Judges do not read most briefs and dispose of most cases through the unresearched, reasonless, arbitrary, fiat-like orders contained in the dumping forms filled out and rubberstamped by clerks: *The math of abuse of power* shows it and can be used to expose it and lead an abuse intolerant, MeToo! public to demand that courts refund filing fees and pay damages, and that judges write reasoned opinions.‡

1. National public attention has been drawn to the judiciary by the nomination of a judge to the U.S. Supreme Court and the upcoming Senate confirmation hearings. So have decisions of individual federal judges, e.g., that suspending nationwide President Trump’s first Muslim ban travel; and those ordering his administration to reinstate DACA and terminate the separation of children from their parents.

2. In New York, the state judiciary drew attention to itself when it humiliated Gov. Andrew Cuomo by forcing him to withdraw his proposal in his January 2018 Budget Speech to the Legislature to increase the judiciary budget by 2.5% if the judges agreed to certify monthly that they had worked at least 8-hour days†. Because they close their courts without working even that minimum, they have given rise to a chronic backlog of cases and deny justice by delaying it.

3. When judges can tell the President and a governor what to do and not to do and that they will continue to ignore basic work requirements, what chance does the public have of forcing judges to do even the basic: read briefs and decide cases themselves by applying the law? None.

A. The enormous financial and emotional cost of briefs

4. If judges close their courts after working less than the minimum daily hours, why and where would they open briefs to read and work on them? They just do not read most briefs, causing parties to lose their financial and emotional investment in producing them.

5. Indeed, what gives rise to a case in court is a dispute between parties. They pay for the dispute resolution services offered by judges as public servants. The judges require that the parties file briefs setting forth the facts and legal arguments that justify the only section of the brief that matters to the parties because it is the one that has practical consequences for them: the “Relief Requested”. Each party asks the judges to relieve it of the dispute’s burden on it by issuing the orders to each of the parties that provide the greatest relief to the requesting party.

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† http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf >from OL2:394
6. To prepare their briefs parties must perform an enormous amount of work, which costs $Ks and even $10Ks. This is so whether they retain a lawyer or do the work themselves, for the hours that they invest working on their case represent their opportunity loss: the hours that they cannot employ doing something else. Likewise, the constant flow of emotional energy needed to prosecute or defend a case through its ups and downs for months or years has a wearing effect; it can be compensated by an amount of money.

7. Preparing a brief, whether for a case or a motion, includes, among other things:
   a. studying the underlying documents, e.g., contracts, ads, wills, emails, and researching the law to find the legal claims and defenses possibly available;
   b. learning the rules of procedure and evidence of the state or federal judiciary;
   c. finding the facts by gathering evidence through discovery, e.g., searching for documents and analyzing them; for witnesses and interviewing or deposing them; locating objects, e.g., financial accounts; inspecting premises, e.g., the place of the accident, and conducting their forensic examination; causing the medical examination of people;
   d. identifying expert witnesses, consulting with them, and studying their reports;
   e. once more law researching into the claims and defenses that will be asserted in the brief;
   f. studying the court’s own rules of procedure, with whose minutiae every party must comply, lest its brief be rejected by the filing clerk or objected to by the opposing party;
   g. writing the brief;
   h. compiling the record of supporting documents, including transcripts, which cost around $5.30 per page so that one hour’s worth of transcription can cost over $600;
   i. printing and binding the required number of copies;
   j. paying fees to file those for the judges and serve two on each party or its lawyer; and
   k. preparing for, and delivering, oral argument before the judges.

After all that exhausting and costly work, known to the judges, they do not read most briefs. They make it go to waste. Yet, they pretend that they reached a decision “upon reading the papers”, although they fail to disclose that they do not even have the material possibility of reading them.

B. Model for analyzing judges’ possibility of brief reading

8. The nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and their pool of clerks pick out of some 7,250 filings per year only some 78 cases to be heard and decided by written decisions. This is not a standard of service responsibly rendered in proportion to the known cost of brief production and filing fee. However, it provides a baseline for comparison with other courts’ statistics and the following model of analysis that you, the Reader, and others can undertake (see OL2:763§D¶18.b infra).

9. For example, the homepage of the NY State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (AD1) states the following:

   Over 3,000 appeals, 6,000 motions, and 1,000 interim applications are determined each year. In addition, the Appellate Division admits roughly 3,000 new attorneys to the Bar each year, disciplines practicing lawyers, and otherwise exercises its judicial authority in Manhattan and the Bronx. 2
10. AD1 judges also prepare and hold administrative and policy-making meetings; induct new judges; honor retiring ones; receive visitors from, or visit, other courts; etc. Some days they may be sick; busy with attorney registration matters; have a family emergency; attend seminars; serve on moot courts or the board of charities; etc. Work is cut back during the summer recess months.

11. The site shows that there are 19 AD1 justices. They serve on 5-justice panels. It can be assumed arguendo that only the equivalent to three panels can be deemed to work on 10,000+ pleadings 250 weekdays per year after excluding 10 holidays and weather days. Each panel is assigned 3,333+ pleadings a year or 13+ a day.

12. To handle 13+ pleadings in what is left of each 8-hour workday after deduction of the time allocated for oral arguments, panel deliberation, research and writing opinions, and discussion of the latter by the panel, which can lead to the writing of concurring or dissenting opinions, an AD1 justice would have to read:
   
   a. the briefs of 13+ appellants and 13+ respondents, each having up to 14,000 words or 70 pages, as provided for by AD1’s Rules of Procedure;
   
   b. any replies of appellants, which may have up to 35 pages or 7,000 words;
   
   c. even as few as 10 pages of each of 13+ records on appeal, each with 100s or 1,000s of pages;
   
   d. their motions and answers, and any replies, each with some 2,000 words or 10 pages, although the Rules do not limit their length;
   
   e. exhibits to motions, answers, and replies;
   
   f. some 10 pages of each of the 13+ decisions of the judges appealed from, although a judge can write a decision of whatever length; and
   
   g. any number of cases, laws, regulations, and legislative, expert, or corporate reports cited by the parties or found through the judge’s own research.

13. No judge can read over 1,500 pages a day each of 250 days. Neither can their clerks. Instead, the decisions downloadable from AD1’s website exhibit a pattern that supports probable cause to believe that the clerks dump pleadings out of the justices’ caseload by using a dumping form: Its top part provides blanks for identifying the parties and the appeal; its bottom part provides blanks for mentioning any one point picked out of the decision on appeal as the pretext for affirming it; followed by the word “Affirmed” and the rubberstamped signature of the clerk of court. “Denied” is how most motions are dumped. The “Relief Requested” is not discussed.

14. Clerks may not even be lawyers and were not vetted publicly. No provision of law allows justices to delegate judicial discretionary power to them. Clerks merely follow the justices’ dumping instructions uncritically. As instructed, they must disregard the uniqueness of the facts, the merits or novelty of the arguments, and the equities at stake. Hence, they must leave the status quo unchanged, which does not require them to consider the implications of changing it by reversing a decision or granting a motion, except for clerical matters, e.g., extending a filing date.

15. Dumping form disposition is unreasoned and thus, conclusory and arbitrary, a fiat that expediently dumps out a pleading; not a considered decision intent on rendering justice according to law. It is not the kind of dispute resolution service that the judges offered and the parties had demanded and paid for, thus forming a contract for services. See a deeper analysis of federal circuit courts’ statistics and their judges’ abuse, which can be applied to SCt. nominee Brett Kavanaugh.
C. Denial of due process and equal protection of law

16. Judges deny parties due process of law when they do not read their briefs. Thereby they:
   a. neither take notice of plaintiffs’ claims;
   b. nor afford defendants an opportunity to defend against them;
   c. nor identify the issues raised by the claims and requiring research to determine which party is legally entitled to which order requested in the “Relief”;
   d. nor can write an opinion stating their reasons for granting or denying each relief.

17. Also, judges deny most parties equal protection of the law, for those few whose disputes are bound to attract public scrutiny or are chosen as an opportunity to make law get their briefs read and a reasoned opinion discussing their claims and requested reliefs. Those few receive any value for the filing fees that they paid; the many had to pay them too and invested even $10Ks in their briefs but only get a dumping form on one 5¢ sheet, often printed on its front side only.

D. From attention on the judiciary to action to recover

18. “Outrageous!” is the reasonably expected reaction of the public upon learning that judges do not read most briefs. The outrage will be widespread because people file more than 50 million cases every year, to which must be added the parties to scores of millions of pending cases, and to the hundreds of millions of cases already decided; and their friends and family, workmates, etc. They form part of a national public with the self-assertive MeToo! attitude that shouts loud and clear the rallying cry: Enough is enough! We won’t take any abuse by anybody anymore.

19. They constitute the receptive audience of a commercially savvy media outlet that seized the opportunity to take the lead in showing them how not to take judges’ abuse. Through its investigation and publication of a series of articles and by sponsoring presentations and the development of a website as a rallying point the outlet can call for, and become a key organizer of:
   a. a national movement composed of ‘local chapters’ formed by actual and potential parties to cases before the same court, who join forces to demand that it refund their filing fees, pay damages, and use only reasoned opinions to resolve disputes filed with it;
   b. law and journalism students that demand that their schools offer seminars and research projects to audit the decisions of a court through statistical, linguistic, and literary analysis, and interview parties, judges, and clerks to ascertain the decisions’ quality and authorship, and expose judges’ and clerks’ performance in fact rather than in theory;
   c. unprecedented public hearings on judges’ abuse of power, conducted by publishers, news anchors, and journalism and law professors, and broadcast nationally and statewide to make it a decisive issue of the Senate confirmation hearings, and the mid-term and 2020 presidential campaigns, and force politicians to hold televised public hearings thereon.

20. A media outlet can issue an Emile Zola’s I accuse!-like denunciation of judges’ institutionalized abuse of power and accomplish what The New York Times did by publishing its exposé of Harvey Weinstein: set off a societal transformation here and abroad. We the People can realize that we are the masters of “government of, by, and for the people” (jur:82172), entitled to hold our judicial servants, like all other servants, accountable for their job, serving Equal Justice Under Law, and liable for their abuse. Just as NYT trailblazed sexual abuse exposure in the world and won a Pulitzer, that outlet can worldwide pioneer the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting. Dare trigger history...and you may enter it.

E.g., New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR); http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/lawssrch.cgi?NVLWO: >Laws of New York >CVP


A meticulous party would also check the law regulating the judiciary; e.g., http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc.pdf; as well as the rules of the chief administrator of the courts; e.g., https://www.nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/index.shtml.


E.g., http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/AD1/Practice&Procedures/rules.shtml, Rules 600.10. Format and Contents of Records, Appendices and Briefs; and 600.11. Perfecting and Hearings of Appeals; Calendars.

Id., Rule 600.15. Fees of the Clerk of the Court, a.5 and 6: The fee for filing an appeal in AD1 is $315 and for a motion it is $45. Under CPLR §8002(a), the cost of filing a Notice of Appeal is $65.


† OL2:457§D, 546

† OL2:719¶¶6-8. The Dissatisfied With The Judicial And Legal System form a huge audience.

† OL2:648, 660

† OL2:598, 719§C

† OL2:622, 746

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org with 24,450 subscribers at this moment,† OL2:app:5; 563

† OL2:274-280, 304-307

† OL2:729, which can be used to hold the first, national conference on judicial accountability.

† OL2:641, 644; *Lsch:23

*jur:131§b; † OL2:588

* OL2:60, 255; † OL2: 645§B, 687

*jur:10-14; † OL2:546, 548

† OL2:504, 724

*jur:7§5, 172

† OL2:725, 743, 745

† OL2:611§B, 688

† OL2:645; *jur:47§c
Overview of the presentation on unaccountable judges’ riskless abuse of power, the proposal for further research and investigation, and the issuance of an Emile Zola’s I accuse!-like denunciation to a MeToo! national public intolerant of any form of abuse so as to become its Champion of Justice Based on the study by Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., Exposing Judges’ Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Wrongdoing: Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting*

A. The math of judicial perfunctoriness reveals the judiciary as a fraud scheme

1. As a baseline for comparison, not as a standard of justice, there is the fact that the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and their pool of clerks pick out of some 7,250 filings per year only some 78 cases to be heard and decided by written decisions(↑>OL2:459§E). Compare that with what the homepage of the NY State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (AD1), states:

   Over 3,000 appeals, 6,000 motions, and 1,000 interim applications are determined each year. In addition, the Appellate Division admits roughly 3,000 new attorneys to the Bar each year, disciplines practicing lawyers, and otherwise exercises its judicial authority in Manhattan and the Bronx.2

2. AD1 judges also prepare and hold meetings to administrate and make policy, induct new judges, honor retiring ones, and receive visitors or visit other courts. Some days they may be sick, busy with attorney registration and disciplinary matters, have a family emergency, attend seminars, serve on moot courts, etc. Work is cut back during the summer recess months. So it can be assumed arguendo that out of AD1’s 19 judges, only the equivalent to three 5-judge panels can be deemed to work on over 10,000 pleadings 250 weekdays per year after excluding 10 holidays and weather days. So each panel handles more than 3,333 pleadings a year and more than 13 a day. This includes over 1,000 appeals compared to the 78 that nine Supreme Court justices dispose of annually.

3. To handle 13+ pleadings in what is left of each 8-hour workday after deduction of the time allocated for oral arguments, panel deliberation, and research and writing decisions, an AD1 judge would have to read a. the briefs of 13+ appellants, b. 13+ respondents, each having up to 14,000 words or 70 pages4; c. even as few as 10 pages of each of the 13+ records on appeal – each of which runs to hundreds or even thousands of pages of depositions and trial transcripts and other evidentiary documents–; d. their motions and answers, each with some 2,000 words or 10 pages; e. exhibits to each; and f. some 10 pages of each of the 13+ decisions of the judges appealed from. No judge can read over 1,500 pages a day each of 250 days. Neither can nor will their unappealable clerks.

4. In addition, determining a motion or appeal calls on judges to g. identify the relevant facts and controlling issues; h. research case precedent or statutory law; i. consider attenuating and aggravating circumstances; j. discuss them in light of legal principles and requirements; k. consider what only matters to a party, that is, each element of its “Relief requested”; l. state what most affects the court below on remand: the reversible error, why it was such, and how to remedy and avoid it; m. what concerns the court above on appeal: the implications of the reversal for future cases; and n. write a reasoned decision…13+ times a day! “Too much work. Forget a ‘bout it! Dump it by form!”

5. That is how judges ‘determine’ motions and appeals: They have clerks gavel the clerk of court’s signature rubberstamp on dumping forms: forms with the same wording whose blank is filled out by a clerk with only one operative word, mostly Denied, for a motion, or Affirmed, for an appeal.5

   Thereby neither the clerks nor the judges assume responsibility for changing the status quo while avoiding the need to read the pleadings and write an opinion and decision similar in quality to the answer that law students are expected to turn in to a question on a test at the end of the first semester.

of law school. But judges expect their decisions not to be ‘corrected’ by anybody. As AD1 puts it:

Since, with few exceptions, appeals to the Court of Appeals, the State’s highest court, are by permission only, the Appellate Division is the court of last resort in the majority of cases.²

6. So are terminated most motions and appeals: with one-disposition-fits-all, reasonless, mass-produced fiat on a dumping form.³ It is arbitrary because it disregards the merits of the case at hand. Individualizing elements are limited to the names of the parties and details that a clerk took from the Request for Appellate Division Intervention form, thus avoiding having to read the Statement of Facts of the parties. A complaint to the judges about pro forma disposition of cases gets the complainant nowhere since the clerks did simply what they were asked to do: dump most cases and allow the judges to work on the few that they like. Perfunctoriness is part of the courts’ modus operandi. So it is in the federal appeal courts, where 93% of appeals are dumped(OL2:457§D).

7. Judges come to ‘their’ courtrooms without having read motion pleadings despite their due process duty to afford an ‘opportunity to be heard’ through written statements. They do not ask of themselves the question ‘Are the parties ready?’ Though ignorant of the facts and issues, they make on-the-spot, off-the-cuff decisions, indifferent to how they will affect the property, liberty, and rights and duties that frame the parties’ lives: A reversal has no impact on their tenure, career, or salary.

1. Judges’ mutually assured survival results in extortionate complicity

8. Most appellate judges come from the ranks of trial judges. They are not going to turn against their former peers to criticize them for the same perfunctory work that they rendered while sitting with them in the courts below. Worse yet, they may be judges because of their affiliation with the same political party that put them on their electoral slate or that supported their appointment to the bench. They are not going to discipline, certainly not in public, a judge that belongs to the same party. Nor will they discipline a judge that belongs to another party, for an explicit or implicit reciprocal conniving agreement governs their relation: ‘If you don’t discipline the judges of my party, I won’t discipline yours’. Similarly, the judges of last resort will not hold the judges below accountable for their perfunctoriness, much less their wrongdoing. They are liable as principals or as accessories that have covered up for them(jur:88§§a-c), thus compounding their own wrongdoing.

9. Their ears ring with the threatening shout: ‘If you bring me down, I’ll take you with me!’ Their conduct is not guided by ethical principles or commitment to the integrity of judicial process(jur:68 123a). It is determined by the self-interest underlying mutually assured survival: ‘Today I protect you so tomorrow you and your friends protect me. Why should we mend our ways or denounce our perfunctoriness and wrongdoing?’ They are riskless, for we are unaccountable. The consequences of our conduct are borne only by litigants and the rest of the public. That’s their problem.’

10. This explains why in the last 228 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, the number of federal judges impeached and removed is 8!(jur:21§1) Yet, on September 30, 2015, the number of judicial officers on the federal bench was 2,293(jur:2213). They are not only unaccountable; in practice they are also irremovable. It does not matter what they do, to what standard of quality they do it, or what they fail to do. What adverse consequence imposed by whom could possibly deter them from being perfunctory or doing wrong? Their judgeship amounts to having a license to be where no person ought to be: They are Judges Above the Law, secure in jurisdictions that have become safe havens for perfunctory performers and wrongdoers. Mere litigants, all at their mercy, cannot bring them down to where they can be held accountable and liable.

2. A filing fee fraud scheme run by judges in their own interest

11. Judges have no scruples about going through the motions of judicial process without revealing to

* http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Adcvtes.pdf >all prefixes:# up to OL:393 OL2:609
filers that their $45 motion filing fee and their $315 appeal filing fee will get the majority of them only a perfunctory dumping form. For the payment of consideration in the form of such fees, filers enter with judges into a contract for “justice services” that the judges know will in most cases not be delivered. They not only fail to administer justice according to the rule of law, but also engage in false advertisement and the concealment of a pre-programmed breach of contract. They run in self-benefit a judicial system that is in effect only a fraud scheme. They deserve this criticism because they have failed their duty to ‘avoid even the appearance of impropriety’ (jur:68\textsuperscript{123b}, 44\textsuperscript{71}).

12. Even if judges are overworked, they have dealt with that problem wrongfully, as the math of their operation reveals: Judicial process is mostly only for show because judges have neither the time, nor the need, nor the will to do the work required to assure due process and the equal protection of the law to the majority whose cases are dumped by form. Only a few get fair and impartial process because judges expect their decisions in those cases to be scrutinized by the media and law journals; or strive to make them worthy of inclusion in law school casebooks and of their being considered for a higher court. It has been their duty of integrity (jur:68\textsuperscript{123a}) to inform the public thereof so that people could decide whether they wanted to gamble their effort, money, and hopes for a chance to win the offered dispute resolution services at the court cum rigged casino of justice.

13. Since judicial process is pro forma, judges should have suspended the fraudulent collection of fees; encouraged the parties to choose an alternative dispute resolution means; demand from politicians more funds to run a judiciary capable of delivering the offered “justice services”; and accept an external control system that holds them accountable for their delivery, thus recognizing that self-discipline is anathema to human nature: Nobody can be an unbiased judge in his own cause (OL2:548).

3. Judges’ and politicians’ mutually beneficial conniving relation

14. Instead, judges have in self-interest run their fraud scheme on the public knowingly and thus intentionally: They have abstained from demanding, not higher salaries (jur:27\textsuperscript{30}), but rather more funds to fix the system. They have thus spared the politicians who recommended, endorsed, nominated, confirmed or appointed them. In turn, politicians have abstained from withdrawing judges’ self-discipline authority and subjecting them to an outside system empowered to hold them accountable and liable to compensate the victims of their perfunctory and wrongful conduct. (jur:158 §§6-8)

15. However, politicians know from their status as legislators that unaccountability breeds wrongdoing. In fact, the rationale for exercising legislative power is that everything is permitted in a world without laws. That is the world of the dinosaurs, ruled by the fiercest T-Rex and his gang. A legislature exists to curb lawless freedom, establish standards of acceptable restricted conduct, and hold people accountable for abiding by them. A toothless law (jur:24\textsuperscript{13a}) is one that lacks any enforcement mechanism, means of breach detection, and punishment for breaching it. When politicians hold judges unaccountable, they accept the known consequences: judges’ riskless perfunctoriness and wrongdoing assisted by their immunized clerks, including padding their salaries by abusing their access to valuable information and their power to allocate assets in controversy (OL2:614).

16. Politicians condone judges’ conduct to avoid their retaliation. The latter includes holding their legislative agenda and signature pieces of legislation unconstitutional, which prevents politicians from delivering on their campaign promises and running on their achievements: P. Trump dare criticize federal judges and they suspended nationwide his Muslim travel ban (OL2:568\textsuperscript{8}C). So has arisen between judges and politicians mutually beneficial connivance. When politicians promise that they will work in the people’s interest in honest government and judges take the oath to uphold the law, although they connivingly fail to do so, they operate a joint fraud scheme on the people.

\textsuperscript{1} \url{http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf} >from OL2:394
B. Judges to issue their *I accuse!* or a *MeToo!* public to accuse abusive judges

17. Judges do not discharge their ‘duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary’(jur:57¶119) by merely abstaining from doing wrong as principals while being their accessories, who by looking the other way cover up for them and encourage them and others to do wrong(jur:90§§b-d). They must follow the historic example of Emile Zola, whose 1898 open letter *I accuse!* in the Dreyfus Affaire (jur:98§2) launched profound change in public servants’ wrongdoing exposure and accountability.

18. Chief Judge DiFiore(OL2:607) is an insider and as such in the know. So are her peers in the Conference of Chief Justices(613). She has recognized that the deficiencies in “justice services” warrant her “Excellence Initiative”1. They can discharge their integrity duty by individually or collectively issuing their *I accuse!* to a. denounce the unaccountability and riskless perfunctoriness and wrongdoing of the most powerful public servants in government by the rule of law, judges; thus b. cause the undertaking of what must precede any talk of reform: the full exposure of their wrongdoing’s nature, extent, and gravity, and their connivance with politicians; c. set off a flood of motions to recuse, disqualify, vacate, etc., that gives their Initiative and *I accuse!* the widest practical effect and publicity; d. inform the national public and outrage it(OL2:604) into forcing all candidates in the 2018 primaries and mid-term elections to put that issue at the center of their platforms, rallies, and townhall meetings; e. call for a generalized media investigation akin to those into Watergate, Russia’s tampering with U.S. elections, and Harvey Weinstein-like wrongdoers; f. lead the public to compel politicians to hold congressional and state televised hearings thereon; g. so intensify the outrage at judges-politicians’ fraud scheme as to generate enough public pressure to force Congress to do what it has avoided doing because it presents an existential threat to its members’ position of power and privilege in the national Establishment: convene the constitutional convention that since April 2014, 34 states have petitioned Congress to convene, meeting the requirement of Article V of the Constitution(jur:2212b); and h. therein lead to a new We the People-government relation. Thus Chief Judge DiFiore and/or any of her Conference peers can become transformative historic figures and be recognized nationally and abroad as the People’s Champions of Justice.

19. However, such course of events does not depend on those justices’ or any other judges’ courage and personal ambition to issue their *I accuse!* The People, the source of all political power in a democracy, can assert their status as the masters of all their public servants, including judges, and hold them accountable and liable. That is facilitated by today’s fast spreading self-assertive attitude that prompts women and men to accuse sexual abusers. They form the “MeToo!” public. Their attitude can extend to all kinds of abuse. It was manifested by Sen. Jeff Flake in his statement of civil courage, “I will not be complicit or silent” about P. Trump’s conduct. Emboldened by each other’s MeToo! self-assertiveness and outraged by information(OL2:599§2), ever more people can join and develop into a Tea Party-like single-issue civic movement(jur:164§9) so powerful as to change their system of governance: the People’s Sunrise(OL:201§1). For the first time in history, the People can assert their right to hold judges, as the latter do everybody else, accountable and liable while shouting “Enough is enough! We won’t take unaccountable judges’ abuse anymore”.

20. You, the Reader, can play a role in that movement. Dr. Cordero can explain how at a presentation.

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1. NYS Chief Judge Janet DiFiore: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/excellence-initiative/
2. Sup. Ct., Appellate Division, 1st Dept. website: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/AD1/index.shtml
3. See in-depth analysis of judicial statistics at *->jur:9-14; 21§§1-3; 105213; >OL2:455§§8-B-G; 548
5. a http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/AD1/calendar/appsmots/AppMotIndex.shtml; b OL2:546¶¶4-7

* http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Admvocate.pdf >all prefixes:# up to OL:393 OL2:611