

May 15, 2021

Why no credibility can be assigned to
either **Attorney General Judge Merrick Garland,**
who pretends that in his DoJ's police department investigations
"We will follow the facts and the law wherever they lead",
for he violated the law when
he dismissed 100% of complaints against fellow judges,
thus covering up their abuse complained about;
or **the Biden Commission on reforming the Supreme Court,**
whose overwhelming majority of members are
former law clerks to justices and judges,
bound by the confidentiality agreement that they signed with them; and
law professors,
whose schools compete for the prestige of having justices and judges
accept their students as clerks, teach as adjunct professors, and
serve on their boards and moot courts

Commissioners compromised by a conflict of interests
will produce an inherently biased, unreliable, and theoretical report.
Hence the proposal for students and journalists to hold

UNPRECEDENTED CITIZENS HEARINGS

Meantime, learn how to ask the Commission to
let the national public hear your story of abuse by unaccountable judges
and how to write it in up to 500 words[‡]

Professor Michael Ramsey
Member of the Biden Commission on reforming the Supreme Court,
the other members of the Commission, Info@PCSCOTUS.gov; tel. (202)501-1777;
professors, students, journalists, and Advocates of Honest Judiciaries

Dear Prof. Ramsey, Commission members, professors, students, journalists, and Advocates,

Thank you, Prof. Ramsey, for your reply to [the article](#) that I emailed to each commissioner
and the public at large, which bears the following summarizing title:

Candidate Biden had announced
the nomination of a commission to reform the court system;
President Biden has formed
a commission only to enlarge the Supreme Court and limit justices' terms.

Has Attorney General Judge Merrick Garland prevailed
to reduce the commission's scope so as to prevent any investigation into judges' conduct,
which would have exposed his unlawful 100% dismissal of complaints against fellow judges and
the consequent cover-up of his and their underlying abuse of power?

Exposing the connivance between the President and the Federal Judiciary
can bring down, not just a president, but rather a branch:
an unaccountable Judiciary risklessly running as a racketeering enterprise.

[Pitching a story](#) with Pulitzer Prize potential

In your reply, you pointed out the issues of resending the article and its credibility thus:

Dear Dr. Cordero, thanks for submitting your comments to me as part of the Commission on the Supreme Court. However, this is the third time you have sent me the essentially identical email. If you persist in this approach, I will have to regard your communications as spam. I might add, also, that this approach is not one that enhances your credibility.

Best regards
Michael Ramsey

My credibility is determined, not by the number of times that I email an article, but rather by the quality of my law research and writing, and strategic thinking, on which depend the reliability, understandability, and insight of its contents. I respectfully invite you to assess them by reading the new article hereunder.

A. Introduction: a Commission that runs away to write a new constitution

1. You, the commissioners, can follow the precedent for ‘a Commission that runs away’ from its mandate: The Articles of Confederation adopted in 1777 by the former 13 colonies and by then independent states entered into effect in 1781. They proved to be unworkable. So in 1787, the states chose delegates to convene to propose amendments. The delegates, including George Washington, presiding over the amending convention, and James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, tried unsuccessfully. Instead of becoming stuck with a doomed mandate, the delegates took a courageous and historic decision: They cast the Articles of Confederation aside and wrote a totally new constitution. It came into force in 1789 and has been in effect ever since.
2. That was 232 years ago! That Constitution was written by only free white landed men. They had a mentality completely different from ours, for they lived in a world completely different from the present one: a pre-industrial one that had no running water, electricity, electronic devices, cars, trains, never mind airplanes; no universal suffrage, education, health care, employee or tenant rights, etc. Since then, that Constitution has been distorted to make it fit by force an evolving world.
3. It is an anachronistic document. It represents ‘the dead man’s hand’ governing us from a world that passed away a long time ago. A dead man, not just a dummy, his lips have been manipulated by ventriloquists on the bench and lawyers before them to say things so repugnant to him and his contemporaries born centuries ago that none of them would have said even under torture that what they said in writing was ever intended to mean it: There is a right to abortion, same-sex marriage, freedom from slavery, privacy...Do you hear them screaming from their graves?:

The horror of it! May the Lord punish you in everlasting hell. Its fire sheds light so bright that it allows of no ‘penumbra’ where those rights could have been hidden. Only in the darkness of ignorance and dishonesty could disingenuously ‘enlightened’ men pretend that our Constitution contains those rights anywhere.
4. The Commission can end this ventriloquist farce. It can make us, *We the People*, the Masters of our Words by drafting a new constitution. It will allow us to speak for ourselves and to our needs.
5. The commissioners should muster the courage to run away from their mandate, to wit, to study ways of reforming the Supreme Court. If they do, they will not run alone. Rather, they will take the lead of the 34 states that since April 2, 2014, have petitioned Congress to call a constitutional convention, as provided for by the amending provisions of Article V of the [Constitution](#).
6. The commissioners would be wise to run away from their mandate because they cannot fulfill it

honestly: An attempt to fulfill it is an exercise in providing cover to a political party's predetermined decision to 'pack the Court' by increasing the number of justices and reducing their term in office in order to reestablish the balance of power in the Court. It is fanciful to think that the commissioners could demonstrate such wisdom in their study as to persuade that party to desist from its decision. The commissioners will end up being that party's dummy.

7. What is more, the commissioners cannot fulfill their mandate because the overwhelming majority of them were law clerks to judges, even to Supreme Court justices, and are law professors. As discussed below, to be allowed to clerk for them, they had to sign the judges' confidentiality agreements; and to obtain from them the glowing letters of recommendation that would make or break their careers they did anything and everything that the judges and justices asked them to do.
8. As law professors they are under pressure from their schools never ever to speak ill of federal judges, who have a life-appointment; the long memory to hold grudges that goes along with it; and crushing power of retaliation as individuals and as a class; e.g.:
 - a. Federal District Judge Gonzalo Curiel was presiding over the Trump University case. In June 2016, Candidate Trump did not like one of his decisions and referred to him disparagingly as "the so-called judge of Mexican heritage", who could not be impartial because Trump wanted to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. He kept campaigning on issuing a ban on Muslim immigration travel. Upon receiving more than 62.5 million votes and becoming president, he issued that ban as one of his first executive orders in 2017.
 - b. Yet, Federal District Judge James Robart of Seattle, Washington State, suspended P. Trump's Muslim travel ban *nationwide* and a panel of three circuit judges –although two would have sufficed– sustained the suspension *nationwide*. As then-Judge, now-Justice Neil Gorsuch put it: "An attack on one of our brothers and sisters of the robe is an attack on all of us". What an unambiguous, unabashed expression of judges' **gang mentality!**
 - c. Subsequently, federal judges and even justices together with their state counterparts ruled against or dismissed at least 86 cases filed by Trump and his allies challenging the 2020 presidential election results.
9. It follows that the commissioners have a conflict of interests: To propose ways of reforming the Supreme Court, they would have to apply the practical model used by Congress: It investigates the issue claimed to need legislation, e.g., by holding public hearings thereon; makes findings of facts; and relies on them as the justification for writing a bill of law.
10. The commissioners cannot expose the conduct in practice, rather than in theory, of judges without revealing that the judges for whom they clerked committed illegal and unethical acts and improprieties (Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 2, which enjoins judges 'to avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety'). The judges engaged in such conduct under cover of their confidentiality agreement with the clerks and their dismissal of 100% of complaints against them, discussed below. Judges' abuse of power is riskless. By contrast, for the commissioners to expose it is fraught with risk. They are compromised.
11. The commissioners can honestly resolve their conflict of interests by 'running away' from a mandate that is a dishonest attempt at political manipulation rather than an honest means of justice reform. They can write a new constitution. Therein they can enable *the People* to strip their judicial public servants of self-ensured unaccountability and hold them to the same equal treatment of compensation for being abusive or incompetent as judges do police officers, priests, lawyers, doctors, and everybody else...except themselves.

12. If you, the commissioners, do so, you will not continue to be former clerks and professors among thousands of them, but will become the ‘parents’ of a historic constitution that brings about transformative change in the system of justice: It goes in as it was framed in 1789, but comes out a different one appropriate for those living today. That will earn you recognition here and abroad as the *Peoples’* Champions of Justice.

B. Resending an email to overcome the interception by judges of people’s emails and mail to detect and suppress those that are critical of judges

13. We all suffer from information overload. Nobody can read all the emails that they receive. So senders, including me, resend their emails: to increase the odds that recipients will read them. Publishers too ‘resend’ their articles when they publish them, not in dailies, but in weeklies, monthlies, or periodicals on display in the stands for two, three, or four months, as professional journals are. TV operators ‘resend’ reruns to distribute and lower their cost per broadcast. Similarly, I resend my emails to distribute the enormous investment of time and effort needed to research and write them.
14. The very first words of my articles make up a note encouraging recipients to acknowledge receipt of the article thereunder. If I do not receive such acknowledgment, I resend them the article.
15. Most importantly, I resend them because of the factual and statistical probable cause to believe that federal judges [intercept the emails and mail](#) of people to detect and suppress those of their critics.
16. The judges’ motive is to prevent criticism of their [abuse of power](#) from so [outraging](#) the public as to force both law enforcement authorities, e.g., the FBI and its state counterparts, to investigate judges; and Congress to conduct hearings that can lead to legislation holding judges accountable.
17. The judges’ means to intercept is their vast, nationwide computer network and expertise, which handle daily hundreds of thousands of filings and retrievals of pleadings, motions, records, petitions, etc.; updating of dockets; issuance of orders and decisions; etc., whether entered or requested by court clerks, lawyers, or parties with access to their Case Management/Electronic Case Filing ([CM/ECF](#)) or Public Access to Case Electronic Records ([PACER](#)) systems.
18. The judges’ opportunity to intercept presents itself, for instance, when under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Title 50 of the [U.S. Code](#) of federal laws, sections 1801 et seq. ([50 USC §§1801 et seq.](#)), the National Security Agency (NSA) and other intelligence agencies secretly request judges to issue secret orders of secret surveillance. Judges grant up to [100% of those requests](#) (>Ln: 212, 263, 269). Judges and those agencies do what since the first impeachment of President Trump officers at the highest level of government are known to do or suspected of doing: enter into quid pro quos.
19. Their willingness to break the law if they think that they can get away with it was indisputably illustrated by the NSA: It secretly and illegally recorded the metadata of scores of millions of phone calls, as revealed by the documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013.
20. In this context, note that the [United States Postal Service](#) handles [429.9 million letters and packages every day](#) and serves [161.4 million addresses](#) in the country. Yet, it has the means of offering the [Informed Delivery](#) service, whereby it sends each of its 33 million registered customers every day an email with the photo of the address side of every letter and package to be delivered to their address that day. [High resolution X-ray scanners](#) and multiline Optical Character Recognition (OCR) readers enable the reading of letters without opening their envelopes.
21. Federal judges have a strong motive to take advantage of their means and opportunity to break the law because thereby they can increase their gain and convenience. Indeed, a public officer as

knowledgeable about financial matters as Sen. Elizabeth Warren has **dare denounce** in her "I have **a plan** for the Federal Judiciary too" how federal judges fail to recuse themselves from cases in which they own stock in a company that is a party to the case before them in order to resolve the ensuing conflict of interests in their favor to protect or increase their stock's value. Sen. Warren refers to such practice throughout the Federal Judiciary as judges' abusive self-enrichment. She attributes it to their **unaccountability**.

22. The evidence of judges' unaccountability is presented and discussed in:

- a. my three-volume study* † ♣ of judges and their judiciaries, which is based on professional law research and writing, and strategic thinking. The study is titled and downloadable thus:

Exposing Judges' Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Abuse of Power:

Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability and abuse reporting* † ♣

* Vol. 1, >all prefixes:# up to OL:393; † Vol. 2, >from OL2:394-1143; ♣ Vol. 3, >from OL3:1144

- i. Open the downloaded files using **Adobe Acrobat Reader**, which is available for free.
- b. the articles that I have written and posted to my website **Judicial Discipline Reform** at <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org>. They have attracted so many webvisitors and the latter have reacted to them so positively that **38,740+** have become subscribers to it as of June 3, 2021 (**Appendix 3**).
 - 1) How many law firms, never mind lawyers, do you know who have a website with so many subscribers?
 - 2) You can join the subscribers thus: go to <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org> <left panel ↓Register or +New or Users >Add New.
 - 3) To invest in the commercial development of the site, see its **business plan**, which is guided by the motto "Making Money While Doing Justice".

1. Judges intercept and self-enrich as they ensure their unaccountability

23. Federal judges break the law because it is riskless for them to abuse their power for their protection and self-enrichment. Indeed, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (**28 USC §§351-364**), any person can file a complaint against a federal judge in the court of appeals of the circuit, or the national court, where the judge sits.
24. The **official statistics** on complaints against federal judges are collected and submitted to Congress (§604(a)(3-4)) as a public document in the **Annual Report** of the Director of the **Administrative Office** of the U.S. Courts. The director is appointed by the Supreme Court Chief Justice (§601).
25. Each complaint is first reviewed by the chief circuit judge. To protect their fellow judges, chief judges **systematically** dismiss 100% of complaints and deny, together with the other judges on the judicial council (**28 USC §§332**) of their respective circuit, 100% of petitions to review dismissals.
 - a. For the judges, the **Code of Conduct** for U.S. Judges has no bearing on whether a complaint should be investigated. They proceed in self-interest to disregard the Code as a matter of institutionalized policy. It follows that extending its field of application to the justices would be an exercise in either inexcusable ignorance or intentionally misleading pretense.
26. This is what President Biden's Attorney General, Judge Merrick Garland, did during his 2013-2020 7-year term as chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in

Washington, DC. Thereby [Chief Judge Garland](#) covered up his fellow judges' abuse of power complained about and collected IOUs to ensure that whenever he was the target of a complaint, he too would be protected.

27. By so doing, he knowingly advanced his personal and judicial class interest while leaving complainants [uncompensated](#) and the rest of litigants and the public at the mercy of judges held unaccountable and free to risklessly continue abusing their power.
28. He did so while Then-Judge, Now-[Justice Brett Kavanaugh](#), who served on that Court for the 2006-2017 11-year period kept silent about such illegal abrogation in practice of that Act of Congress. So did Then-Judge, Now [Justice Sonia Sotomayor](#) while on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Then-Judge, Now-[Justice Neil Gorsuch](#) while on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; and Then-Judge, Now-[Justice Amy Coney Barrett](#) while on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. [Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.](#), has known about judges' [institutionalized policy](#) of complaint dismissal and review petition denial, and has covered it up.
29. Now as Attorney General, Judge Garland cannot expose his fellow judges and justices as abusers of power without risking exposure for his abuse of power. His credibility is compromised. That is why he will not investigate judges' interception of people's emails and mail to detect and suppress those of their critics.
30. Critics can only keep resending their emails in an attempt to overcome such interception. They must also denounce this most outrageous abuse of power, for it infringes on Americans' most cherished rights, namely, those under the U.S. [Constitution](#), First Amendment, guaranteeing their "freedom of speech, of the press, the right of the people peaceably to assemble [through the Internet and on social media too], and to petition the Government [of which judges are the third branch] for a redress of grievances [including compensation for waste and fraud]".

C. Attorney General Judge Garland has no credibility to investigate police departments

31. Attorney General Judge Merrick Garland gave his first and exclusive interview since taking office as AG to ABC News Chief Justice Correspondent Pierre Thomas on Monday, April 19, 2021. In his report on it on the PBS [Washington Week](#) episode of Friday, April 23, 2021, he included a clip where AG Judge Garland says, "Racism is an American problem. We do not yet have equal justice under law and as I said, I think this is an important part of the role of the Justice Department" (DoJ). Accordingly, he has opened a wide-ranging DoJ investigation of police departments.
32. On Monday, April 26, [CBS Evening News](#) anchor Norah O'Donnell introduced a report by correspondent Jeff Pegues containing a clip where AG Judge Garland says that 'the Department of Justice's "investigation will include a comprehensive review of the Louisville [, Kentucky] police department's policies and training" in the wake of its police officers' botched execution of a warrant, which resulted in the killing of Breonna Taylor in her own bed. "We will follow the facts and the law wherever they lead", he added.
33. It is reasonable to assume that among the thousands of complaints filed with chief circuit judges, such as AG Judge Garland himself was at the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit until February 11, 2020, there have been, are, and will be complaints against judges whom complainants have charged and will charge with bias toward police officers and departments accused of abusing their power.

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INVESTIGATION

WHETHER LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT:

- ENGAGED IN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
- UNLAWFULLY EXECUTED SEARCH WARRANTS
- USED UNREASONABLE FORCE



ATTORNEY GENERAL
MERRICK GARLAND

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BREAKING NEWS

DOJ PROBES LOUISVILLE POLICE AFTER BREONNA TAYLOR SHOOTING

© CBS EVENING NEWS WITH NORAH O'DONNELL

CBS Evening News, April 26, 2021
North Carolina city in state of emergency after deadly police shooting; Volunteers making
Watch CBSN Live
59H AGO

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34. It is reasonable to expect that just as Judge Garland dismissed 100% of complaints against fellow

judges without referring them for investigation to the special committees provided for under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act(28 USC §353), he will now as Attorney General continue to protect his own, whether it be himself, his fellow judges, the Federal Judiciary, his Department of Justice, or his boss, i.e., President Biden, by covering up those complaints through their exclusion from his DoJ investigation of police departments.

35. AG Judge Garland has shown that it is in his character to show reckless disregard for “the facts and the law” by systematically steering all complaints into dismissal from 'wherever they would have led' in order to ensure for his fellow judges ‘unequal justice under law’ to the detriment of abusees. It follows that he has no credibility to lead fairly and impartially any “important part of the role of the Justice Department”, especially any investigative part intended to ensure “equal justice under law”.



D. A Commission composed of former law clerks and current law professors has no credibility to study how to reform the Supreme Court

36. For the Commission to be credible it must not only discuss the theory of constitutional law, but also investigate the running in practice of the Supreme Court and the conduct of its justices as well as those of the lower courts and their judges, whom they supervise. Otherwise, the Commission

will only be a thinly disguised device for one political party to “pack the Court” by increasing the number of justices from 9 to 15 in the expectation that by nominating and confirming the new justices, the party will give itself a majority in the Court for one or two generations.

37. However, an investigation of the Court and its justices cannot be fair and impartial if it is undertaken by commissioners who were law clerks to judges and justices so that they have an interest in not exposing the abuse of power of these judicial officers, including their peers and colleagues, because by so doing the commissioners would implicate themselves in the enforcement of these officers’ abuse or its cover-up.
38. The clerks became accessories before and after the illegal and unethical conduct and improprieties in which judges and justices engaged as principals or as their masterminds.
39. Nor can a fair and impartial investigation be conducted by law professors who have an interest in not compromising their standing in their schools by exposing the abuse by judges, who would in retaliation diminish the schools’ prestige by not teaching there as adjunct professors, not serving on their boards and moot courts, and neither referring nor accepting their students for law clerkships. When those schools and their members appeared in their courts, it would be payback time for judges, who would unmistakably scream through their rulings ‘*Don’t you ever mess with us!*’

1. Commissioners are compromised by the confidentiality agreement with, and the letter of recommendation from, judges

40. Judges have two effective means of compelling law clerks to act as enforcers of their abuse, whether by committing it upon their order or covering it up, which includes keeping quiet about it: the confidentiality agreement that clerks must sign before they begin their clerkship; and the letter of recommendation that they need from the judge at the end of it in support of their application for their next job.
41. Law clerks are recently graduated law students -unless they are summer clerks after their first or second law school year-, most are young, and practically all are saddled with a crushing student loan. They clerk for a judge for one year before getting their first regular law job. So they are professionally and financially vulnerable.
42. It is prestigious to clerk for a judge because judges can choose the best candidate –a Supreme Court justice hires three– among the many who apply.
43. So, prospective clerks are not in a position to bargain with judges over the contents of the confidentiality agreement that judges require them to sign. It is an adhesion contract: take it or leave it.
44. While the contents of such agreements are not standard, they require basically the same: ‘whatever you learn during your clerkship that if disclosed can harm the judge or his peers, colleagues, or third parties, you keep it to yourself; and if you disclose it, you consent to paying the judge a liquidated amount of X; three times the value of any benefit that you receive for disclosing it; and whatever is necessary to compensate the judge for any harm, including loss of reputation’.
45. Fellow judges have similar confidentiality agreements with their own clerks and the same interest in having them upheld for their benefit. If a judge goes against another judge sued by his clerks, e.g., by invalidating their agreement, she becomes branded as treasonous and unreliable. The other judges do not want to take the risk of being ‘betrayed’ by her, whatever the matter may be. So she becomes a pariah among them. It is socially, professionally, and emotionally wearing to be so branded among peers and colleagues, especially if they have a life-appointment.

46. It follows that clerks stand no chance of winning against a judge if they challenge the agreement. So they keep quiet. But that does not mean that judges allow them to become passive bystanders.
47. On the contrary, the clerks must do what judges tell them to do: The clerks become the enforcers of judges' abuse. They become compromised by their confidentiality agreement and their own crass personal interest.
48. In fact, clerks are paid a modest salary because a complement comes in the form of a glowing letter of recommendation at the end of the clerkship. It can earn a clerk a sign-up bonus from her new employer worth scores of \$1,000s -a clerk to a justice commands a bonus worth around \$250,000-.
49. The bonus is paid to acquire something valuable from the clerk: precious knowledge of the workings of, and sources of information in, a court, where decision-making judges interact with each other, lawyers, and third parties. The salary that a clerk earns in her first job after her clerkship establishes the floor for future salaries.
50. A lackluster letter of recommendation has a profound and long-term injurious impact on the career of the clerk, branding him a persona non grata in that court, or any other court for that matter, or incompetent as a lawyer. That is what a clerk gets if she dare complain about any abuse by the hiring judge or even any other judge. Judges do not reward 'whiners', never mind whistleblowers.
51. If a clerk complains in a way that the hiring judge alleges to be in breach of the confidentiality agreement, the judge can bring suit, most likely under seal, before his fellow judges. They decide any motion by the clerk for their own recusal...and then find for the hiring judge without even reading his brief. The clerk loses as a result of the judges' implicit or explicit mutual protection agreement.
52. It took some 700 hundred letters sent to Chief Justice Roberts by former and current law clerks complaining about judges' abuse and their use of confidentiality agreements and letters of recommendation as means of forcing clerks into submission for the Chief to set up a commission to study the matter.
53. The [commission](#) went through the motions; the [judges have kept dismissing](#) 100% of complaints and denying 100% of dismissal review petitions.
54. It does not take a suit for judges' to have their peremptory warning bounce between their clerks' ears and render them totally submissive:

We are judges; **we have *all the power!***...

you are nothing.

2. Commissioners that are law professors have an interest in not exposing judges' abuse

55. Law [professors](#) have every interest in not telling their students about their illegal or unethical conduct and improprieties as law clerks: They run the risk of breaching their confidentiality agreement with judges (arguably void or voidable for lack of meeting of the minds since they could not reasonably have expected to be required to conceal or engage in illegal and unethical conduct; and judges' breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
56. They also risk incriminating themselves and rendering themselves liable to third parties. They need not confess what they did as enforcers of judges' abuse. If they exposed what happens in judges' chambers and among judges, third parties could put together what might have happened to them while those professors were clerking for judges. The third parties would subpoena the professors

as witnesses or even name them as defendants.

57. But the professors need not be former law clerks to realize that it is not in their professional interest to expose judges' abuse. Law professors are employees and even officers of their law schools. So the latter and the former are bound by a principal-agent relation.
58. Professors also stand in a position of power over their students and are a source of trusted advice because of their superior knowledge, experience, and connections. So they are bound by a fiduciary duty to their students.
59. Professors' failure to warn students about how judges would compel them upon becoming their clerks to act as enforcers of their abuse provides current and former [students](#) with the predicate for suing both the professors and the schools.
60. This gives schools a motive to pressure their professors into not exposing abuse by judges or any abusive judge. The schools could fire them for concealing material information about their clerkship, that is, information that would have led the schools, acting as reasonable persons in the best interest of their institution and their students, to reach a different or adverse decision on employing them.
61. Accordingly, by law professors keeping silent, they derive the benefit of avoiding the adverse consequences of embarrassing their schools and making them the target of judges' devastating power of retaliation.
62. By speaking up to place students as clerks in prestigious judgeships and justiceships they benefit from becoming more valuable to their schools by enhancing the latter's reputation. Professors do so to the knowing detriment of students.
63. This satisfies the general notion of fraud: The making of a known misrepresentation to obtain a benefit to the known detriment of the target of the misrepresentation. This gives students causes of action against professors for fraud and breach of their fiduciary duty; and supports a claim for compensation for the harm thus suffered. Schools could sue professors for fraud in the inducement to being hired.

3. The Biden Commission will be a prop for political manipulation with no substantive reform

64. The public is at the mercy of abusive judges and those who cover for them. The latter include, as shown above, law clerks and professors. They are compromised. Thus, the public should know whether they are nevertheless the very ones who make up the overwhelming majority of the Biden Commission. If so, the public is justified in asking:
 - a. In what way can the public reasonably expect to benefit from the Commission if it is composed of people who have an interest adverse to the public's, namely, to protect abusive judges and conceal the fact that they are their protectors?

Source: [Announcement of P. Biden Commission on the U.S. Supreme Court](#); April 9, 2021

1.	Name of Commissioner	Current status	Former law clerk to:
2.	Bob Bauer, co-chair	Professor of Practice, New York University (NYU) School of Law	n/a (information not available in the Announcement)

3.	Cristina Rodriguez, co-chair	Professor of Law, Yale Law School	Judge David S. Tatel, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
4.	Michelle Adams	Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law	Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV in the Southern District of NY
5.	Kate Andrias	Professor of Law, University of Michigan	Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg; J. Stephen Reinhardt, Court of Appeals 9 th Cir.
6.	Jack M. Balkin	Professor of Law, Yale Law School	n/a
7.	William Baude	Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School	Judge Michael McConnell and Chief Justice John Roberts
8.	Elise Boddie	Professor of Law, Rutgers University	Judge Robert L. Carter, Southern District of NY
9.	Guy-Uriel E. Charles	Professor of Law, Duke Law School	Judge Damon J. Keith, 6 th Circuit
10.	Andrew Manuel Crespo	Professor of Law, Harvard University	Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Court of Appeals, 9 th Cir.; Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan
11.	Walter Dellinger	Emeritus Professor of Law, Duke University	Justice Hugo Black; has argued 25 cases before the Supreme Court
12.	Justin Driver	Professor of Law, Yale Law School	Judge Merrick Garland, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (Ret.), and Justice Stephen Breyer
13.	Richard H. Fallon, Jr.	Professor of Law, Harvard Law School	Judge J. Skelly Wright; Justice Lewis F. Powell
14.	Caroline Fredrickson	Professor of Law, Georgetown Law	J. James L. Oakes, Ct. of Appeals 2 nd Cir.
15.	Heather Gerken	Dean and Professor, Yale Law School	n/a
16.	Nancy Gertner	Professor of Law, Harvard Law School	Former US District Court Judge (D. Mass.); Justice Luther Swygert, Chief Judge, 7 th Circuit
17.	Jack Goldsmith	Professor of Law, Harvard Law School	
18.	Thomas B. Griffith	Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School	Former Judge at the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit; served on the Code of Conduct Committee of the Judicial Conference
19.	Tara Leigh Grove	Professor of Law, Alabama School of Law	Judge Emilio Garza of the Court of Appeals 5 th Cir.
20.	Bert I. Huang	Professor of Law, Columbia University	Justice David H. Souter; Judge Michael Boudin, Court of Appeals 1 st Circuit
21.	Sherrilyn Ifill	Former Professor of Law, U. of Maryland School of Law; President & Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)	n/a
22.	Michael S. Kang	Research Professor, Northwestern School of Law	Judge Kanne, Court of Appeals 7 th Circuit
23.	Olatunde Johnson	Professor of Law, Columbia Law School	Judge David Tatel, Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit; Justice John Paul Stevens

24.	Alison L. LaCroix	Professor of Law, Chicago Law School	n/a
25.	Maggie Lemos	Professor of Law, Senior Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, and faculty co-advisor for the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law School	Judge Kermit V. Lipez, Court of Appeals 1 st Circuit; Justice John Paul Stevens
26.	David F. Levi	Professor of Law and Judicial Studies, and Director of the Bolch Judicial Institute, Duke Law School; President of the American Law Institute	Judge Ben C. Duniway, Court of Appeals 9 th Cir; Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.; former Chief U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of California
27.	Trevor Morrison	Dean and Professor of Law, NYU School of Law	Judge Betty Fletcher, Court of Appeals 9 th Circuit; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
28.	Caleb Nelson	Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law	Judge Stephen F. Williams, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; Justice Clarence Thomas
29.	Richard H. Pildes	Professor of Law, New York University School of Law	Justice Thurgood Marshall; Judge Abner J. Mikva, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; has represented numerous clients before the Supreme Court
30.	Michael D. Ramsey	Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law	Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Court of Appeals 9 th Cir.; Justice Antonin Scalia
31.	Kermit Roosevelt	Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School	Judge Stephen F. Williams, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; Justice David H. Souter
32.	Bertrall Ross	Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law	Judge Dorothy Nelson, Court of Appeals 9 th Ninth Cir.; Judge Myron Thompson, District Court Middle District, Alabama
33.	David Strauss	Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Supreme Court and Appellate Clinic, University of Chicago	argued 19 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court
34.	Laurence Tribe	Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University	clerked for the California and U.S. Supreme Courts; argued 35 cases in the U.S. Supreme Court
35.	Adam White	Assistant professor of law, George Mason University's Law School	clerked for the Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit
36.	Keith E. Whittington	Professor of Politics, Princeton University	n/a
37.	Michael Waldman	President of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law	n/a

65. Thanks to their experience as law clerks and their superior knowledge as professors, the commissioners have actual and imputed knowledge of judges' abuse.
66. For instance, law clerks know –and all the more so those who were members of the justices' 'pool of clerks' that recommend the grant of petitions to review on appeal lower court decisions–, that the justices grant on average only 1 out of every 93 petitions given that their jurisdiction is discretionary: In their discretion, the justices grant certiorari...while in their exercise of unaccountable power they grant themselves an annual three months' vacation, unheard of whether in the public or the private sector.

67. As a result, circuit judges know that the chances of their appealed decisions being taken up for review by the justices are minimal. But even if review were granted, the justices did the same when they were circuit judges so that they are not going to implicitly criticize themselves by sustaining the charges in the review petition.
68. This allows circuit judges to have their clerks use 5¢ **dumping forms** to dispose, according to the statistics, of **93% of appeals**(>OL2:457§D) in decisions “on procedural grounds [mostly the catch-all pretext of “lack of jurisdiction”], unsigned, unpublished, by consolidation, without comment”.
69. They are unresearched, reasonless, ad-hoc, arbitrary, fiat-like orders. They are unappealable in practice, for there is barely anything to appeal other than their only operative words: "affirmed", if it is a decision appealed from, or "denied", if it is a substantive motion, as opposed to a procedural one, e.g., to extend a filing date. That is how judges have their clerks, who have no judicial authority and cannot receive it by delegation, maintain the status quo without the judges themselves having to do anything.
70. The \$1Ks and even \$10Ks that each party to an appeal to a court of appeals must spend to research, write, print, bind, serve, file, and argue its case **go to waste**. Only the remaining 7% get a written opinion from circuit judges with a semblance of disposition on the merits.
71. The merits are of no concern when it comes to cases filed by parties without the assistance of lawyers, that is, pro se. The Annual Report to Congress of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts states that they are weighed as **a third of a case**(>OL2:455§B). This means that judges are not only authorized to give it only one third of the attention and time that they give a regular case, but also are expected not to waste any more than that on a pro se case regardless of the nature, extent, and gravity of the controversy that it deals with. Yet, a pro se party must pay the same filing fee as a rich party that can afford the most expensive law firm.
72. These are concrete examples of how judges with the **help of clerks** commit *unequal* treatment under law. The justices know about this inequality and abuse, not only because most were lower court judges, but also because under **28 U.S.C. §42** they have been allotted as circuit justices with supervisory duties to one or more circuits. In fact, “The circuit justice...shall have precedence over all the circuit judges and shall preside at any session which he attends”(§45(b)). Duty-bound to supervise the judges in their circuits, circuit justices have imputed knowledge of judges’ abuse; and would have actual knowledge thereof if they had proceeded with due diligence to do so.
73. This shows that neither justices nor judges care about the theoretical constraints that due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment are supposed to impose on them. ‘Possession of riskless power is 95% of judges’ conduct’.
74. Their former law clerks and now law professors know and should know that pro ses and 93% of all parties in the courts of appeals will get, not justice, but rather dumped out of court by the judge-ordered and clerk-enforced perfunctory process and unequal treatment. However, they keep quiet about it and pretend when teaching students, dealing with their clients, and addressing the public that it makes sense to go to court because the judges, supervised by the Supreme Court, will administer to the parties justice in accordance with due process of law.
75. The commissioners cannot reveal that the judges' official statistics and reports themselves show that this is not so. If they did, they would implicate themselves in having enforced the judges' and justices' abuse and misrepresented them as honest public servants and private persons. One can assume that they remember with fear what judges have tattooed on their foreheads to give each other and their clerks a constant warning of their complicity: ‘If you let anybody take me down, ///

bring you with me!

76. This generates a conflict of interests that deprives the commissioners of the capacity to meaningfully contribute to reforming the Supreme Court by investigating justices' conduct in practice, rather than merely discussing it in theory. Compromised, the commissioners will neither directly nor indirectly investigate judges' abuse of power. If they hold public hearings at all, they will demand that prospective witnesses submit in advance a statement of their intended testimony and use it to exclude from the hearings –and from the documents supporting their report- those who would tell a negative story of judges' conduct, not in theory, but in practice.
77. So, the commissioners' activities will be pro forma and their report a whitewash of the Court and themselves. Through them the commissioners will commit fraud on the public: benefiting from being praised for their work while knowingly harming the public by keeping it subject to judges' unaccountability and consequent riskless abuse of power. The credibility at stake is their own.

E. Unprecedented citizens hearings to do what the commissioners will not do: expose judges, force their resignation, and bring down their judiciaries

78. [Law students](#) together with students of journalism are among the best and the brightest. They can join forces among themselves and with journalists and [media](#) outlets to expose judges' abuse of power by holding unprecedented citizens hearings (described in greater detail [here](#) & [OL3:1318](#)).
79. [Students and journalists](#) can hold citizens hearings via video conference, a means with which Covid and Zoom have familiarized the whole world. Thereby they can afford everybody an inexpensive opportunity to tell their stories of abuse by judges that they have suffered or witnessed until something emerges: patterns of judges' abuse and abuse articulated in complex forms, that is, [schemes](#).
80. They can reveal judges' abuse to be so systematic as to be their modus operandi; and so coordinated as to be their means of running their judiciaries for their abusive self-enrichment and convenience as [racketeering enterprises](#).
81. So revealing abuse will have fateful consequences: It will launch a generalized investigation of judges abuse. On professional and commercial grounds, other students and journalists, including citizens journalists as well as other members of academic communities, will want to jump on the investigative bandwagon. Its direction can be guided by an incisive question:

What did you know about judges' abuse and when did you know it?

82. That question is an adaptation of the one asked from 1973 on by Sen. Howard Baker, co-chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee. It had a damning effect, forcing the resignation of President Nixon on August 8, 1974; and leading to the imprisonment of all his White House aides. This is described by *Washington Post* reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in their bestseller *All the President's Men* and the homonymous blockbuster movie.
83. Today, that question can bring down, not just men, but rather a branch of government: the unaccountable and abusive Federal Judiciary. It is the model for its state counterparts. They would follow suit.

F. Actions requested from the commissioners and the other addressees

84. Therefore, I respectfully request that:

- a. you, the commissioners, publicly acknowledge that your confidentiality agreements, the letters of recommendation, and your current status in your schools have given rise to a conflict of interests that impairs your credibility as fair and impartial examiners of the Supreme Court acting in good faith to attain the intended purpose of reforming it;
- b. each of you resign from the Commission;
- c. if you stay on the Commission, you muster the personal and civic courage to publish jointly and severally an Emile Zola's *I accuse!*-like denunciation of judges' unaccountability and riskless abuse of power, just as Sen. Elizabeth Warren did (supra ¶21);
- d. you provide public access on your website to all submissions, including those critical of judges, the Commission, and its members, just as the official statistics showing judges **dismissing 100%** of complaints, and documents filed in civil and criminal court, including indictments, and with the Senate Subcommittee on **Judicial Nominations**, are public;
- e. you hold public hearings where everybody has the opportunity to tell the national public their story of the abuse of power by judges that they have suffered or witnessed;
- f. you share this article with all students in your schools and the rest of your universities and encourage them to hold the proposed **unprecedented citizens hearings**;
- g. you use your good offices to cause the publication of this article by a national publisher, bringing to their attention the precedent for the transformative change that an article can bring about: *The New York Times* and *The New Yorker* published their exposés of the abuse by Harvey Weinstein on October 5 and 10, 2017, respectively. Within a week the *MeToo!* movement erupted worldwide. Public accountability in practice began to change substantially everywhere and in every aspect of society.
 - 1) An article exposing the conduct in practice of judges, before whom police brutality cases are brought, and given the widespread Black Lives Matter mood, can provoke **public outrage**. It can set off a generalized academic and media investigation into judges. It can start a trend in our country and the rest of the world.
 - 2) The findings of the investigation can lead to transformative reform, causing one or all justices to resign, as Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas had to on May 14, 1969; former 9th Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski on December 18, 2017; and 3rd Circuit Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, the sister of President Donald Trump, on February 11, 2019.
 - 3) Hence, the article can be instrumental in toppling the Federal Judiciary, exposed as a **racketeering enterprise**. The whole system of justice could be reformed in its substance here and abroad.
- h. you and all other addressees make public your '1st Amendment grievance redress petition': Let everybody with a story of abuse by judges suffered or witnessed be heard and **compensated**.
- i. to that end, you all share both your petition and this article with your friends and relatives, and post them to social media, such as:

Facebook, Youtube, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Instagram, Google plus, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, and Twitter: Join the petition that the Biden Commission on Supreme Court reform hear publicly all stories of abuse by judges and report on how to hold them &

judiciaries accountable & liable to compensation; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Biden_Sct_reform_Commission.pdf

- j addressees take advantage of [the two-phase method](#)(>§G) for writing their story in up to 500 words; and submit it together with their petition and this article to the commissioners by pasting in the To: box of their email this bloc of their email addresses (to which mine is added for reference):

cristina.rodriguez@yale.edu, robert.bauer@nyu.edu, kandrias@umich.edu,
jack.balkin@yale.edu, RBauer@perkinscoie.com, baude@uchicago.edu,
madams@yu.edu, charles@law.duke.edu, acrespo@law.harvard.edu,
wdellinger@omm.com, ecb95@law.rutgers.edu, justin.driver@yale.edu,
rfallon@law.harvard.edu, heather.k.gerken@yale.edu, ngertner@law.harvard.edu,
jgoldsmith@law.harvard.edu, tgriffith@law.harvard.edu, bhuang@law.columbia.edu,
mkang@northwestern.edu, ojohns@law.columbia.edu, lacroix@uchicago.edu,
lemos@law.duke.edu, michael.waldman@nyu.edu, trevor.morrison@nyu.edu,
cnelson@law.virginia.edu, mramsey@SanDiego.edu, krooseve@law.upenn.edu,
bross@law.berkeley.edu, d-strauss@uchicago.edu, tribe@law.harvard.edu,
development@naacpldf.org, awhite36@gmu.edu, kewhitt@princeton.edu,
caroline.fredrickson@georgetown.edu levi@law.duke.edu, Info@PCSCOTUS.gov
tgrove@law.ua.edu, rick.pildes@nyu.edu, DrRCordero@Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org

- k. after having heard us, *the Masters of our Living World*, you, the commissioners, run away from your mandate and draft a new constitution that sets forth our current notions of rights and duties, and power to hold our judicial public servants accountable for their performance and liable to compensate the victims of their abuse.

G. My offer to present this article to you and your guests

85. I offer to make a presentation of this article to the commissioners, professors, students, journalists, and Advocates via video conference or, if here in New York City, in person. You may assess my capacity to make such presentation by watching my [video](#) and following it on its [slides](#).

H. Every meaningful cause needs resources for its advancement; none can be continued, let alone advanced, without money

Put your money
where your outrage at abuse and passion for justice are.

DONATE to
Judicial Discipline Reform

to support its professional research and writing, strategic thinking, and sending and resending its articles; see also its [business plan](#) guided by the motto “Making Money While Doing Justice”,

by making a deposit or an online transfer to Citi Bank,
routing number 021 000 089, account 4977 59 2001

through **Paypal**, https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=HBFP5252TB5YJ

or by mailing a check to the address in the letterhead above.

Dare trigger history!...and you may enter it.

Appendixes

**Every meaningful cause needs resources for its advancement;
none can be continued, let alone advanced, without money**

1. If you are interested in bringing Judges Above the Law and their judiciaries down to the level where every other person is held accountable and liable to compensate the victims of their abuse of power because All Are Equal Before the Law, support Judicial Discipline Reform in its:
 - a. professional law research and writing, and strategic thinking([†]>OL2:445§B, 475§D); and
 - b. implementation of its business plan(OL2:914) by, to begin with, turning its informational website at <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org> into a profit center that offers:
 - 1) **a clearinghouse** for complaints(OL2:918) about judges that anybody can upload for free; and
 - 2) **a research center** for fee-paying customers to audit(*>OL:274-280, 304-307) many complaints in search of(*>jur:131§b, OL:255) the most persuasive type of evidence, i.e., patterns([†]>OL2:792§A), trends(OL2:455§B), and schemes(OL2:614, 929, 457§D) of abuse of power, including the coordinated fraudulent filing by judges and approval by other judges of mandatory annual financial disclosure reports(jur:102§a and ^{213b}) under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978(jur:65^{107d}), which are intentionally misleading in order to conceal assets, evade taxes, and launder money, such as the money grabbed by judges through their self-enrichment denounced by Sen. Warren in her “plan” to hold them accountable for it(OL2:998).

**Put your money
where your outrage at abuse and
passion for justice are.**

DONATE
through

PayPal

https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=HBFP5252TB5YJ

or at the **GoFundMe** campaign, <https://www.gofundme.com/expose-unaccountable-judges-abuse>

Offer of a presentation

2. Dr. Cordero offers to present via video conference or in person his business plan and program of activities(OL2:978§E) to you and your guests. To reach him and discuss the presentation's terms and conditions and its scheduling, you may use the contact information in the letterhead above.
3. To decide whether to organize such presentation watch his video as you follow its slides([†]>OL2:958) using these links:

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_video.mp4

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_slides.pdf

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_introduction_video_slides_judges_abuse.pdf

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-richard-cordero-esq-0508ba4b>

Dare trigger history!([†]>OL2:1003)...and you may enter it.

[†] http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_Honest_Jud_Advocates2.pdf

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New York City

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Exposing
Judges' Unaccountability
and
Consequent Riskless Abuse of Power

Pioneering the news and publishing field
of
judicial unaccountability reporting

A three-volume study of judges and their judiciaries that exposes their coordinated abuse of power as their institutionalized modus operandi; and promotes a generalized media investigation and unprecedented citizens hearings that inform and so outrage the national public as to stir it up to assert its right as *We the People*, the Masters of all public servants, including judicial public servants, to hold judges accountable for their performance and liable to compensate the victims of their abuse

VOLUME I:

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf

Volume II:

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates2.pdf


Volume III:

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL3/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates3.pdf

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<input type="checkbox"/>	 1Barret1cuple	—	tornado102034@hotmail.com	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 1oftheman	—	terree@comcast.net	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 365betv31h	—	yana.negrebetskaya.95@mail.ru	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 3aplus63von	—	sam@3aplus63.ru	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 791064087357326	—	daniellacarroll@mailcatch.com	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AaaBEvick	—	a21@play.quakeclub.com	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AAAGlennbeish	—	umbainvro@viagraforsale.monster	Subscriber	0
<input type="checkbox"/>	 AaaPiopsy	—	enn.max.to.y@gmail.com	Subscriber	0
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June 2, 2021

Links to individual files, each containing one of the articles in the three-volume study* † ♣ of judges and their judiciaries:‡

Exposing Judges' Unaccountability and Consequent Riskless Abuse of Power:
Pioneering the news and publishing field of judicial unaccountability reporting* † ♣

- * Volume 1: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates.pdf
- † Volume 2: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates2.pdf
- ♣ Volume 3: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL3/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates3.pdf

Many of the articles have also been posted to the website of

Judicial Discipline Reform

at <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org>.

Visit the website and join its 38,724+ subscribers to its articles thus:
homepage <left panel ↓Register or + New or Users >Add New.

A. Articles available for review, downloadable as individual files

1. *>jur:10; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_complaint_dismissal_statistics.pdf for all circuits
2. http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_collected_statistics_complaints_v_judges.pdf
 - Cf. a. jur:11: while Then-Judge, Now-Justice Sonia Sotomayor served on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_complaint_dismissal_statistics.pdf
 - b. OL2:546; while Then-Judge, Now-Justice Neil Gorsuch served on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_hearings_JGorsuch_complainants&parties.pdf
 - c. OL2:748; Judge Brett Kavanaugh, Chief Judge Merrick Garland, and their peers and colleagues in the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed 478 complaints against them during the 1oct06-30sep17 11-year period; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_JJ_Kavanaugh-Garland_exoneration_policy.pdf; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_table_exonerations_by_JJ_Kavanaugh-Garland.pdf
 - d. OL2:1176; while Then-Judge, Now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett served on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_JgACBarrett_condonation_judges_power_abuse.pdf
 - e. OL3:1229; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-JudgeRPratt.pdf> and <https://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/content/senior-district-judge-robert-w-pratt>
 - f. OL3:1237 on exposing attorney general designate Judge M. Garland; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_media_exposing_judges.pdf
 - g. Template to be filled out with the complaint statistics on any of the 15 reporting courts:

* http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL3/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates3.pdf >from OL3:1144
 *.../OL/... >all prefixes:# up to OL:393 †.../OL2/... >from OL2:394-1143
 † http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_individual_files_links.pdf

http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_template_table_complaints_v_judges.pdf

3. *>jur:65; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_abuse_by_justices.pdf
4. jur:122; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judicial_unaccountability_brochures_report.pdf
5. jur:130; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_Institute_judicial_unaccountability_reporting.pdf
6. *>Lsch 5; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Deans_professors_students.pdf
7. *>Lsch:13; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_dynamic_analysis&strategic_thinking.pdf
8. http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/DoJ-FBI/9-2-3DrRCordero-FBI_Corruption_Unit.pdf
9. *>DeLano Case Course; dcc; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_Syllabus.pdf
10. *>Creative writings, cw; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_creative_writings.pdf
11. *>OL:42; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_law_research_proposals.pdf
12. *>OL:158; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_no_judicial_immunity.pdf
13. *>OL:180 http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_turning_judges_clerks_into_informants.pdf
14. *>OL:190; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_institutionalized_judges_abuse_power.pdf
15. *>OL:255; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-university_law_research.pdf
16. *>OL:274; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_auditing_judges.pdf
17. *>OL:311; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-presidential_candidates.pdf
18. *>OL:440; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-IT_investigate_interception.pdf
19. OL2:433; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_Yahogroups.pdf
20. OL2:452; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Deans_professors_students.pdf
21. OL2:453; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judicial_accountability_presentation.pdf
22. OL2:468; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_turning_court_clerks_into_informants.pdf
23. †>OL2:546; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_complaint_dismissal_statistics.pdf;
see also infra OL2:792; see the supporting official statistical tables of the federal courts at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/statistics&tables/statistical_tables_complaints_v_judges.pdf
24. †>OL2:548; table of 100% complaint dismissal and a100% dismissal review petitions denial while Then-Judge, Now-Justice Neil Gorsuch served on the 10th Circuit; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_hearings_JGorsuch_complainants&parties.pdf
25. OL2:567; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-The_Dissatisfied_with_Judicial_System.pdf
26. OL2:608, 760; **article using official court statistics to demonstrate “the math of abuse”**: neither judges nor

clerks read the majority of briefs, disposing of them through 'dumping forms', which are unresearched, reasonless, arbitrary, ad-hoc fiat-like orders on a 5¢ rubberstamped form; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_do_not_read.pdf

27. OL2:614; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_how_fraud_scheme_works.pdf
28. OL2:760; see OL2:608
29. OL2:768; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Congress.pdf>
30. OL2:773; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Harvard_Yale_prof_students.pdf
31. OL2:781; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_intercepting_emails_mail.pdf
32. OL2:792; Complaint filed with Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-SupCt_CJ_JGRoberts.pdf
33. OL2:799; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-RepJNadler.pdf>
34. †>OL2:821; Programmatic presentation on forming a national civic movement for judicial abuse of power exposure, redress, and reform; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_programmatic_presentation.pdf
35. OL2:840; <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-LDAD.pdf>;
36. *>OL2:879; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_Black_Robed_Predators_documentary.pdf
37. OL2:901; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-LDAD.pdf>
38. OL2:918; File on the complaint's journey –from OL2:792– until its final disposition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-11Circuit.pdf>
39. OL2:929; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-IT_investigate_interception.pdf
40. OL2:932; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-ProfRPosner.pdf>
41. OL2:947; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-media.pdf>
42. OL2:951; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_citizens_hearings.pdf
43. OL2:957; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_video.mp4
44. OL2:957; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_slides.pdf
45. OL2:971; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Professors_students_journalists.pdf;
http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Professors_students_lawyers.pdf
46. OL2:983; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_introduction_video_slides_judges_abuse.pdf
47. OL2:991; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_on_SenEWarren.pdf
48. OL2:997; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_SenEWarren_plan_judges.pdf
49. <https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/restore-trust?source=soc-WB-ew-tw-ro>
50. OL2:1003; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-media_DARE.pdf
51. OL2:1006; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_pitch-Media.pdf

52. OL2:1022; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Capital_Investors.pdf
53. OL2:1027; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_SenEWarren_plan_judges.pdf
54. OL2:1032; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_international_exposure_judges_abuse.pdf
55. OL2:1037; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_out_of_court_inform_outrage_strategy.pdf
56. OL2:1040; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-parties_invoking_impeachment_trial.pdf
57. OL2:1045; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Professors_Students_Journalists.pdf; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Professors_students_lawyers.pdf
58. *>OL2:1051; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_citizen_hearings.pdf
59. OL2:1056; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-reporters_clerks.pdf = http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_sham_hearings.pdf
60. OL2:1066; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_adapting_to_new_legal_market.pdf [sent to LexisNexis]
61. OL2:1073; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_inform_outrage_be_compensated.pdf
62. *>OL2:1081; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_intercepting_emails_mail.pdf = <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-LexisNexis.pdf>
63. OL2:1084; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Thomson_Reuters.pdf
64. OL2:1090; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-SZarestky_Above_the_Law.pdf
65. *>OL2:1093; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Washington_Post.pdf
66. OL2:1101; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-judicial_abusees&publishers.pdf
67. OL2:1104; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Hiring_manager.pdf
68. OL2:1108; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-International_Team.pdf
69. OL2:1116; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_research_documents&sources.pdf
70. OL2:1119; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judicial_abuse_forms.pdf
71. OL2:1125; exposing the Federal Judiciary as a racketeering enterprise; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Reuters_judges_investigation.pdf
72. *>OL2:1134; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Talkshow_hosts_coalition.pdf
73. OL2:1144; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_your_story_for_Reuters.pdf
74. OL2:1154; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-American_Thinker.pdf
75. *>OL2:1164; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Center_Public_Integrity.pdf; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_abuse_of_power.pdf
76. *>OL2:1168; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_joining_forces_making_allies.pdf
77. *>OL2:1172; http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_judges_exposure_election_justice.pdf
78. *>OL2:1; http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_coalition_to_expose_judges.pdf

79. *>OL2:1176; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_JgACBarrett_condonation_judges_power_abuse.pdf
80. OL3:1187; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-LDAD_repairing_democracy.pdf
81. OL3:1197; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_citizens_hearings.pdf
82. *>OL2:1205; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Reuters_Law_Firm_Council.pdf
83. *>OL2:1212; agenda for video conference; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_preparing_video_conference.pdf
84. OL2:1221; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-News_Directors_on_judges_abuse.pdf
85. OL3:1228; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_emails_mail_intercepted_by_judges.pdf
86. OL3:1229; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-JudgeRPratt.pdf> and <https://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/content/senior-district-judge-robert-w-pratt>
87. OL3:1237; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_media_exposing_judges.pdf
88. OL3:1243; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_talkshow_hosts_coalition.pdf
89. OL3:1246; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-CLEs_lawyers_media.pdf
90. <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-NYCBar.pdf>
91. OL3:1253; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_exposing_Judge_Garland&judges.pdf; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_actions_to_expose_judges_abuse.pdf
92. OL3:1257; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Guardianship_Abuse_Symposium.pdf; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_exposing_judges_power_abuse.pdf
93. OL3:1273; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Guardianship_Abuse_Symposium_slides.pdf
94. OL3:1283; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_facts_&_strategic_thinking.pdf
95. OL3:1291. http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-ProPublica_&_media.pdf
96. OL3:1301; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Biden_ScT_reform_Commission.pdf
97. OL3:1318; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero_citizens_hearings_outrage_compensation.pdf
98. OL3:1323; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Honest_method_for_writing_your_story.pdf

B. Subjects of a series of articles based on the study* † ♣ of judges and their judiciaries

99. judges' unaccountability(*>OL:265) and their riskless abuse of power(*>jur:5§3; OL:154§3);
100. statistical analysis for the public(†>OL2:455§§B-E, 608§A) and for researchers(jur:131§b);
101. significance of federal circuit judges disposing of 93% of appeals in decisions **"on procedural grounds [i.e., the pretext of "lack of jurisdiction"], unsigned, unpublished, by consolidation, without comment"**, which are unresearched, reasonless, ad-hoc, arbitrary, fiat-like orders, in practice unappealable(OL2:453);

102. to receive ‘**justice services**’(OL2:607) parties pay courts filing fees, which constitute consideration, whereby a contract arises between them to be performed by the judges, who know that they will in most cases not even read their briefs(OL2:608§A), so that courts engage in false advertisement, fraud in the inducement, and breach of contract(OL2:609§2);
103. Justiceship Nominee N. Gorsuch said, “**An attack on one of our brothers and sisters of the robe is an attack on all of us**”: judges’ gang mentality and abusive hitting back(OL2:546);
104. fair criticism of judges who fail to “**avoid even the appearance of impropriety**”(jur:68^{123a});
105. abuse-enabling clerks(OL2:687), who fear arbitrary removal without recourse(jur:30§1);
106. law clerks’ vision at the end of their clerking for a judge of the latter’s glowing letter of recommendation(OL2:645§B) to a potential employer morally blinds them to their being used by the judge as executioners of his or her abuse;
107. judges dismiss 99.82% of complaints against them(jur:10-14; OL2:548), thus arrogating to themselves impunity by abusing their self-disciplining authority(jur:21§a);
108. escaping the futility of suing judges(OL2:713, 609§1): the out-of-court inform and outrage strategy to stir up the public into holding them accountable and liable to compensation(OL2:581);
109. how law professors and lawyers act in self-interest to cover up for judges so as to spare themselves and their schools, cases, and firms retaliation(jur:81§1): their system of harmonious interests against the interests of the parties and the public(OL2:635, 593¶15);
110. turning insiders into Deep Throats(jur:106§C); outsiders into informants(OL2:468); and judges into criers of ‘*MeToo! Abusers*’(OL2:682¶¶7,8) that issue an *I accuse!*(jur:98§2) denunciation of judges’ abuse: thinking and acting strategically(OL2:635, 593¶15) to expose judges’ abuse by developing allies who want to become Workers of Justice(OL2:687), as opposed to being enforcers of abuse or enablers by endorsement or willful ignorance or blindness;
111. two unique national stories, not to replace a rogue judge, but to topple an abusive judiciary:
 - a. *Follow the money!* as judges grab(OL2:614), conceal(jur:65^{107a,c}), and launder(105²¹³) it;
 - b. The Silence of the Judges: their warrantless, 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, and assembly-violative interception of their critics’ communications(OL2:582§C);
 - 1) made all the more credible by Former CBS Reporter Sharryl Attkisson’s \$35 million suit against the Department of Justice for its illegal intrusion into her computers to spy on her ground-breaking investigation and embarrassing reporting(OL2:612§b);
 - 2) the exposure of such interception can provoke a scandal graver than that resulting from Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA’s massive illegal collection of only non-personally identifiable metadata(OL2:583§3);
 - 3) the exposure can be bankrolled as discreetly as Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, bankrolled the suit of Hulk Hogan against the tabloid Gawker for invasion of privacy and thereby made it possible to prosecute and win a judgment for more than \$140 million(OL2:528);
 - 4) principles can be asserted and money made by exposing judges’ interception;
112. launching a Harvey Weinstein-like(jur:4¶¶10-14) generalized media investigation into judges’ abuse of power as their institutionalized modus operandi; conducted also by journalists and me with the benefit of the numerous leads(OL:194§E) that I have gathered;

113. *Black Robed Predators*(OL:85) or the making of a documentary as an original video content by a media company or an investigative TV show, with the testimony of judges’ victims, clerks, lawyers, faculty, and students; and crowd funding to attract to its making and viewing the crowd that advocate honest judiciaries and the victims of judges’ abuse of power;
114. promoting the unprecedented to turn judges’ abuse of power into a key mid-term elections issue and thereafter insert it in the national debate:
- a. the holding by journalists, newsanchors, media outlets, and law, journalism, business, and IT schools in their own commercial, professional, and public interest as *We the People’s* loudspeakers of nationally and statewide televised citizens hearings(OL2:675§2, 580§2) on judges’ unaccountability and consequent riskless abuse;
 - b. a forensic investigation by Information Technology experts to determine whether judges intercept the communications of their critics(OL2:633§D, OL2:582§C);
 - c. suits by individual parties and class actions to recover from judges, courts, and judiciaries filing fees paid by parties as consideration for ‘justice services’(OL2:607) offered by the judges although the latter knew that it was mathematically(OL2:608§A; 457§D) impossible for them to deliver those services to all filed cases; so the judges committed false advertisement and fraud in the inducement to the formation of service contracts, and thereafter breach of contract by having their court and law clerks perfunctorily dispose of cases by filling out “**dumping forms**”(OL2:608 ¶ 5);
 - d. suits by clients to recover from their lawyers attorneys’ fees charged for prosecuting cases that the lawyers knew or should have known(jur:90§§b, c) the judges did not have the manpower to deliver, or the need or the incentive to deal with personally, whereby the lawyers committed fraud by entering with their clients into illusory contracts that could not obtain the sought-for ‘justice services’; and
 - e. suits in the public interest to recover the public funds paid to judges who have failed to earn their salaries by routinely not putting in an honest day’s work, e.g., closing their courts before 5:00 p.m., thus committing fraud on the public and inflicting injury in fact on the parties who have been denied justice through its delay(cf. OL2:571¶24a);
115. how parties can join forces to combine and search their documents for communality points (OL:274-280; 304-307) that permit the detection of patterns of abuse by one or more judges, which patterns the parties can use to persuade journalists to investigate their claims of abuse;
116. the development of my website **Judicial Discipline Reform** at <http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org>, which as of June 2, 2021, had 38,724+ subscribers, into:
- a. a clearinghouse for complaints against judges uploaded by the public;
 - b. a research center for professionals and parties(OL2:575) to search documents for the most persuasive evidence of abuse: patterns of abuse by the same judge presiding over their cases, the judges of the same court, and the judges of a judiciary; and
 - c. the showroom and shopping portal of a multidisciplinary academic and business venture (jur:119§§1-4). It can be the precursor of the institute of judicial unaccountability reporting and reform advocacy attached to a top university or established by a consortium of media outlets and academic institutions(jur:130§5);
117. a tour of presentations(OL:197§G) by me sponsored by you on:
- a. judges’ abuse(jur:5§3; OL:154 ¶ 3);

- b. development of software to conduct fraud and forensic accounting(OL:42, 60); and to perform thanks to artificial intelligence a novel type of statistical, linguistic, and literary analysis of judges' decisions and other writings(jur:131§b) to detect bias and disregard of the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law;
 - c. promoting the participation of the audience in the investigation(OL:115) into judges' abuse; and their development of local chapters of investigators/researchers that coalesce into a Tea Party-like single issue, civic movement(jur:164§9) for holding judges accountable and liable to their victims: *the People's Sunrise*(OL:201§J);
 - d. announcement of a Continuing Legal Education course, a webinar, a seminar, and a writing contest(*>ddc:1), which can turn the audience into clients and followers;
118. a multimedia, multidisciplinary public conference(jur:97§1; *>dcc:13§C) on judges' abuses held at a top university(OL2:452) to pioneer the reporting thereon in our country and abroad;
119. the call of the constitutional convention(OL:136§3) that 34 states have petitioned Congress to convene since April 2, 2014, satisfying the amending provisions of the Constitution, Article V.

C. Useful external links and quotations

1. U.S. Constitution, Code, and rules (federal, as opposed to state, laws)

120. U.S. Constitution, **Preamble**: "*We the People* of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, **establish Justice**"; http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/docs/US_Constitution.pdf
121. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section. 2. The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/US_Constitution.pdf
122. <https://uscode.house.gov/download/download.shtml> (with procedural rules in the appendix "a" files)
123. Cf. Legal Information Institute (LII) of Cornell Law School; <https://www.law.cornell.edu/>
124. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Appendix to 5 USC; <https://uscode.house.gov/download/download.shtml>
125. <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/18usc.pdf>
126. Cf. 18 U.S.C.; <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18>
127. 18 USC 3057 on duty to report abuse; <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3057>
128. The Judicial Code; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc.pdf>
129. Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure and Evidence, USC 28a; <https://uscode.house.gov/download/download.shtml>
130. Circuit justices, 28 USC §42
131. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980; (28 USC §§351-364); <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc.pdf> (see also jur:24^{18a})

2. U.S. Supreme Court

132. <https://www.supremecourt.gov/>

133. https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/rules_guidance.aspx
134. <https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2020year-endreport.pdf> of the Chief Justice
- a. bill S.1873, passed on October 30, 1979, and HR 7974, passed on September 15, 1980, entitled The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980; Congressional Record, September 30, 1980; 28086; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Jud_Councils_Reform_bill_30sep80.pdf (see also [jur:159²⁸⁰](#))
 - b. The Reform part of the bill included a provision for opening the councils, but was excluded from the version that was adopted; 28 U.S.C. §332(d)(1), http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc331-335_Conf_Councils.pdf (see also [jur:75¹⁴⁸](#))
135. Rules for Processing Judicial Conduct and Disability Complaints; <https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-conduct-disability>
136. https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_11 (duties of those who sign papers and make representations to the court; sanctions for non-compliance)
137. Ethics in Government Act of 1978; http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/docs/5usc_Ethics_Gov_14apr9.pdf

3. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (federal , as opposed to state, courts)

138. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts(AO); <https://www.uscourts.gov/>
139. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; (28 USC §§601-613); <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc.pdf>
140. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports>
141. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/directors-annual-report>
142. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2020>
143. http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/statistics&tables/num_jud_officers.pdf

Number of federal judicial officers https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2020			
Categories of federal judicial officers	30sep18	30sep19	30sep20
Supreme Court justices	9	9	9
circuit judges	166	175	179
senior circuit judges (semi-retired)	96	100	99
district judges id.	562	585	621
senior district judges	412	423	419
bankruptcy judges (including recalled judges)	350	344	334
magistrates (including recalled judges)	664	671	680

Totals	2259	2307	2341
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- 144. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2020-tables>
- 145. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/annual-report-2019>
- 146. <https://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business-2019-tables>
- 147. AO's 1997-2019 judicial business reports, containing the statistics on complaints against federal judges in Table S-22; <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts>
- 148. <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2019j>
- 149. Judicial misconduct procedure, e.g., in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; <https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/Judicial+Misconduct>
- 150. <https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/court-appeals-miscellaneous-fee-schedule>
- 151. Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges; <https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges#d>

4. Case Management/Electronic Case Filing and Public Access to Case Electronic Records

- 152. <https://www.uscourts.gov/court-records/electronic-filing-cmecf>
- 153. <https://pacer.uscourts.gov/>

5. Federal Judicial Center (for research; and education of judges)

- 154. Federal Judicial Center on impeachments; <https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges>

6. United States Postal Service

- 155. <https://facts.usps.com/#:~:text=For%2055%20cents%2C%20anyone%20can%20send%20a%20letter%2C,mail%20pieces%20each%20day.%20Zero%20tax%20dollars%20used>

7. State laws and statistics

- 156. Number of cases filed in state courts annually; http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/num_state_cases_07.pdf

8. Bar codes of conduct

- 157. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct; https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_l_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/
- 158. American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct; https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/

9. Entities accrediting educational institutions (serving as portals to

them)

159. (journalism schools) <http://www.acejmc.org/accreditation-reviews/accredited-programs/accreditedreaccredited/>
160. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/
161. (business schools) <https://acbsp.org/page/contact-event>
162. https://www.academia.edu/upgrade?feature=searchm&stm_copy=a+thesis+chapter&trigger=stm; consortium of 16,941+ universities to enable the storage and retrieval of professional articles and reports)

10. Law book publishers

163. <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/law-books>
164. <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/support#contact>
165. https://store.legal.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Jurisdictions/New-York/c/20075?elq_mid=23169&elq_cid=15386188&elq_ename=P_PRNT_PRD_9030215_EMUSNPR1REMNYTitles_em1_20201209&cid=9030215&email=drccordero%40judicial-discipline-reform.org&sfdccampaignid=7014O000000vZOgQAM&campaignCode=&chl=Em&utm_medium=email&utm_source=eloqua&utm_campaign=P_PRNT_PRD_9030215_EMUSNPR1REMNYTitles_20201209&utm_content=9030215
166. <https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/home.page>

11. Investigation by the media of judges' abuse of power

167. The Teflon Robe; Michael Berens and John Shiffman; Thomson Reuters:
 - a. Part 1, 30jun20; <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-misconduct/>
 - b. Part 2, 9july20; <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-deals/>
 - c. Part 3, 14juy21; <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-commissions/>
 - d. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-judges-commissions-snapshot-idUSKCN24F1E4>
 - e. 30jun20; <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-methodology-qanda/>
 - f. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-data/>
168. In the secret courts of Massachusetts – A Globe Spotlight report; Jenn Abelson, Nicole Dungca, and Todd Wallack; The Boston Globe; 30sep18
 - a. <https://apps.bostonglobe.com/spotlight/secret-courts/>

12. Other entities and people

169. <https://press.aarp.org/?intcmp=FTR-LINKS-PRO-PRESS2-EWHERE>
170. <https://www.iasd.uscourts.gov/content/senior-district-judge-robert-w-pratt>
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