8. Later on that day, March 8, 2004, at the confirmation hearing of debtors' repayment plans before Judge Ninfo, Dr. Cordero protested Att. Weidman's unlawful act, but Trustee Reiber ratified the actions of his attorney and vouched for the good faith of the petition.
9. For his part, Judge Ninfo started off his response in open court and for the record by saying that Dr. Cordero would not like what he had to say; that he had read Dr. Cordero's objections; that Dr. Cordero interpreted the law very strictly, as he had the right to do, but he had again missed the local practice; that he should have called to find out what that practice was and, if he had done so, he would have learned that the trustee would not allow a creditor to go on asking questions until 8 in the evening, particularly when he had a room full of people.
10. Dr. Cordero protested because he had the right to rely on the law and the notice of the meeting of creditors stating that the meeting's purpose was for the creditors to examine the debtors. He also protested the Judge not keeping his comments within the bounds of the facts since Dr. Cordero had not asked questions for hours, but had been cut off by Mr. Weidman after two questions in a room with only two other persons.
11. Judge Ninfo said that Dr. Cordero should have done Mr. Weidman the courtesy of giving him his written objections in advance so that Mr. Weidman could determine how long he would need. Dr. Cordero protested because he was not legally required to do so, but instead had the right to file his objections at any time before confirmation of the plan and could not be expected to disclose his objections beforehand, which would allow the debtors to craft their answers with their attorney. He added that Mr. Weidman's conduct was suspicious because he kept asking Dr. Cordero what evidence he had that the DeLanos had committed fraud despite Dr. Cordero having answered the first time that he was not accusing the DeLanos of fraud, whereby Mr. Weidman showed an interest in finding out how much Dr. Cordero already knew about fraud committed by the DeLanos before he, Mr. Weidman, would let them answer any further questions. Dr. Cordero said that Mr. Weidman had put him under examination although he was certainly not the one to be examined at the meeting, but rather the DeLanos were; and added that Mr. Weidman had caused him irreparable damage by depriving him of his right to examine the Debtors before they knew his objections and could rehearse their answers.
12. Yet, Judge Ninfo came to Mr. Weidman's defense and once more said that Dr. Cordero applied the law too strictly and ignored the local practice…

13. That is precisely what Dr. Cordero has complained about! Judge Ninfo together with other court officers engages in "local practice", which consists in the disregard of the law, the rules, and the facts and the systematic application of the law of the locals. That law is based on both personal relationships among people that work in the same small federal building and with people who appear before Judge Ninfo frequently and who must fear antagonizing him by challenging his rulings, for he distributes favorable and unfavorable decisions as he sees fit without regard for legal rights and the available facts . Such local practice of disregard of legality has resulted in a pattern of non-coincidental, intentional, and coordinated acts of wrongdoing and bias in which Judge Ninfo together with others have participated to the benefit of local parties and the detriment of Dr. Cordero. (Cf. §II.C-E of Dr. Cordero's motion of November 3, 2003, in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, herein incorporated by reference.)

1. Frequency of appearance by local parties before Judge Ninfo

14. The evidence that such personal relationships has developed is indisputable. Indeed, a PACER query about Trustee Reiber ran on April 2, 2004, returned the statement that he was trustee in 3,909 *open* cases!, 3,907 before Judge Ninfo; cf. Chapter 7 Trustee Kenneth Gordon was the trustee before Judge Ninfo in 3,382 out of his 3,383 cases, as of June 26, 2004. Likewise, the statistics on Pacer as of November 3, 2003, showed that in the other case to which both Mr. DeLano and Dr. Cordero are parties, namely, Pfuntner v. Gordon et al., docket no. 02-2230, which is of course also before Judge Ninfo, Plaintiff James Pfuntner's attorney, David D. MacKnight, Esq., had appeared before Judge Ninfo 427 times out of 479 times. Similarly, Raymond C. Stilwell, Esq., had so appeared 132 times out 248 times; he is the attorney for another party, David Palmer, the owner of Premier Van Lines, the company to which M&T Loan Officer DeLano lent money and which went bankrupt.
15. If those local parties know what is good for them, they take what they are given by Judge Ninfo and hope for something as good or better next time, which can be fifteen minutes later when they appear in their next case before him. In so doing, they make the Judge's life so much easier. A non-local party like Dr. Cordero, who comes into his court with no other relation than that to the law, the rules, and the facts, and who tries to confine the Judge's rulings to the provisions of such relation and even dare appeal from his rulings, can only upset the Judge's relationship to the local parties and the modus operandi that they have developed. That Judge

Ninfo will not tolerate.

16. Hardly did the Judge have to tolerate it, for Dr. Cordero not only was a non-local appearing merely through the written word or over the phone in only one case, that is, the Pfuntner one, but he was also a pro se litigant, as he still is in the DeLano case. Thus, Dr. Cordero neither stood nor stands any chance of making Judge Ninfo apply the law and the rules or respect the constraint of the facts. He was and is supposed merely to take whatever is left that the Judge throws at him. As a result of such disregard for legality and of bias, Judge Ninfo has for the last three years caused this non-local pro se party the loss of an enormous amount of effort, time, and money and inflicted upon him tremendous emotional distress. It should not continue any longer.

2. Judge Ninfo's disregard for the law, the rules, and the facts led him to make the ludicrous statement that "local practice" can be found out by making a phone call

17. The facts demonstrate Judge Ninfo's disregard for legality. In his orders in the Pfuntner and the DeLano cases, whether they be written or issued from the bench , he makes no mention of, let alone discusses, the law of Congress or the procedural rules approved by it, much less any court decision, not even decisions of the Supreme Court, and that in spite of Dr. Cordero's numerous citations, after painstaking research, of both statutory and case law as well as the rules and the facts, in support of the arguments in his briefs and motions, and at hearings. Judge Ninfo's decisions have no more basis than 'because-I-say-so-and-what-I-say-goes-here'. Why should he bother with the law to provide for the impartiality required by due process when he is accustomed to receiving the whole of due respect that comes with exercising unchallenged judicial power?
18. Only a person used to making rulings with the expectation that they be accepted uncritically by those depending on his good will rather than be examined under the criteria of the law and logic could make in the presence of a stenographer who is supposed to be keeping a record of his every word Judge Ninfo's comment on March 8, 2004, that Dr. Cordero should have called to find out what the local practice for the meeting of creditors was and, if he had done so, he would have learned that the trustee would not allow a creditor to go on asking questions. In addition to being flatly contradicted by the law (para. 5, supra), that comment is ludicrous!
19. A person reflexively expecting to be challenged by the participants in truly adversary proceedings would hardly even think that a non-local who lives hundreds of miles from

Rochester can phone somebody there to find out what the "local practice" is and such somebody would have the time, selfless motivation, and capacity to explain accurately and comprehensively the details of the "local practice" and its divergencies from the law and rules of the land of Congress. How could the details of such somebody place the non-local at arms length with his local adversaries, let alone with the judges and other court officers? By contrast, the details of how to implement such comment will readily reveal how impracticable it is and how impaired by bias and prejudice the judgment of he who made it is:

a) Whom was Dr. Cordero supposed to call to obtain all the details of "local practice"? Had he called a clerk of court and asked that she tell him all there is about "local practice", would she not have jumped and said, "Ah!, you mean the local rules. You can download them from the Internet or I can send you a hardcopy in the m…" "No! no! I mean "local practice", you know, the unpublished, unwritten local tricks that lawyers in Rochester know can invalidate national law." Would the baffled clerk not think that Dr. Cordero was being facetious or conspiratorial and try to get rid of him by repeating once more that clerks are not allowed to give legal advice and that he should hire local counsel to find out whatever he meant by "local practice"?
b) Should Dr. Cordero call opposing counsel and ask that he be fair with him and level the field by spending his time sharing with him the winning secrets of "local practice"?
c) Or should Dr. Cordero call the trustee and ask him the seemingly ridiculous question whether "local practice" would allow him to ask more than two questions at the officially convened meeting of creditors if he was the only creditor present?
d) Should so much futile effort have justified Dr. Cordero in calling Tony Soprocal, the notorious Rochester attorney, whom the media calls "the master of local practice"? Dr. Cordero would come clean –Tony requires that from those he deals with- and admit that although he can read law books and in fact he is said to read the law, no wrongly, but just strictly, he is still missing what really matters in a Rochester court, not the law, but rather the knowledge of the initiated in unwritten "local practice". Tony would smirk, for in his line of work a euphemism is more expressive than any long speech. "Sure! You can retain me for the unwritable dirty secrets of how things get done in our local court. You can't get more 'local' than through a chat with me…unless you also want 'practice', but that will cost them an arm and a leg…you too, but you pay me in money."

"For…forgeta'bout it, Tony," would babble a shaky Dr. Cordero, "the chat will be enough."

e) Then what? Could it be reasonable for Dr. Cordero to state at the next meeting or hearing what he expects Judge Ninfo to do because Tony said that's the way it is done in "local practice"? Will Judge Ninfo say, "Now you are talking, Dr. Cordero! If Tony told you what the "local practice" is and you relied on it, then that's the end of it. I have no choice but to enforce it, you know, I am not one to disappoint your reasonable reliance on the basis of my conduct as a judge."

20. What nonsense! But the description of such scenes is not meaningless at all, for it shows starkly how uneven the field is when Judge Ninfo gives precedence to whatever it is that he calls "local practice" over both the written and published laws of Congress and official notices of the court, such as the notice of the meeting of creditors (para. 6, supra). The practical consequences of such abrogation by him of the law are very serious, for in addition to frustrating Dr. Cordero's reasonable expectations that the proceedings will be held according to law, it renders for naught all his enormous effort to educate himself about the Bankruptcy Code, procedural rules, and case law as well as the time and money that he spends whenever he travels all the way to Rochester to appear in person in his court. By unfairly surprising him with his trump card of "local practice", Judge Ninfo has created an untenable situation of legal uncertainty and arbitrariness. That is antithetical to the very essence of a system of justice that in order to curb abuse of power is based on notice of the law given in advance and opportunity to be heard without bias or prejudice, not tidbits about "local practice" that one must ferret out on a hit and miss basis and rely on at one's own risk.

21. That risk is all the more real and constant because Judge Ninfo's bias and prejudice lead him to break faith even with his own statement of that "local practice", whether stated orally or in a written order.

B. Judge Ninfo said in open court that he would issue Dr. Cordero's written requested order for the DeLanos to produce documents that can prove their bankruptcy fraud if, in accordance with local practice, he resubmitted it as a proposed order; however, after it was so resubmitted, the Judge not only did not issue it, but at Dr. Cordero's instigation issued pro forma his own watered down version that he then allowed the DeLanos to disobey with impunity

22. On July 9, 2004, Dr. Cordero submitted to Judge Ninfo a Statement analyzing the DeLanos'

bankruptcy petition and other few documents, which they belatedly produced upon request of Trustee Reiber after Dr. Cordero's repeated demands under 11 U.S.C. §§1302(b)(1) and 704(4) and (7) that the Trustee request them. The statement showed, among other things, how the DeLanos had engaged in bankruptcy fraud and how Trustee Reiber had failed to review the initial petition, to request documents for months, to subpoena documents when the DeLanos would not produce any, and how the Trustee had instead moved to dismiss the case due to the DeLanos' "unreasonable delay" in producing documents. Included in that Statement Opposing the Motion to Dismiss was Dr. Cordero's request for an order for the production of a specific list of documents.

23. At the hearing on July 19, 2004, of the Trustee's motion to dismiss, Dr. Cordero asked Judge Ninfo to grant his request for the order described in his July 9 Statement. The Judge stated that the Court does not prepare orders, but rather issues them on proposal from a party. Dr. Cordero proposed to reformat the text of his requested order into a proposed order. Having already had the opportunity to read that text, Judge Ninfo decided that Dr. Cordero could do so and gave him his fax number to make it possible for him to receive and issue it immediately so that the parties would have formal notice of their obligation to begin producing certain documents right away.
24. Dr. Cordero reformatted into a proposed order the same text of the requested order, with the changes necessary to take into account what had occurred at the hearing, and faxed it to Judge Ninfo the following day, July 20. To do so, he had to call the clerks and find out why his fax would not go through, whereupon he was told that the fax number that the Judge had given him was incorrect; he was then given the correct one.
25. But Judge Ninfo did not issue it. Instead, he gave precedence to the untimely objections of a local party, the DeLanos' attorney, Christopher Werner, Esq. In a letter addressed to Judge Ninfo delivered via messenger that day, July 20, he stated: "We are in receipt of Mr. Cordero's proposed Order which we believe far exceeds the direction of the Court." That was it. But that was enough for the Judge to take the hint. Att. Werner's letter was docketed immediately and made available through PACER. By contrast, Judge Ninfo not only failed to issue the proposed order; but he also did not even have it docketed forthwith, whereby he violated FRBkrP Rule 7005 and FRCivP Rule 5(e) and showed bias toward Att. Werner and the DeLanos.
26. In so doing, Judge Ninfo disregarded Dr. Cordero's statement in his letter accompanying the

proposed order that Att. Werner had had ten days since Dr. Cordero faxed his July 9 Statement to him to learn the breath of his requested order, yet he had failed to object to the Judge's decision at the hearing that Dr. Cordero should convert it into a proposed order and fax it to him. If, as the Attorney stated at the July 19 hearing, he has been in this business for 28 years, then he had to know his obligation to raise timely objections, particularly since:

a) Att. Werner and the Judge knew what documents had been requested, many for months since Dr. Cordero's written Objections of March 4, 2004!;
b) the Judge agreed to its production; and
c) FRCivP Rule 26(b)(1) favors broad discovery (made applicable by FRBkrP Rule 7026).

27. It was simply too late for Att. Werner to object for the first time after the hearing was over; cf. FRCivP Rule 26(a)(1)(E) last paragraph, providing for disclosure "unless the party objects during the conference"; and FRCivP Rule 46, requiring exceptions to be made "at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought". Att. Werner's objection was untimely and constituted an unfair surprise. Dr Cordero protested. To no avail. Judge Ninfo, showing bias once more, did not even acknowledge Dr. Cordero's objection.

28. Nor did Judge Ninfo issue the faxed proposed order as agreed at the July 19 hearing, or for that matter any production order at all. Yet, by July 21 PACER[1] already contained the minutes of that hearing, which included the statement in capital letters:

> Order to be submitted by Dr. Cordero. NOTICE OF ENTRY TO BE ISSUED.

29. So Judge Ninfo made Dr. Cordero waste his time and effort once more (cf. §III of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 14, 2004, for docketing and other relief, herein incorporated by reference) in preparing and submitting a document that the Judge knew he was not going to act upon at all. Did he ask for it for leverage? Having broken faith with his own word officially recorded and electronically published, Judge Ninfo cannot be taken seriously because his word cannot justifiably be relied on.

30. Even as late as July 26, the Judge had not caused Dr. Cordero's faxed letters and proposed order of July 19 and 21 to be docketed. Dr. Cordero called the Court and asked Clerk Paula Finucane specifically why. She said that they were in chambers and that she had not received any order to be docketed.

[1] PACER is the Public Access Court Electronic Records service that allows subscribers to see through the Internet case dockets and to retrieve documents to their computers.

31. Only the following day, July 27, was the July 19 letter docketed, but only it. Indeed, the entry in the docket accessible through PACER read thus:

07/20/2004	53	Letter dated 7/19/04 Filed by Dr. Richard Cordero regarding Proposed Order . (Finucane, P.) (Entered: 07/26/2004)

When Dr. Cordero clicked on the hyperlink 53, only the letter –page 1 of 5- downloaded as an Adobe PDF (Portable Document Format), but not the order! Why?!

32. By contrast, the entry for Att. Werner's objection of July 19, 2004, to Dr. Cordero's claim as creditor of the DeLano Debtors read thus.

07/22/2004	51	Motion Objecting to Claim No.(s) 19 for claimant: Richard Cordero, Filed by Christopher Werner, atty for Debtor David G. DeLano , Joint Debtor Mary Ann DeLano (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Certificate of Service) (Finucane, P.) (Entered: 07/23/2004)

33. When Dr. Cordero clicked on the hyperlinks 51>2 an order proposed by Att. Werner to disallow Dr. Cordero's claim downloaded! This was blatant discriminatory treatment that showed Judge Ninfo's bias (cf. §II of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 14, 2004, for other instances of a pattern of docket manipulation).

    1. Judge Ninfo broke faith with his word that he would issue Dr. Cordero's proposed order for document production by the DeLanos just because their attorney, despite his untimeliness, "expressed concerns", thereby protecting the DeLanos from discovery that could show their bankruptcy fraud

34. As late as July 27, there had been no docketing of Dr. Cordero's letter of July 21 to Judge Ninfo protesting his failure to issue the proposed order that the Judge had asked Dr. Cordero to fax to him.

35. Instead, the Judge had an order of his own entered, which bore the date of July 26, 2004, rather than Dr. Cordero's proposed order that he had agreed to enter and the minutes of the July 19 hearing recorded its intended entry.

36. In his order, Judge Ninfo stated what it took to deny in effect Dr. Cordero's proposed order:

> WHEREAS, Richard Cordero submitted a proposed Order, a copy of which is attached, to which Attorney Werner expressed concerns in a July 20, 2004 letter, a copy of which is also attached;

37. This is an unfortunate hybrid between 'objections to' and 'concerns about'. It is indicative of Judge Ninfo's awareness that due to untimeliness, Att. Werner could not have raised valid objections for the first time after the hearing was over. Nevertheless, it shows how little it took for the Judge to break faith with his word given in open court: "concerns" expressed untimely by the debtors' attorney. On such "concerns", the Judge protected the DeLanos from having to produce documents that could prove their bankruptcy fraud, such as:
    a) the bank account and debit card statements that could show the whereabouts of the DeLanos' declared earnings of $291,470 in only the three fiscal years 2001-2003, while they declared having:
    b) only $535 in cash or in bank accounts…with Mr. DeLano's bank, M&T, which may have issued a bank officer like him with its credit card, perhaps even at a preferential rate, or its debit card, although the DeLanos did not declare possessing any such M&T Bank card, not to mention 'sticking' his employer with a bankruptcy debt, as they did other credit card issuers –most likely those that Veteran Banking Industry Mr. DeLano would know have a higher threshold of loss to trigger their participation in bankruptcy proceedings- on whose 18 credit cards they owe a whopping $98,092;
    c) two cars worth together merely $6,500;
    d) equity in their home of only $21,415, although people in their 60s, as the DeLanos are, have already paid or are about to finish paying their mortgage, on which by contrast they owe $78,084;
    e) household goods worth only $2,910…that's all they have accumulated throughout their work lives!, despite the fact that they have earned over a hundred times that amount in only the last three years…unbelievable! Where did the money go or is?
38. But that common sense question Judge Ninfo would not ask, much less let Dr. Cordero find the answer to, never mind that the Judge has a duty under 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(3) to ascertain whether "the [debtor's debt repayment] plan has been proposed in good faith and not by means forbidden by law". In fact, the Judge too had the duty to presume that the DeLanos had submitted their plan in bad faith, for that is what the Code entitles the creditors and the trustee to do. Thus, the Revision Notes and Legislative Reports, 1978 Acts, accompanying §343 provides that:

> The purpose of the examination [at the meeting of creditors] is to enable

creditors and the trustee to determine if assets have improperly been disposed of or concealed or if there are grounds for objection to discharge.

39. Far from pursuing this statutory line of inquiry, Judge Ninfo entered his July 26 Order, which was an inexcusably watered down version of Dr. Cordero's proposed order that he had agreed to enter. Despite the evidence of concealment of assets by the DeLanos, the Judge failed to require them to produce bank or *debit* account statements; documents concerning their undated "loan" of $10,000 to their son; instruments attesting to any interest of ownership in fixed or movable property, such as the mobile home admittedly bought with that "loan"; etc. Why? What motive could justify preventing the facts to be ascertained through production of those documents?
40. Consequently, Judge Ninfo's failure even to do his job under the Code, in addition to failing to keep his word, provides the foundation for the question whether he in effect denied Dr. Cordero's proposed order for document production by the DeLanos merely because of the undefined "concerns" expressed by Att. Werner or because of his own concerns and, if the latter, what are his concerns. Is the Judge protecting them because they are local parties and in general he has developed relationships with local parties that make him biased toward them, or because in particular Mr. DeLano is a 32-year veteran of the lending industry and knows too much about how abusive bankruptcies, even those to avoid repayment of loans to his bank, are handled? There is solid basis for the latter part of this question (§C, infra).

2. Judge Ninfo denied having received the proposed order despite the fact that Dr. Cordero faxed it to him, Dr. Cordero's phone bill reflects that, and his clerks acknowledged that it was in his chambers, just as in Pfuntner v. Gordon et al. he denied that Dr. Cordero's motion to extend time to file notice of appeal from his decision had arrived timely although Trustee Gordon had in writing admitted against his interest that it had arrived at a timely date, whereby trust in the Judge's word has been shattered

41. Still by Friday, August 6, neither Dr. Cordero's proposed order of July 19 nor his letter of July 21 had been docketed. On that day, Dr. Cordero inquired about it of Deputy Clerk of Court Todd Stickle. The latter told him that his clerks had not received it for docketing and that he would look into it and consult with Clerk of Court Paul Warren into the possibility of discriminatory treatment.
42. On Monday, August 9, Mr. Stickle informed Dr. Cordero that upon asking Judge Ninfo and his Assistant, Ms. Andrea Siderakis, he had been told that Dr. Cordero's July 21 fax never arrived.
43. That explanation for its not being docketed was definitely unacceptable: The fax went through

on July 22 and a copy sent to the Judge of Dr. Cordero's telephone bill showed that he did fax the letters and proposed order on July 20 and 22 to (585)613-4299. In addition, the receipt of his July 21 letter was acknowledged by Clerk Finucane, as was the place where it was withheld: Judge Ninfo's chambers.

44. This was by no means the first time that Judge Ninfo sprung on Dr. Cordero such a surprise: In the Pfuntner v. Gordon et al., docket no. 02-2230, in which both Mr. DeLano and Dr. Cordero are parties, the Judge dismissed Dr. Cordero's claims against Chapter 7 Trustee Kenneth Gordon, a local that so very frequently appears in his court (cf. ¶14, supra). Dr. Cordero timely mailed a notice of appeal on January 9, 2003. Trustee Gordon moved to dismiss it as untimely filed and Dr. Cordero timely mailed a motion to extend time to file the notice. Although Trustee Gordon himself acknowledged on page 2 of his brief in opposition of February 5, 2003, that Dr. Cordero's motion had been timely filed on January 29, Judge Ninfo surprisingly found at its hearing on February 12, 2003, that it had been untimely filed on January 30! By such expedient allegation contrary to fact, Judge Ninfo denied Dr. Cordero's motion. Moreover, the Judge would not even look into how that discrepancy could have arisen between his alleged date of January 30 for the filing and Trustee Gordon's admission against legal interest that the filing occurred on January 29. Thereby the Judge insured that Dr. Cordero's appeal against his dismissal was doomed. (cf. §I.A.1. of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 8, 2003, for Judge Ninfo to recuse himself from the Pfuntner case, which is herein incorporated by reference).

45. The trust that a party must have in the integrity of a judge and that a judge must earn by his irreproachable conduct was thus shattered; subsequent events have only replaced it with distrust. Under these circumstances, it is not just the appearance of lack of impartiality that warrants the recusal of Judge Ninfo, but also of lack of integrity. Alas, there is even further factual basis for such assertion.

C. Judge Ninfo is protecting the DeLanos by reaching the biased conclusion, before they ever took the stand, or complied with his order of document production, or were examined by the creditors, that Dr. Cordero is wrong in his contention that the DeLanos moved untimely to disallow his claim for the single purpose of eliminating the only creditor that has examined their petition, found evidence of fraud, and is objecting to the confirmation of their debt repayment plan

46. The DeLanos commenced this case by their bankruptcy petition of January 26, 2004. Had they

wanted to object to Dr. Cordero's claim, they could and should have done so at that time. The reasons for this are that:

a) It was they who in Schedule F therein named Dr. Cordero among their creditors;
b) Mr. DeLano knew the nature and basis of Dr. Cordero's claim against him since he was served with his complaint of November 21, 2002, in Pfuntner v. Gordon et al.;
c) Att. Werner signed that petition and, therefore, also knew of Dr. Cordero's claim against the DeLanos;
d) both the DeLanos and Att. Werner knew that Dr. Cordero was determined to pursue his claim as stated in his Objection of March 4, 2004, to the Confirmation of the DeLanos' Plan of Debt Repayment, so determined that he traveled all the way from New York City, and in fact was the only creditor, to attend the meeting of creditors on March 8, 2004, at which, interestingly enough, Mr. DeLano was accompanied also by his attorney in the Pfuntner case, Michael Beyma, Esq., of Underberg & Kessler, LLP;
e) Att. Werner objected to Dr. Cordero's status as creditor in his statement to Judge Ninfo of April 16, 2004, which Dr. Cordero refuted in his timely reply of April 25, after which Att. Werner dropped the issue and went on for months treating Dr. Cordero as a creditor; and
f) Att. Werner continued to treat Dr. Cordero as a creditor for more than two months even after he filed his proof of claim on May 15, 2004.

47. But then only after Dr. Cordero faxed to Att. Werner his Statement of July 9, 2004 –in which he opposed Trustee Reiber's motion to dismiss and presented the evidence pointing to the DeLanos' having engaged in bankruptcy fraud, particularly concealment of assets- and after the hearing on July 19, 2004, did the DeLanos and Att. Werner come up with the idea of moving to disallow Dr. Cordero's claim.

48. It should be noted that for months Dr. Cordero had repeatedly requested under 11 U.S.C. §§1302(b)(1) and 704(4) and (7) that Trustee Reiber investigate the DeLanos and require them to produce specific types of documents. His requests were met only with Trustee Reiber's avoidance of his duty to investigate, his ineffectiveness in obtaining documents when, at Dr. Cordero's insistence, he appeared to request them, and the DeLanos' effort to produce as few documents and as late as possible. Hence, in his July 9 Statement Dr. Cordero presented Judge Ninfo for the first time with a requested order for specific documents. How the Judge dealt with

that request has been described above (para. 23, supra). In addition, how he dealt in his Orders of August 30 and November 10, 2004, with the DeLanos' motion to disallow is no less revealing of his bias and disregard for the law, the rules, and the facts.

49. To begin with, the DeLanos' motion to disallow was untimely and barred by laches, coming as it did almost two years after Mr. DeLano had known of Dr. Cordero's claim and six months after they had acknowledged in their petition his status as a creditor and during which they dealt with him as a creditor. Mr. DeLano, with his career long experience as a bank *loan* officer, had reason to expect that during that time Dr. Cordero, a non-local, non-institutional, and pro se creditor, would be worn down, for he Mr. DeLano knew that even institutional lenders simply stay away from the overwhelming majority of bankruptcies and write off what is owed them. However, Dr. Cordero not only continued pursuing his claim, but also requesting documents that could show the DeLanos' bankruptcy fraud and even pointed to the evidence of their concealment of assets. Then they came up with the subterfuge of moving to disallow Dr. Cordero's claim. And Judge Ninfo played along with them!

50. Thus, the Judge stated in his August 30 Order, without providing any reasons in accordance with law or in light of the facts, as judges are supposed to do, but in another "local practice" this-is-so-because-I-say-so fiat that:

> …the Claim Objection [the motion to disallow] was timely, there having been no waivers or laches on the part of the Debtors that would prevent the filing and Court's determination of the Claim Objection;

51. Through such fiat, without any citation of any authority, Judge Ninfo disregarded the Bankruptcy Code, which considers untimeliness such a grave fault that it provides under §1307(c)(1) that "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors" is grounds for a party in interest, who need not even be a creditor, to request the dismissal of the case or even the liquidation of the estate. There can be no doubt that it is prejudicial to Dr. Cordero to have been treated as a creditor by the DeLanos for six months, during which he spent a lot of effort, time, and money researching and writing numerous papers, preparing for hearings, and even traveling to Rochester, only to be challenged, after he presented evidence of their bankruptcy fraud, on the threshold question whether he is a creditor at all.

52. Then Judge Ninfo severed Dr. Cordero's claim against Mr. DeLano from the Pfuntner case and required Dr. Cordero to take discovery of Mr. DeLano to prove his claim, the one that the DeLanos themselves had taken the initiative to acknowledge in their petition. In so doing, he

severed that claim from the Pfuntner case to try it out of the context of all the other parties and issues in that case, to the benefit of Mr. DeLano and the detriment of Dr. Cordero. Thereby he disregarded his own order entered at the hearing on October 16, 2003, where he suspended all proceedings in the Pfuntner case until Dr. Cordero had appealed his decisions all the way to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where they had been since May 2, 2003, docket no. 03-5023, and from there to the Supreme Court. (Cf. §I of Dr. Cordero's motion of September 9, 2004, in the Court of Appeals, hereby incorporated by reference.) Once more the Judge had sprung another surprise on Dr. Cordero, frustrating his reasonable expectations, and further proving that the Judge's word cannot be relied on.

53. Likewise, in asking Dr. Cordero to prove his claim, the Judge disregarded FRBkrP Rule 3001(f) and the presumption of validity that had attached thereunder since May 15, 2004, to Dr. Cordero's properly filed claim (id., §II).

54. Moreover, Judge Ninfo suspended every other aspect of the case, to the detriment of all the other creditors, and without citing any authority or giving any reason for taking a step that so unnecessarily redounds to the detriment of all the other 20 creditors, whose interest it is to have the case move along so that they can start receiving payment under the plan or see it denied and be free to collect from the DeLanos. Thereby, however, the Judge protected the DeLanos by not having to deal with the issue under 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(3) whether "the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by means forbidden by law" (cf. ¶38, supra). Moreover, by so doing, he provided the DeLanos a subterfuge for not providing to Dr. Cordero the documents that could prove their bankruptcy fraud, so that they claimed in the Statement by Att. Werner of November 9, 2004, "All of the Debtors' financial documents sought by Cordero in his demand relate to the Debtor's finances and have nothing to do with the matter at hand, which is Cordero's claim", targeted by the DeLanos' motion to disallow. Perfect pitcher-catcher coordination, but severely defective by its disregard of the rules (§C.2, infra).

1. Judge Ninfo disregarded the incontrovertible evidence that the DeLanos had documents that they had been requested to produce by Trustee Reiber, by Dr. Cordero, and even by his own Order of July 26; which he allowed them to disobey with impunity

55. To comply with the Order to prove his claim, Dr. Cordero requested the DeLanos on September 29, to produce a specific list of documents very similar to those on his proposed request of July 19, as well as other documents relating specifically to his claim against Mr. DeLano stemming

from the Pfuntner case.

56. In his Response of October 28, 2004, by Att. Werner, Mr. DeLano declined discovery of every item requested by Dr. Cordero either as irrelevant or not in the DeLanos' possession. However, that statement is irreconcilable with the facts and the legal obligations of the DeLanos.
57. Let's begin with the pretense that the DeLanos did not have in their possessions the requested documents. At of Dr. Cordero's instigation, Trustee Reiber requested on April 20 and May 18, 2004, that the DeLanos produce documents to support their petition. Although his request was unjustifiably insufficient in its scope given the claims and statements that the DeLanos had made in their petition, the Trustee requested the statements for the last three years of each of 8 of the 18 credit cards that they had listed in Schedule F. Even so, what the DeLanos produced on June 14, 2004, was a single statement for each of those 8 cards and they were between 8 and 11 months old! That fell indisputably short of what they had been requested to produce and showed their effort to avoid producing any documents at all, so much so that the Trustee moved to dismiss their case for "unreasonable delay". Nevertheless, by producing them the DeLanos also showed that they did keep such statements for many months and presumably for all their cards, for it is implausible that they just happened to have one single statement of each of the cards that happened to be included in the request.
58. Dr. Cordero brought to Trustee Reiber's attention the gross insufficiency of what they had produced. Eventually, on July 28, 2004, the DeLanos produced some of the statements that Att. Werner had subpoenaed from issuers of those credit cards. Among them was the set produced by Discover Card for Mr. DeLano's account 6011 0020 4000 6645. It included the statements since April 16, 2001, until the one with the payment due date of May 29, 2004. All of them were addressed to him at the DeLanos' home on 1262 Shoecraft Road, Webster, NY 14580-8954. This shows that as late as May 2004, months after filing their petition, the DeLanos kept receiving monthly credit card statements. It is also all but certain that they kept receiving the monthly statements for the other credit card that they had. The evidence for this is found in the credit bureau reports for each of the DeLanos, which show credit cards with activity well into 2004.

	Credit reporting agency	Date of report	Person reported on	Credit card issuer	Credit card account no.	Date of: last activity=a; balance=b; update=u; payment=p & amount; or items as of date reported=i
1.	Equifax	July 23, 04	David D.=D	Capital One	4388 6413 4765*	**i: July 2004** **p: January 2004**
2.			D	Capital One Bank	4862 3621 5719*	**i: July 2004** **p: February 2004**
3.			D	Cbusa sears	3480 0743 0*	**i: July 2004**
4.			D	Genesee Regional Bank		**i: July 2004** **p: June 2004**
5.			D	MBNA Amer	4313 0229 9975*	i: May 2004
6.			D	Wells Fargo Financial	674-1772	**i: February 2004**
7.	Equifax	July 23,04	Mary D.=M	Capital One	4862 3622 6671*	p: February 2004
8.	Experian	July 26, 04	D	Bank of America	4024 0807 6136…	b: May 2004
9.			D	Bank of Ohio	4266 86 99 5018	**p: May 2004: $197**
10			D	Bk I TX	4712 0207 0151…	**p: May 2004: $205**
11			D	Capital One Auto Finance	6206 2156 8765 2	b: June 2004
12			D	Fleet M/C	5487 8900 2018…	**p: May 2004: $172**
13			D	HSBC Bank USA	5215 3170 0105…	**p: February 04: $160**
14			D	MBGA/JC Penney	80246…	**p: *July* 2004: $57**
15			D	MBNA America Bank NA	7499 0999 89…	b: May 2004
16			D	MBNA America Bank NA	5329 0319 9996…	b: May 2004
17			D	W F Finance	1070 9031 772…	b: June 2004
18			D	First Premier Bank	4610 0780 0310…	**p: *July* 2004: $48**
19			D	Kaufmanns	R25243	b: April 2004
20			D	The Bon Ton	8601…	b: June 2004
21	Experian	July 26, 04	M	Capital One Bank	4862 3622 6671…	b: February 2004
22			M	Fleet M/C	5487 8900 2018…	**p: May 2004: $172**
23			M	MBGA/JC Penney	80246…	**p: *July* 2004: $57**
24			M	MBNA America Bank NA	4313 0229 9975…	b: May 2004
25			M	Kaufmanns	R25243	b: April 2004
26			M	The Bon Ton	8601…	b: June 2004
27	TransUnion	July 26, 04	D	Norwest Finance	1070 9031 7720 544	u: June 2004
28			D	First USA Bank.	4712 0207 0151 3292	u: April 2004
29			D	First USA Bank	4266 8699 5018 4134	u: April 2004
30			D	Summit Acceptance Corp	6206 2156 8765 2100 1	u: June 2004

	Credit reporting agency	Date of report	Person reported on	Credit card issuer	Credit card account no.	Date of: last activity=a; balance=b; update=u; payment=p & amount; or items as of date reported=i
31			D	Citi Cards	3480 0743 0593 0	u: July 2004
32			D	MBNA America	4313 0228 5801 9530	u: April 2004
33	TransUnion	July 26, 04	M	Discover Financial Svc	6011 0020 4000 6645	u: June 2004
34			M	Chase NA	4102 0082 4002 1537	u: May 2004
35			M	Citi Cards	3480 0743 0593 0	u: July 2004
36			M	JC Penney/MBGA	1069 9076 5	**p: July 2004**

59. These 36 accounts are by no means all those that the DeLanos have, just those for which those particular credit bureau reports as of July of last year provide a date under any of the categories of the last column of the table above and for which that date is in 2004. Nevertheless, they are enough to show that only an utterly biased person toward the DeLanos could even imagine that they did not receive any credit card statements so that they could no produce them to comply with the requests for those statements. They had no shortage of such requests: of April 20 and May 18 by Trustee Reiber; of August 14, September 29, and November 4 by Dr. Cordero; and the Order of July 26 of Judge Ninfo. Only a person utterly biased could disregard the fact that the DeLanos not only were billed, but also paid credit card charges as late as July 2004, the month when they requested those credit bureau reports. In fact, at the meeting of creditors held on February 1, 2005, at Trustee Reiber's office, Mr. DeLano admitted for the record that he currently uses and makes payments on his credit card issued by First Premier, no. 4610 0780 0310 8156.
60. Likewise, only a person utterly biased toward the DeLanos could assume that they no longer have any checking or savings accounts despite their reference in Schedule B to their having them with M&T Bank, where Mr. DeLano still works. Therefore, they must have received monthly statements of those accounts, which they could also have produced.
61. Consequently, they must be presumed to have concealed those statements. But if they did not have them in their possession, that would only mean that they systematically destroyed them. In so doing, they could have followed the example of their advisor, Att. Werner. He stated for the record at their examination that he destroyed documents that the DeLanos had provided him for the preparation of the petition and that he engages in that practice routinely. That constitutes a

flagrant violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519, found in Chapter 73-Obstruction of Justice and providing as follows:

> Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of…any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such…case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

62. In the same vein, the few credit card statements that they produced, and more so the credit bureau reports, show that the DeLanos were systematically engaged in a skip and pay pattern for juggling their astonishingly high number of credit cards. This follows from the Equifax reports of July 23, 2004, which show that the DeLanos failed to make the minimum monthly payment a staggering 279 times!

63. It follows that Att. Werner's assertion in that April 16 Statement to the Court that "The Debtors have maintained the minimum payments on those obligations for more than ten (10) years" was plainly untrue. If Att. Werner had conducted even a cursory inquiry, let alone a reasonable one under the suspicious circumstances of a bank loan officer that goes bankrupt owing $98,092 on unsecured credit cards, he would have readily realized that such a statement was untrue. Therefore, Att. Werner violated FRBkrP Rule 9011(b). As to the DeLanos, to the extent that they gave him that information, they intentionally misled him, the Court, and all the creditors and parties in interest.

64. Consequently, the DeLanos' 1) scores of credit card accounts; 2) their charging since "1990 and prior credit card purchase" (Schedule F) tens of thousands of dollars for "living expenses" (Att. Werner's written statement to the Court dated April 16, 2004) and for the two-year educational expenses of their two children at a low in-state tuition, near-home community college; 3) their systematic failure to make even the minimum payments, 4) their expert knowledge about the lending industry's handling of delinquencies and bankruptcies; and 5) their concealment of account statements that they indisputably received and were legally bound to keep, show that the DeLanos made the life-style choice to live it up on credit cards without ever intending to pay their unsecured issuers while concealing the whereabouts of the $291,470 that they earned in just the 2001-03 fiscal years according to their petition and their 1040 IRS forms.

65. Consequently, only a disingenuous person could pretend that the DeLanos did not produce the

requested documents because they did not have them in their possession. Moreover, only a person utterly biased toward them could disregard these facts about the conduct of the DeLanos for more than 15 years, since '1990 and prior years', and still refer to them, as Judge Ninfo did in his August 30 Order, as "honest but unfortunate debtors who are entitled to a bankruptcy discharge, because they have filed a good faith Chapter 13 case". How impartial can he appear to a reasonable observer?

2. Judge Ninfo has protected the DeLanos by requiring Dr. Cordero to prove his claim against Mr. DeLano and then allowing the latter, in disregard of the broad scope of discovery under FRCivP Rule 26, to allege self-servingly the irrelevancy of the requested documents to deny Dr. Cordero every single one, whereby the evidentiary hearing for Dr. Cordero to prove his claim will be a sham!

66. Confirming this favorable prejudgment of the DeLanos before they had ever taken the stand or even had their petition formally submitted to him by Trustee Reiber, Judge Ninfo stated in his Order of November 10, 2004, that he "in all respects denied…the Cordero Discovery Motion" of November 4, "because DeLano indicated in the Response [to Dr. Cordero's discovery request of September 29] that he had produced all documents which he has in his possession that are relevant to the Claim Objection Proceeding". This the Judge stated although Mr. DeLano did not provide a single document requested by Dr. Cordero! He just took Mr. DeLano's self-serving assertion at face value and purely and simply disregarded the facts and common sense.

67. Judge Ninfo made that decision by disregarding once more the rules. He did not even mention, let alone discuss, as judges do who apply the law, Dr. Cordero's argument in his November 4 motion about the broad scope of discovery under FRBkrP Rule 7026 and FRCivP Rule 26(b)(1), providing that "Parties may obtain discovery regarding **any matter**, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or **defense** of any party" (emphasis added). Based thereon, Dr. Cordero argued that he was entitled to defend against the DeLanos' untimely motion to disallow his claim, which led to Judge Ninfo's August 30 Order requiring him to take discovery from Mr. DeLano. His defense is dependent precisely on taking discovery that will allow him to establish, among other things, that the DeLanos' motion is a desperate attempt in contravention of FRBkrP 9011(b) to eliminate him from their case because he is the only creditor that objected to the confirmation of their Chapter 13 repayment plan and that has relentlessly insisted on their production of documents that can show whether they submitted their petition in bad faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(3) and are engaged in bankruptcy fraud, particularly

concealment of assets.

68. Had Judge Ninfo had any regard for the rules, he would not have uncritically sustained Att. Werner's wholesale denial in his October 28 Response to Dr. Cordero's discovery request on the pretense that "all of such demands are not relevant to the claim of Richard Cordero against the Debtors." Instead, he would have complied, as judges respectful of the legality do, with FRCivP Rule 26(b)(1), which provides that:

> …Relevant information **need not be admissible** at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (emphasis added)

69. Moreover, had Judge Ninfo not been so blind by his bias, he would have put two and two together to conclude that the DeLanos' avoidance for months of their duty to comply under 11 U.S.C. §521(3) and (4) with Trustee Reiber's document production requests to the point that the Trustee moved to dismiss for "unreasonable delay" constituted reasonable evidence that in refusing to provide even one single document requested by Dr. Cordero Mr. DeLano was engaging in the same conduct aimed at the same objective, namely, concealing documents to prevent the discovery of his bankruptcy fraud.

70. By Judge Ninfo forcing Dr. Cordero to take discovery of Mr. DeLano to prove his claim against Mr. DeLano without requiring the latter to overcome the presumption of validity attached to a properly filed claim under FRBkrP Rule 3001(f), only to deny him every single document requested, the Judge has made sure that Dr. Cordero is deprived of the means of examining effectively Mr. DeLano at the upcoming evidentiary hearing. Judge Ninfo has set up Dr. Cordero to fail at a hearing that will be a sham!

3. Judge Ninfo has protected from Dr. Cordero's discovery requests Mr. DeLano, who was the lender to David Palmer, whom the Judge also protected from Dr. Cordero's application for default judgment, thus raising the question whether Mr. DeLano is protected because the Judge's bias or because a 32-year veteran bank loan officer knows too much not to be protected

71. Mr. DeLano was the M&T Bank Officer who lent money for Mr. David Palmer to run his moving and storage company Premier Van Lines, which went bankrupt and gave rise to Pfuntner v. Gordon et al., in which both Mr. DeLano and Dr. Cordero are parties. Mr. Palmer too is a party in that case. He was supposed to store Dr. Cordero's property, but in fact abandoned it while he kept taking in his storage and insurance fees. Dr. Cordero served him

with a summons and complaint, which Mr. Palmer never answered. Consequently, Dr. Cordero served him with an application dated December 26, 2002, for default judgment for a sum certain under FRCivP Rule 55, made applicable by FRBkrP Rule 7055, and applied to Judge Ninfo for the entry of such judgment.

72. However, even after Mr. Palmer was defaulted by the Clerk of Court Paul Warren on February 4, 2003, the Judge would not enter such judgment. Instead, flatly contradicting the requirements of Rule 55, Judge Ninfo imposed on Dr. Cordero the obligation to conduct an "inquest" to establish loss or damage of his property. Dr. Cordero participated in such an "inquest" on May 19, 2003. At the hearing on May 21, it was established that there had been loss or damage of Dr. Cordero's property to the point that Judge Ninfo himself asked Dr. Cordero to resubmit his application for default judgment. Dr. Cordero did resubmit the same application on June 7. Nevertheless, at the hearing on June 25, 2003, Judge Ninfo would not enter it! He denied it by raising for the first time the pretext that Dr. Cordero had not proved how he had arrived at the sum claimed. Yet, that was the exact sum certain that he had claimed back in December 2002 and that the Judge had had six months to examine! (Cf. §§I.B. and C. of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 8, 2003.)
73. Why would Judge Ninfo ask him to resubmit the application, make him spend his effort, time, and money to do so while getting his hopes high if the Judge was going to deny it on the basis of an element that he had known for six months? Why did Judge Ninfo feel the need to become the advocate of defaulted Mr. Palmer and keep him away from his court rather than protect Dr. Cordero, whose property Mr. Palmer had lost or damaged through negligence, recklessness, and fraud? These questions are particularly pertinent because it was Mr. Palmer who had invoked the protection of the law by applying for voluntary bankruptcy on March 5, 2001, and thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Judge Ninfo, under which he still was. Why did the Judge not hold Mr. Palmer to his obligation under the law to answer a summons or let him contest for himself a default judgment, as he could do under FRCivP Rules 55(c) and 60(b)?
74. Therefore, how inconsistent for Judge Ninfo to state in his Order of August 30, 2004, that "…the Court is not aware of any evidence whatsoever, produced either in the Premier A[dversary]P[roceeding] or in the DeLano Case, that demonstrates that DeLano is legally responsible or liable for any loss or damage to the Cordero Property, if there in fact has been any loss or damage…". How can the Judge cast doubt on the fact of such loss or damage since

he so much acknowledged that there had been such that he asked Dr. Cordero to resubmit the application for default judgment?…only to deny it again! What this shows is that Judge Ninfo does not know what he has done and only knows that he will do and say anything so long as it is to protect the local parties and injure Dr. Cordero. (Cf. §II of Dr. Cordero's motion of November 3, 2003, in the Court of Appeals.)

75. This background provides the foundation for asking how much Mr. DeLano, as a party in the Pfuntner case and the lender to Mr. Palmer, knows that could incriminate others in bankruptcy fraud. In turn, this begs the question in how many other cases during his 32-year long career as a bank officer Mr. DeLano has been involved one way or another so that now he knows too much not to be protected. The same motives for Judge Ninfo to protect Mr. Palmer from Dr. Cordero's application for default judgment may explain why he is now protecting Mr. DeLano from Dr. Cordero's effort to obtain the documents showing his involvement in bankruptcy fraud. None of those motives, however, can legally justify Judge Ninfo's bias and prejudice against Dr. Cordero.

III. The totality of circumstances assessed by a reasonable person gives rise to the appearance of bias and prejudice on the part of Judge Ninfo that requires his recusal

76. Every assertion that Dr. Cordero has made in this motion or in his other papers referred to here has been supported either by citations and discussion of the applicable law and rules or facts established by other documents in the dockets of the cases under consideration (Table of References, infra). Moreover, in our system of justice a person can lose his property, his freedom, and even his life on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Hence, the approach taken by fair and impartial persons, whether they be judges, jurors, or observers, when examining evidence is, not to chip away at it by discarding its elements one by one out of context, but rather to take into consideration "the totality of circumstances" and analyze it from the point of view of the reasonable persons that the law requires people to be. Such persons would proceed on the sound principle that two similar events can be explained away as a coincidence, but three form a pattern.

77. In the DeLano case, just as in the Pfuntner case, Judge Ninfo, without citing a single law or rule, let alone discussing any, but rather disregarding their provisions as well as the surrounding facts and instead engaging in his very own "local practice" (§§9 et seq., supra), has made a series of

decisions that so consistently benefit the local parties and injure Non-local Pro se Dr. Cordero as to form a pattern of non-coincidental, intentional, and coordinated acts of wrongdoing and bias. This is the antithesis of process in accordance with law and constitutes a denial of due process (cf. §III of Dr. Cordero's motion of November 3, 2003, in the Court of Appeals).

78. In light thereof, would it appear to a reasonable person informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances of these cases that in the DeLano case generally, and at the upcoming evidentiary hearing in particular, Mr. DeLano or Dr. Cordero could say anything that would cause Judge Ninfo to reach any other but the forgone conclusion that Dr. Cordero has no claim against Mr. DeLano, that his claim should be disallowed, and that he has no standing to oppose the confirmation of the DeLanos' plan?…and good riddance! If so, the appearance of partiality has been reasonably questioned and Judge Ninfo has a statutory duty to recuse himself from the DeLano case. (Cf. §II of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 8, 2003.)

IV. Relief Requested

79. Therefore, Dr. Cordero respectfully requests that:
    1) in the interest of justice the DeLano case and the Pfuntner case, and at any rate the former, be removed under 28 U.S.C. §1412 to another district where a court unrelated to any of the parties or Judge Ninfo can give rise to the expectation that it will afford all parties a fair and impartial process, as presumably will do the U.S. court for the Northern District of New York in Albany (cf. §III of Dr. Cordero's motion of August 8, 2003);
    2) a report be made under 18 U.S.C. §3057(a) of these cases to U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for investigation into bankruptcy fraud; into concealment of assets and other bankruptcy offenses under 18 U.S.C. §152 et seq.; and of the trustees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §526(a)(1); and that it be recommended that the investigation be conducted by neither the U.S. Attorney's Office nor the FBI Office in Rochester or Buffalo, NY, but rather by such Offices whose personnel is not related to or familiar with any party in these cases, as presumably are the Offices in Washington, D.C., and Chicago;
    3) Judge Ninfo recuse himself from both cases, and at any rate from the DeLano case.

February 17, 2005

Dr. Richard Cordero

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TABLE OF REFERENCES

papers and documents referred to in the motion for Judge Ninfo to recuse himself of February 17, 2005, by Dr. Richard Cordero

1. ***Dr. Cordero**'s motion of **August 8**, 2003, **for** Judge **Ninfo** to remove the Pfuntner case and **recuse himself**
2. ***Dr. Cordero**'s motion of **November 3**, 2003, **to** the **Court of Appeals** for the Second Circuit for leave to file updating supplement of evidence of **bias** in Judge **Ninfo**'s denial of Dr. Cordero's request for a trial by jury
3. Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, Deadlines
4. Voluntary Petition of January 26, 2004, under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, with Schedules, of David DeLano and Mary Ann DeLano
5. Chapter 13 Plan of January 26, 2004
6. Dr. Cordero's Objections of March 4, 2004, to the confirmation of the DeLanos' Chapter 13 debt repayment plan
7. "Debtors' statement of April 16, 2004, in opposition to Cordero objection [sic] to claim of exemptions", submitted and filed with the court by Att. Werner
8. Dr. Cordero's Statement of July 9, 2004, in opposition to Trustee Reiber's motion to dismiss the DeLano petition and containing in the relief the text of a requested order
9. Dr. Cordero's letter of July 19, 2004, faxed to Judge Ninfo together with his:

   Proposed order for production of documents by the DeLanos and Att. Werner, obtained through conversion of the requested order contained in Dr. Cordero's Statement of July 9, 2004, to the court
10. Att. Werner's notice of hearing and order of July 19, 2004, objecting to Dr. Cordero's claim and moving to disallow it
11. Dr. Cordero's letter of July 19, 2004, faxed to Judge Ninfo together with his:
12. Proposed order for production of documents by the DeLanos and Att. Werner, obtained through conversion of the requested order contained in Dr. Cordero's Statement of July 9, 2004

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* Incorporated by reference.

13. Att. Werner's letter of July 20, 2004, to Judge Ninfo, delivered via messenger, objecting to Dr. Cordero's proposed order for document production

14. Att. Werner's letter of July 20, 2004, to Dr. Cordero accompanying the following document:

    Dr. Cordero's letter of July 21, 2004, faxed to Judge Ninfo, requesting that he issue the proposed order as agreed at the hearing on July 19, 2004

15. Judge Ninfo's order of July 26, 2004, providing for the production of only some documents but not issuing Dr. Cordero's proposed order because "to [it] Attorney Werner expressed concerns in a July 20, 2004 letter"

16. *Dr. **Cordero**'s motion of **August 14**, 2004, for **docketing** and issue, **removal**, referral, examination, and other relief, noticed for August 23 and 25, 2004

17. Judge Ninfo's Interlocutory Order of August 30, 2004, requiring Dr. Cordero to take discovery of his claim against Debtor DeLano arising from the Pfuntner v. Gordon et al. case on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

18. ***Dr. Cordero**'s motion of **September 9**, 2004, in the **Court of Appeals** for the Second Circuit to **quash** the **order** of Bankruptcy Judge John C. **Ninfo**, II, of August 30, 2004, to sever a claim from the case on appeal in the **Court of Appeals** to try it in the DeLano bankruptcy case, docket no. 04-20280

19. Dr. Cordero's letter of September 29, 2004, to Att. Werner requesting production of documents pursuant to Judge Ninfo's order of August 30, and without prejudice to Dr. Cordero's motion of September 9, to quash it in the Court of Appeals

20. Att. Werner's letter of October 28, 2004, to Dr. Cordero accompanying Mr. DeLano's Response to discovery demand of Richard Cordero-Objection to Claim of Richard Cordero, where discovery of every item requested is denied as not relevant and the item concerning Mr. Palmer is said not to be in Mr. DeLano's possession

21. Dr. Cordero's motion of November 4, 2004, to enforce Judge Ninfo's Order of August 30, 2004, by ordering Mr. DeLano to produce the requested documents and declaring that the Order does not and cannot prevent Trustee Reiber from holding a §341 examination of the DeLanos

22. Att. Werner's statement of November 9, 2004, to the court on behalf of the DeLanos to oppose Cordero [sic] motion regarding discovery and request that it be denied in all respects

23. Judge Ninfo's Order of November 10, 2004, denying in all respects Dr. Cordero's motion of November 4 and holding the hearing, noticed for November 17, to be moot

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* Incorporated by reference.