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For immediate release, 9/26/07

2nd PRESS RELEASE on

The Hearing on Draft Rules Governing Judicial Misconduct Complaints

The Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States has released for public comment its Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28 U.S.C. §351-364), which confers upon any person the right to file a complaint against a federal judge. The Draft Rules aim at implementing the recommendations contained in the Breyer Report issued by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, chaired by Justice Stephen Breyer and appointed by the Late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Chief Justice Roberts "asked that the report's recommendations be referred to the appropriate committees of the Judicial Conference for thorough consideration and prompt action." (pr:42-43 infra) The Draft Rules ensued.

A hearing on the Draft Rules is planned to commence at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, September 27, 2007, in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY, tentatively in courtroom 8a South. Your attendance is encouraged in view of the importance of determining whether the only rules for disciplining complained-about federal judges, written and to be applied by their own peers, will work any better than the current ones. Under the latter, the judges took disciplinary action against their peers in only 9 cases out of the 7,462 complaints filed in the 10-year period between October 1996 and September 2006, according to the statistics of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. (reproduced with links to the originals in the link above)

Given that the current rules have been applied so biasedly by federal judges for the protection of their own, it is no wonder that the judges would not want to draw attention to the Draft Rules that simply mirror them. Consequently, they announced their release on only one website and are holding only one single hearing in the whole nation, only from 10:00 a.m. to mid-afternoon, not at the Supreme Court or where the Judicial Conference holds its two annual meetings and the Administrative Office sits, i.e. the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, in Washington, D.C., not even at the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City, but rather in a district court courthouse in Brooklyn. As a result, even many members of the media are unaware of this hearing or its importance. (see announcement in the link above).

Indeed, through the systematic dismissal of judicial misconduct complaints, judges have misused the mechanism of self-discipline to effectuate in practice the abrogation of a federal statute and the deprivation of the rights conferred by it upon every person. Having exempted themselves from any discipline, they have perpetuated another inherently suspicious record: in the 218 years since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution only seven federal judges have been removed from the bench, according to the statistics of the Federal Judicial Center. (see link above)

Unchecked judicial power turns into absolute power...has it bred absolute corruption too? That question will be discussed after the hearing by Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org at a press conference where Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., and other judicial reform advocates will propose to the media to engage in a Watergate-like *Follow the money!* investigation to determine whether a federal judgeship has become a safe haven for coordinated judicial wrongdoing. (see proposal in link above)

(http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/transcript_27sep7.pdf)

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Outline of Comments on

The Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings Released for Public Comment by the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability

Delivered at the Hearing in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Street, Brooklyn, NY, on September 27, 2007


- 1. The draft rules are almost identical to the current rules and will not prevent judges from dismissing more than 99% of all complaints against their peers.
- 2. They protect a complaint system irreconcilable with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice through due process of law:
 - No change in the players or the procedure
 - **No** public filing of complaints or access to the procedure applied to handle them
 - **No** requirement that the complained-about judge respond to the complaint
 - **No** adversarial confrontation between complainant and complained-about judge
 - **No** requirement that a special investigating committee be appointed
 - No public access to any investigating report
 - No greater rights of appeal for complainants
 - **No** compelling reason to protect judges with "the confidentiality of the complaint process"
 - **No** system of checks and balances on the exercise by judges of absolute judicial power
- 3 Secret proceedings upon complaints kept from the public privatizes the justice that judges administer to themselves and renders it not equal under law.
- 4. Only one new relevant provision: Rule 8(b): clerk must copy the Committee on complaints.
- 5. The example of filing insurance claims, not before the courts, but before the regional CEO of the most powerful insurance company; appeals lie to the regional council of insurers; which decides whether to refer claims to the national insurance conference of successful insurers.


- 6 The Committee announced this hearing only on one website and is holding only one hearing.
- 7. In the 218 years since the 1789 Constitution, only 7 federal judges have been impeached and removed from the bench.
- 8. In the 27 years since the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, the Judicial Conference of the U.S. has issued only 15 decisions.
- Judges that are unimpeachable in practice are above the law, for they fear no adverse consequences from abusing their judicial power. Such power becomes absolute and corrupts them absolutely.
- 10. Constitutional challenge to 28 U.S.C. §§351-364 on grounds, among others, of equal protection (see http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/no_judicial_immunity.pdf).
- 11. Need for a **board of citizens** unrelated and unanswerable to the judiciary; otherwise, panels of three retired judges from circuits other than that or those of the complainant and the complained-about judge; empowered to publicly censure him, withdraw from him any and all cases, and recommend his impeachment.
- 12. Call for the Committee to recuse itself and recommend to the Chief Justice to appoint people unrelated to the Judiciary to draft the rules...after such people have reviewed the complaints filed in the last 10 years.
- 13. Let the Committee write the equivalent of Emile Zola's "I Accuse" in the Dreyfus Affair.
- 14. Call for bloggers and journalists to engage in a Watergate-like Follow the money! investigation to determine whether a federal judgeship has become a safe haven for judicial coordinated wrongdoing.

Summary of Dr. Cordero's Comments on the Draft Rules


(keyed to the paragraph numbers of the Comments in pr:54 et seq., infra)


- 2. The Rules' "largely based...administrative perspective" allows no confrontation or compensation.
- 3. Complicit toleration of the wrongdoing that judges see other peers practice taints them too.
- 4. Only do something that is "best able to influence a judge's future behavior in constructive ways".
- 5. Under Rule 2, a chief circuit judge can suspend the new Rules if he only "finds expressly that exceptional circumstances render the application of a Rule in a particular proceeding manifestly unjust or manifestly contrary to the purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§351-364 or these Rules".
- 11. The final sentence of Rule 2 turns the Rules into suggestions that the chief circuit judge can disregard whenever pressure from his peers or conflict of interests makes it expedient to do so.
- 12. "Rule 5(2) A chief judge:...(B) need not identify a complaint if it is clear on the basis of the total mix of information available to [him] that the review provided in Rule 11 will result in a dismissal under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e). However, a chief circuit judge may identify a complaint in such circumstances in order to assure the public that highly visible allegations have been investigated. In such a case, appointment of a special committee under Rule 11(f) may not be necessary"...thus misleading the public with a complaint bound to be dismissed.
- 20. Rule 6 aims to prevent the public from even knowing the complained-about judge's name.
- 24. Under Rule 16(e), the possibility of receiving the report of the special committee is a carrot dangled in front of the complainant. She may be allowed to eat it depending on "the degree of the complainant's cooperation in preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings, including the identity of the complained-about judge".
- 30. "Many complaints are clear candidates for dismissal even if their allegations are accepted as true, and there is no need for the complained-about judge to devote time to a defense".
- 31. Rule 8 does not require the judge to take cognizance of the complaint and put in writing his or her response. So he can go on behaving as if no complaint had ever been filed.
- 33. Absence in Rule 8(b) of any required action by either the judge or the chief judge of his court upon receipt of a copy of the complaint allows them not to bother even reading it.
- 42. Rule 10 allows all complainants regardless of their number, except "only one or more", to be deprived of their right to complain against a judge simply because to his peers it just "appears" that their complaints are "part of an orchestrated campaign". The thousands of complaints against ENRON could not have been dismissed on those grounds. Unequal justice.
- 49. The chief circuit judge must also dismiss the complaint if he concludes that it "(5) is otherwise not appropriate for consideration under the Act". This is a vague and standardless catch-all that allows the chief circuit judge to dismiss a complaint for any reason and no reason.
- 53. Rule 11 provides no standard for determining what "appropriate corrective action" already taken allows the dismissal of the complaint. A judge may volunteer "action" that has nothing to do with the remedy requested by the complainant, thus exempting himself from liability.
- 60. The Rules have been drafted to ensure self-preservation, not to establish checks and balances between "We the People Under Law" and the class of federal judges above the law, let alone to provide "Equal Justice" for both.
- 66. Rule 11(e) allows the chief circuit judge to dismiss a complaint by claiming that "remedial action [is] impossible", without stating what action is impossible and why, or giving the complainant the opportunity to challenge that claim and propose alternative 'possible' action.







Source: Tables of the Adm. Off. of the U.S. Courts; collected in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_draft_rules.pdf









[Footnotes in the originals]

NOTE: EXCLUDES COMPLAINTS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE CIRCUITS BECAUSE THEY DUPLICATED PREVIOUS FILINGS OR WERE OTHERWISE INVALID FILINGS.

- * REVISED. [regarding complaints pending]
- ** EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDGES. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Source: for Tables 1, 2, and 3, Judicial Business of U.S. Courts, 1997-2006 Annual Reports of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

For Tables 3, 4, 5, 2005-2006 Judicial Facts and Figures, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

The original Tables are collected and reproduced in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_draft_rules.pdf, wherein they are accompanied by links to the originals.

Tables 1, 2, and 6, supra, report on complaints filed and processed in the Federal Circuit, the District of Columbia, the 1st-11th circuits, the U.S. Claims Court, and the Court of International Trade

 † The category "Special Investigating Committees Appointed" appears for the first time in the 2006 Table.

These figures do not even include cases filed with Article I courts, which are part of the Executive, not the Judicial, Branch, such as the U.S. Tax Court, established in 1969 (after it was created as the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924 and its name was first changed to Tax Court of the U.S. in 1942). Another such court is the U.S. Claims Court, established as an Article I court in 1982, and renamed U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1992. Likewise, the U.S. Court of Veterans' Appeals was established as an Article I court in 1989 and then renamed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 1998.

They too support the conclusion to be drawn from these statistics: The significant increase in cases filed with these courts every year attests to the litigiousness of the American society. They belie the judges' report that for the last 10 years Americans have filed a steady number of complaints against them hovering around the average (after eliminating the outlier) of only 712 complaints. The explanation lies in the first footnote in the originals, above: Judges have arbitrarily excluded an undetermined number of complaints. The fact that they have manipulated these statistics is also revealed by the first table above: After 9 years during which the judges filed less than one complaint a year, they jumped to 88 in 2006...and that same year it just so happened that complainants filed the lowest number of complaints ever, 555! *Implausible*! Yet, the judges did not discipline a single peer, just one magistrate.

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Synopsis of an Investigative Journalism Proposal

Where the Leads in Evidence Already Gathered in 12 Federal Cases¹ Would be Pursued in a Watergate-like *Follow the money!* Investigation to Answer the Question:

Has a Federal Judgeship Become a Safe Haven for Coordinated Wrongdoing?

This is a poignant question, for it casts doubt on the integrity of the branch of government that should incarnate respect for the law and high ethical values. What makes it a realistic question worth investigating is the fact that since 1980 judges are charged with the duty to discipline themselves; what is more, complaints by anybody against their conduct must be filed with, and handled by, them. But according to the statistics of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts², judges systematically dismiss³ all complaints. As a result, in the last 27 years only three judges out of some 2,133 federal judges, have been impeached, the last one in 1989. Actually, in the whole 218 years since the U.S. Constitution of 1789, only 7 judges⁴ have been impeached and removed from the bench...on average one every 31 years!

If that were the time it would take for your CEO to be held accountable by his peers for his conduct toward you and the other people in your office, and in the meantime he could wield power over your property, liberty, and life with no more consequences than the suspension of a decision of his, do you think that he would be tempted to treat you however he wanted? If all complaints of yours ended up in the wastebasket together with those of your colleagues in the office, would you say that they would want to know of your efforts to force your CEO and his peers out of their safe haven in order to require them to treat you and your colleagues with respect or be liable to all of you? If so, you have a U.S. audience of 300 million colleagues waiting to know about your efforts to hold your judicial CEO and his peers accountable for their conduct.

Indeed, by law the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the associate justices review with the chief district and appellate judges twice a year reports⁵ showing that complaints against judges are dismissed systematically, which points to coordination to disregard a duty placed upon them by law. They have known also that in an area such as bankruptcy, judges wield enormous power over tens of billions of dollars annually. Power and money, the two most insidious and absolute corruptors in the hands of the same judges that have exempted themselves from any discipline. There is evidence that bankruptcy judges have engaged in a bankruptcy fraud scheme⁶ with the knowledge and support of district judges, and at least the toleration of circuit judges and the justices of the Supreme Court. That evidence and leads⁷ are hereby being offered for a joint *Follow the money!* investigative journalism project.

The discovery of evidence that a federal judgeship has become a safe haven for coordinated wrongdoing is bound to have a farther reaching impact than finding out that the Watergate Burglary was connected to President Richard Nixon. Unlike the president and his White House aides, federal judges hold office for life or renewable 14-year terms and can only be removed through the historically useless impeachment mechanism⁸. Hence, the investment of investigative resources in this project would not be for a momentary scoop, but rather for the development of a lode of news that would implicate the Congress dominated by "the culture of corruption" and the Executive, whose agenda is challenged in court. A *Follow the money!* investigation from acts or toleration of judicial bias and disregard for the law to concealed assets would outrage the public and lead to a cleansing institutional crisis. For the bloggers and investigative journalists that pursued the story most competently there are rewards to be gained: 15 minutes of fame, a Pulitzer Prize, or the title of the Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of our generation. Let's get together to discuss the objectives and strategy¹⁰ to join resources and push forward this investigation.

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DrRCordero-summary @Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org

(as of October 19, 2007)

Summarize Your Judicial Misconduct Complaint in 350 or Fewer Words

to convince the media and bloggers of the need to investigate and discuss how judges engage in misconduct and self-exempt from any discipline

Last September 27, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States (28 U.S.C. §331), held its one single hearing in the whole nation to receive public comment on its draft rules governing judicial misconduct complaint proceedings provided for under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. §§351-364).

I presented graphs based on official statistics of the federal judiciary showing that between October 1996 and September 2006, the number of complaints against federal judges and magistrates filed with U.S. chief circuit judges was 7,462, but the judges disciplined only 9 of their peers!

This proves that federal judges have engaged in the systematic dismissal of judicial misconduct complaints. They have compromised their integrity to protect their peers while disregarding their duty "to administer justice without respect to persons". (28 U.S.C. §453) By so doing, they have turned the system of judicial self-discipline set up under the Act into a sham, removing themselves from the reach of any discipline and, consequently, placing themselves above the law. Just as they have disregarded the current rules governing judicial complaint proceedings (cf. CA2 complaint rules), they will likewise disregard the draft rules, from which they are practically indistinguishable. (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_draft_rules.pdf)

Illustration of how to summarize a complaint

It is important to illustrate that meritorious judicial misconduct complaints within the scope of the Act were dismissed systematically by judges as part of their concerted activity to immunize themselves from all discipline. The purpose is to persuade independent third parties, such as the media and bloggers, to investigate and discuss judicial misconduct. However, they are not going to read hundreds of pages of complaints. But they may read a series of well-crafted summaries that set forth a pattern of judicial misconduct. So do not ask them to read your novel, just tell them the anecdote of your complaint, as others will, in 350 WORDS OR LESS.

Doing so requires that you make every word count. No word can be wasted arguing the legal merits of your case, which is done through the appeals process. Nor is there room to advocate public policy, which is better pursued through your legislative representatives. Just a concise, even bullet-pointed statement of the most evident facts of judicial misconduct in your case.

Reducing a complaint to 350 or fewer words is similar to the process to employ if you were told that Hurricane Katrina will strike your city and you must evacuate your home to seek shelter in the state capitol, taking with you, not your belongings, but only a few receipts and photos that will enable you to prove ownership of the most valuable pieces for whose loss an insured may claim compensation under a government issued general property insurance policy.

To be able to claim under that policy, you would select the receipt or photo of the piece of property that at first blush appears to you the one most commonly accepted to be everybody's most valuable one, and for the loss of which the government would most likely pay compensation. This is unlikely to be the piece that has greatest emotional value to you individually. Then you would compare to it the receipt or photo of another piece of property and keep the one most likely to convince any government employee to compensate any insured for its loss. You would repeat this process until you ended up with the three receipts or photos that would be most convincing under the government policy, i.e., The Policy for the Administration of Equal Justice Under Law by Judges Conducting Themselves in a Fair, Unbiased, and Honest Manner.

Those receipts or photos, not your belongings themselves, are the equivalent of distinct and accurate facts of judicial misconduct in your case, not the case documents themselves. To apply this illustration to the summarizing of your complaint, follow this step-by-step process:

- 1. To get a draft, first write what comes to mind as having caused you to complain about the judge's conduct.
- 2. Identify the most important FACTS OF MISCONDUCT and order them in short paragraphs. Those facts show the following type of conduct or condition on the judge's part:
 - a. abuse of judicial power
 b. bribery or corruption
 c. disregard for the rule of law or the facts
 d. bias or prejudice
 e. undue decisional delay
 f. abusive language or demeanor
 i. mental or physical disability to perform judicial functions
- 3. Check the paragraphs against the documents of the case for accuracy and relevance.
- 4. Then write to convince, not your friends or group members, but jurors, as it were, who do not know or trust you. Briefly state for them the case's 6Ws: who, when, where, what, how, and why. Appeal to their common sense to show that what happened in your case is not how a judge should behave or is evidence of wrongdoing engaged in or tolerated by the judge.
- 5. Rewrite to eliminate unimportant details and highlight important ones. Revise to correct grammatical errors. Run a spell-check. If your complaint matters to you, *SWEAT OVER IT*, not to turn out a miniature of it all, but a selection of its most telling features. Count your words until you have a snapshot, not a movie, of judicial misconduct in 350 or fewer words.

Use this template for summarizing your complaint

- 1. I am Name, of City, State,
- 2. [party type: parent, divorcing spouse, debtor/creditor in bankruptcy, etc.],
- 3. in Case Name/Docket #, in Court Name,
- 4. which concerns [case type: bankruptcy, child support or custody, probate, etc.].
- 5. This case came before Judge Name, who showed [misconduct type as listed above].
- 6. State the most revealing FACTS of misconduct: No opinions or mere accusations, no exaggerations, no arguments on the merits. Just ACCURATE FACTS OF MISCONDUCT,

with dates, names, and numbers. Be as fair to everybody as you are asking them to be to you. Be a responsible advocate of judicial reform, for your own good and that of all those who seek "Equal Justice Under Law".

- 7. If you filed a judicial misconduct complaint, state docket number, name of judge filed with, length of time from filing to disposition, and disposition.
- 8. State why the medial or bloggers should investigate or discuss, not your particular complaint, but rather the general problem of judges that engage in misconduct in our courts.

Sample SUMMARY

I am Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq., of New York City, creditor in *In re DeLano*, 04-20280, WBNY, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, a voluntary bankruptcy petition, now in the Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir., 06-4780-bk.

This case came before Judge John C. Ninfo, III, who supported or tolerated a bankruptcy fraud scheme.

Mr. DeLano, a banker for 39 years, was an M&T Bank bankruptcy officer when he and his wife filed their petition in January 2004 declaring:

- 1. that they had in cash and on account only \$535, although they had declared that their monthly excess income was \$1,940; and in their Financial Affairs Statement and 1040 IRS forms that in the three years preceding their filing they had earned \$291,470, still unaccounted for;
- 2. that their only real property was their home, bought in 1975 and appraised in November 2003 at \$98,500, their mortgage still \$77,084, and their equity only \$21,416...after making mortgage payments for 30 years! and receiving during that period \$382,187 through eight mortgages!;
- 3. that they owed \$98,092 on 18 credit cards, but valued their household goods accumulated during more than 30 years at \$2,810, less than 1% of their earnings in the previous three years!
- 4. Only 2½ months after being discharged, they sold their home for \$135,000, a 37% increase in value in a down home market.
- 5. Their case is among the trustee's 3,907 cases and their lawyer's 525 before Judge Ninfo.
- 6. Judge Ninfo ordered an evidentiary hearing, but violating my discovery rights under FRCivP 26 and 34, he, the DeLanos, the trustees, District Judge David Larimer, and the Court of Appeals denied me *every single document*, which would prove concealment of assets and their support of a bankruptcy fraud scheme as part of their coordinated wrongdoing.

The media and bloggers should investigate how judges have self-exempted from all discipline. Fearing no consequences from abusing their power, they wield absolute power, which corrupts absolutely. Only independent third parties can expose them, cause public outrage, force official investigations and the discussion by presidential candidates of a Citizens Board For Processing Judicial Conduct and Disability Complaints. (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLano_docs.pdf)

SUMMARY word count: 349

Send your complaint SUMMARY to news bureaus, investigative reporters, bloggers, and DrRCordero-summary@Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org.

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Draft Rules Will Not Stop Judges From Systematically Dismissing Complaints Against Them

Last October 15 finished the period for filing public comments on the draft rules to amend the current rules for handling complaints filed by anybody against a federal judge under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. Neither the Act nor these rules establish standards of complainable misconduct or disability, let alone what discipline judges are to mete out to themselves. They set up a system of judicial self-discipline and only prescribe the procedure for federal judges to process complaints filed against them.

Since a man cannot be impartial in his own cause, self-discipline does not work. Judges, who were rendered neither more honorable nor incorruptible upon their politics-determined nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, have proved to be mere men and women as incapable of self-discipline as their neighbor.

7,462 judicial misconduct complaints, but only 9 judges disciplined in 10 years!

Indeed, out of the 7,462 complaints filed against federal judges in the 10-year period 1997-2006, they disciplined only 9 of their peers! These are official statistics that the judges must file by law with the highest administrative body of the federal judiciary, i.e., the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, whose director is appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Both review them with the court of appeals chief judges that produce them when they meet twice a year in the Judicial Conference of the U.S., the judiciary's highest policy-making body, whose Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, formed by judges, drafted the rules at the request of the Chief Justice, who once was also a lower court judge as were the other Justices. (28 U.S.C. §§332(g), 604(h)(2), 331 4th par., 601)

They all have known about these statistics and what they prove: That all of them, from the bottom to the top of the Judiciary, have engaged in, tolerated, and benefited from, the systematic dismissal of complaints against them! (The statistics are collected with links to the originals in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial complaints/DrCordero draft rules.pdf

Their systematic dismissal of complaints against them amounts in practice to the unlawful abrogation of an Act of Congress by judges sworn to uphold the law. By systematically dismissing those complaints, judges have self-exempted from any discipline: They have abused their judicial power in self-interest and to the detriment of all the complainants, whom they have left to suffer at the hands of the complained-about judges.

Types of serious judicial wrongdoing excused by the judges' self-exemption from discipline

Fearing no disciplinary, let alone penal, consequences, the judges have engaged in, and tolerated, the types of misconduct and disability under which they classify complaints: abuse of

judicial power, prejudice, bias, conflict of interests, bribery, corruption, undue decisional delay, incompetence, neglect, mental or physical disability, and judicially unbecoming or abusive demeanor.

Since they ensure their unaccountability, they have managed an inherently suspicious feat: Though there have been tens of thousands of federal judges in the 218 years since the creation of the federal judiciary in 1789, the number of those impeached and removed from the bench is 7! (official statistics at http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf >Judges of the U.S. Courts>Impeachments of Federal Judges)

Ordinary people as judges are, they would not give up such extraordinary privilege: They are above the law. Hence, the draft rules are practically a carbon copy of the current rules that have served them so well. To conceal this fact as much as possible and put their peers also beyond public scrutiny, the judges on the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability announced the release of their draft rules on one single website, that of the barely known Administrative Office, and held only one single hearing in the whole country: in a district court not covered by a press corps. The public comments that they requested on the rules, have not been made public.

Yet, this commentator managed to obtain a copy of the official transcript of the hearing and is making it and his comments public through the first link above.

Neither AG Nominee Judge Mukasey nor Congress will investigate the systematic dismissal of misconduct complaints but a Watergate-like Follow the money! investigation can expose coordinated judicial wrongdoing

Neither the systematic dismissal of complaints nor the abuse of judicial power will need to stop if Judge M. Mukasey is confirmed as Attorney General, for he was a judge for 20 years and as a participant and would incriminate himself if he ordered this coordinated judicial wrongdoing investigated. (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/JMukasey_2.pdf)

Nor will they be voluntarily investigated by Congress, described by its Speaker, H.P. N. Pelosi, as "dominated by the culture of corruption", so that its members are leery of becoming known as 'judicial inquisitors', for if their own corruption landed them in court, the judges could exploit the opportunity to retaliate.

However, Congress could be forced to investigate judges and reform the judiciary by a public outraged at the exposure of the judges' coordinated wrongdoing, in general, and one of its most egregious manifestations, in particular: a fraud scheme in bankruptcy, an area in which judges control annually tens of billions of dollars. This would be the purpose of a Watergate-like *Follow the money!* investigation conducted by judicial reform advocates and investigative journalists, as set forth in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/investi_jour_proposal.pdf.

For details on how to join the *Follow the money!* investigation, contact:

Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq. at DrRCordero-collaboration@Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org

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The Salient Facts of The DeLano Case

showing a bankruptcy fraud scheme supported or tolerated by judges

DeLano is a federal bankruptcy fraud case. As part of 12 such cases, it reveals fraud conducted through coordinated wrongdoing that is so egregious as to betray overconfidence born of a long standing practice: Fraud has been organized into a bankruptcy fraud scheme. This case was commenced by a bankruptcy petition filed with Schedules A-J and a Statement of Financial Affairs on January 27, 2004, by the DeLano couple. (04-20280, WBNY¹) Mr. DeLano, however, is a most unlikely candidate for bankruptcy, for at the time of filing he was already a 39-year veteran of the banking and financing industry and was and continued to be employed by M&T Bank precisely as a bankruptcy officer. He and his wife, a Xerox technician, declared:

- **1.** that they had in cash and on account only \$535 (D:31¹), although they had declared that their monthly excess income was \$1,940 (D:45¹); and in the FA Statement (D:47¹) and their 1040 IRS forms (D:186¹) that they had earned \$291,470 in just the three years prior to their filing;
- 2. that their only real property was their home (D:2¹), bought in 1975 (D:3¹) and appraised in November 2003 at \$98,500, as to which their mortgage was still \$77,084 and their equity only \$21,416 (D:30¹)...after making mortgage payments for 30 years! and receiving during that period at least \$382,187 (D:1¹)...through a string of eight mortgages! (D:341¹) *Mind-boggling!*
- **3**. that they owed \$98,092 –spread thinly over 18 credit cards (D:38¹)- while they valued their household goods at only \$2,810 (D:31¹), less than 1% of their earnings in the previous three years! Even couples in urban ghettos end up with goods in their homes of greater value after having accumulated them over their worklives of more than 30 years.
- **4**. Theirs is one of the trustee's $3,907^2$ open cases and their lawyer's 525^3 before the same judge.

These facts show that this was a scheme-insider offloading 78% of his and his wife's debts (D:58¹) in preparation for traveling light into a golden retirement. They felt confident that they could make such incongruous, implausible, and suspicious declarations in the schedules and that neither the schemers would discharge their duty nor the creditors exercise their right to require that bankrupts prove their petition's good faith by providing supporting documents. Moreover, they had spread their debts thin enough among their 20 institutional creditors to ensure that the latter would find a write-off more cost-effective than litigation to challenge their petition. So they assumed that the sole individual creditor, who in addition lives hundreds of miles from the court, would not be able to afford to challenge their good faith either. But he did! The Creditor analyzed their petition and documents and estimated that the DeLano Debtors had concealed assets worth at least \$673,657! (D:1¹)

The Creditor requested that the DeLano Debtors produce financial documents as obviously pertinent to prove the good faith of any debtors' bankruptcy petition as their bank account statements. Yet the trustee, who is supposed to represent the creditors' interests, tried to prevent the Creditor from even meeting with the DeLanos. After the latter denied *every single document* requested by the Creditor, he moved for orders of production. Contrary to their duty to determine whether the Debtors had engaged in bankruptcy fraud by concealing assets, the bankruptcy judge, the district judge, and the Court of Appeals⁴ also denied *every single document* requested. Then they eliminated the Creditor by disallowing his claim in a sham evidentiary hearing. Revealing how incriminating these documents are, to oppose their production the DeLanos, with the trustee's recommendation and the bankruptcy judge's approval, have been allowed to pay their lawyers legal fees in the amount of \$27,953...although they had declared only \$535 in cash and on account! To date \$673,657 is still unaccounted for. Where did it go and for whose benefit?

¹ http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLanos_docs.pdf

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Summary of the DeLanos' income of \$291,470, mortgage receipts of \$382,187, and credit card borrowing of \$98,092

unaccounted for and inconsistent with their declaration in Schedule B (D:31) of their bankruptcy petition that at the time of its filing on January 27, 2004, they had in hand and on account only \$535!

Exhibi		Mortgage	s or loans
page #	produced by the DeLanos to Chapter 13 Trustee George Reiber ^a	year	amount
D:342	1) from Columbia Banking, S&L Association	16jul75	\$26,000
D:343	2) another from Columbia Banking, S&L Asso.	30nov77	7,467
D:346	3) still another from Columbia Banking, S&L Asso.	29mar88	59,000
D:176/9	4) owed to Manufacturers &Traders Trust=M&T Bank	March 88	59,000
D:176/10	5) took an overdraft from ONONDAGA Bank	March 88	59,000
D:348	6) another mortgage from Central Trust Company	13sep90	29,800
D:349	7) even another one from M&T Bank	13dec93	46,920
D:350-54	8) yet another from Lyndon Guaranty Bank of NY	23dec99	95,000
	9) any other not yet disclosed?	btotal	\$382,187
	e DeLanos' earnings in just the three years preceding the voluntary bankruptcy petition of January 27, 2004 (D:23)	eir	
2001	1040 IRS form (D:186)	\$91,229	\$91,229
2002	1040 IRS form (D:187)	\$91,859	
	Statement of Financial Affairs (D:47)		91,655
2003	1040 IRS form (D:188) Statement of Financial Affairs (D:47)	+97,648	+108,586
	ust be added the receipts contained in the \$98,092 owed on 18	\$280,736°	\$291,470 ^d
credit ca	rds, as declared in Schedule F (D:38) ^b	TOTAL	\$673,657

^a The DeLanos claimed in their bankruptcy petition that their only real property is their home, valued on November 23, 2003, at \$98,500, as to which their mortgage is still \$77,084 and their equity is only \$21,416 (D:30/Sch.A)...after making mortgage payments for 30 years! and having received during that same period at least \$382,187 through the known elements of a string of mortgages! *Mind-boggling!*

^b The DeLanos declared that their credit card debt on 18 cards totals \$98,092 (D:38/Sch.F), while they set the value of their household goods at only \$2,810! (D:31/Sch.B) Couples in the Third World end up with household possessions of greater value after having accumulated them in their homes over their worklives of more than 30 years.

^c Why do these numbers not match?

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(as of 8/19/7)

The DeLanos' String of Eight Known Mortgages and the Valuation of their Only Real Property and its Real Market Value

David Gene DeLano, born on September 1, 1941, and his wife, Mary Ann DeLano, born on September 21, 1944, bought on July 16, 1975, the property on 1262 Shoecraft Road, Town of Penfield, by taking out a mortgage for \$26,000. That was the first of eight known mortgages that the DeLanos took on that same property and through which they obtained a known total of \$382,187.

Preparing for retirement, they filed a bankruptcy petition on January 27, 2004, when Mr. DeLano was a 39-year veteran of the banking and financing industries, working precisely as an officer in the bankruptcy department of M&T Bank, and Ms. DeLano was a Xerox technician. They listed that property in Schedule A as their only real property, had it appraised two months earlier at \$98,500, and declared that their mortgage was still \$77,084 and their equity only \$21,416...after making monthly mortgage payments for 30 years!

Question 1: Where did \$382,187, the proceeds of those eight mortgages, and their mortgage payments go, particularly since the DeLanos listed in Scheduled B that they had in cash and on account only \$535, although they reported in their Statement of Financial Affairs and their 1040 IRS forms for the three years preceding their filing that they had earned \$291,470? Were assets concealed and, if so, which and where?

Moreover, a public record obtained through WestLaw puts the value of the same property at 1262 Shoecraft Road, Webster, NY 14580-8954, assessed by the County of Monroe and updated as of May 4, 2007, at \$116,000.

Question 2: How could that property increase in value in 3.5 years by \$17,500, i.e., 18%, in a market going down for years? Was the valuation declared in Schedule A fraudulent?

The DeLanos have submitted some mortgage documents, though incomplete. They can be found below together with their bankruptcy petition, their 1040 IRS forms, the WestLaw public record, and an Equifax credit report concerning what are deemed to be two of the eight mortgages. The most salient data on these documents is presented on the table of their income, receipts, and borrowings. (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLano_docs.pdf)

Nevertheless, those documents contain with respect to both that property and the mortgages some technical references that may be useful in searching the property records to find the answer to the above questions. A summary of those references is as follows: (D:# is the page number of the documents in the file downloadable through the link given in the paragraph above.)

- 1. (D:345) property on Shoecraft Road, Liber 3679 of Deeds, page 489;
- 2. (D:342) sold by the Church of the Holy Spirit of Penfield, NY, to David Gene and Mary Ann DeLano by warranty deed on July 16, 1975, Liber 4865 of Deeds, page 122;
- 3. (D:342) mortgaged on July 16, 1975, Liber 4000 of Mortgages, page 196;
- 4. (D:343, 345) mortgaged on November 30, 1977, Liber 4488 of Mortgages, pages 152;
- 5. (D:346-347) mortgaged on March 29, 1988, Liber 8682 of Mortgages, page 81, Mortgage # CE033444;
- 6. (D:176/9) the DeLanos borrowed \$59,000 in March 1988 from Manufacturers & Traders Trust Bank;
- 7. (D:176/10) the DeLanos obtained \$59,000 in March 1988 from ONODAGA Bank/Overdraft;
- 8. (D:348) mortgaged on September 13, 1990, Liber 10363 of Mortgages, page 38, Mortgage # CH016334;
- 9. (D:348) mortgage assigned on November 26, 1991, Liber 893 of Assignment of Mortgages, page 402;
- 10. (D:349) mortgaged on December 13, 1993, Liber 12003 of Mortgages, page 507, Mortgage # CK039604;
- 11. (D:350-352) mortgaged on April 23, 1999, Liber 14410 of Mortgages, page 132, Mortgage # CQ002917
- 12. (D:353-354) involvement of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in a settlement dated April 23, 1999

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Table S-24.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c) for the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 1997

							Cir	cuits								ationa ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT
	1		1	1					V			1 0				
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1996*	109	0	1	21	5	11	7	10	1	3	11	31	8	0	0	0
Complaints Filed	679	3	15	16	40	62	69	84	68	28	56	137	54	47	0	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complaint	678	3	15	16	40	62	69	84	68	27	56	137	54	47	0	0
On Order of Chief Judges	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	461	3	4	10	3	24	29	14	11	5	102	249	7	0	0	0
District	497	0	14	17	27	28	48	43	59	25	45	121	38	32	0	0
National Courts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Judges	31	0	0	2	2	2	6	3	2	2	2	6	1	3	0	0
Magistrate Judges	138	0	0	1	8	7	15	27	10	0	9	24	25	12	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	11	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	3	2	0	0	0	0
Physical Disability	4	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	11	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	4	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	179	3	0	6	25	1	40	20	8	13	17	19	22	5	0	0
Prejudice/Bias	193	1	9	8	32	8	27	12	17	4	14	30	20	11	0	0
Conflict of Interest	12	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	3	3	0	1	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	28	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	4	2	4	13	0	1	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	44	0	0	1	0	6	1	10	4	2	3	11	5	1	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	30	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	5	0	0	16	1	0	0	0
Other	161	1	3	2	0	30	1	38	24	10	7	19	22	4	0	0
Complaints Concluded	482	3	9	13	33	31	69	80	49	24	41	60	53	17	0	0
Action By Chief Judges																
Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute	29	2	4	0	3	1	4	2	1	3	6	2	0	1	0	0
Directly Related to Decision																
or Procedural Ruling	215	0	0	6	12	21	34	26	21	11	14	31	24	15	0	0
Frivolous	19	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	6	1	5	2	0	0	0

Table S-24. (Continued)

							Circ	cuits								tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of																
Intervening Events	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	5	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Subtotal	270	3	4	6	15	22	45	29	23	21	21	38	26	17	0	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	212	0	5	7	18	9	24	51	26	3	20	22	27	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	212	0	5	7	18	9	24	51	26	3	20	22	27	0	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1997	306	0	7	24	12	42	7	14	20	7	26	108	9	30	0	0

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT.
2CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
* REVISED.
** EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-24.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c) for the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 1998

							•									ational
								cuits			1	1	1 40.1			ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1997*	214	0	6	3	10	31	0	6	18	4	18	82	1	35	0	0
Complaints Filed	1,051	1	27	10	73	120	73	46	86	37	78	265	37	197	1	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	1,049	1	27	10	73	120	73	46	86	36	78	264	37	197	1	0
On Order of Chief Judges	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	443	1	16	2	14	22	23	13	8	17	134	20	11	162	0	0
District	758	0	47	9	56	83	50	27	82	26	83	250	29	16	0	0
National Courts	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Bankruptcy Judges	28	0	2	0	1	2	5	1	3	2	3	6	1	2	0	0
Magistrate Judges	215	0	3	2	8	13	15	12	16	5	7	110	8	16	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	92	0	0	3	9	4	7	2	18	0	36	13	0	0	0	0
Physical Disability	7	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Demeanor	19	0	0	0	2	3	0	1	3	0	0	8	0	2	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	511	1	2	2	30	8	48	16	8	21	27	168	9	171	0	0
Prejudice/Bias	647	0	21	9	36	32	22	22	44	19	46	198	20	178	0	0
Conflict of Interest	141	0	0	1	0	7	3	3	0	0	3	117	2	5	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	166	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	2	155	2	3	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	50	0	3	1	4	4	2	0	1	5	7	14	8	1	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	99	0	0	0	1	4	4	0	3	1	1	81	1	3	0	0
Other	193	0	17	1	11	94	3	13	20	4	11	3	10	6	0	0
Complaints Concluded	1,002	1	33	13	56	95	73	49	70	40	78	257	35	202	0	0
Actions by Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	43	0	6	0	4	2	5	0	2	3	6	5	3	7	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	532	1	0	5	19	54	42	15	43	16	52	88	18	179	0	0
Frivolous	159	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	5	13	2	133	1	0	0	0

Table S-24. (September 30, 1998—Continued)

							Circ	cuits								tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of																
Intervening Events	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	742	1	8	6	24	57	48	16	51	34	62	227	22	186	0	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	258	0	25	7	32	38	25	32	19	6	16	29	13	16	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	260	0	25	7	32	38	25	33	19	6	16	30	13	16	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1998	263	0	0	0	27	56	0	3	34	1	18	90	3	30	1	0

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT.

²CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*} REVISED.
** EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-23.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c) for the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 1999

							Cir	cuits								ational ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1998*	228	0	3	1	23	48	0	3	28	0	19	75	3	25	0	0
Complaints Filed	781	2	16	17	99	34	55	196	72	31	36	115	58	50	0	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complaint	781	2	16	17	99	34	55	196	72	31	36	115	58	50	0	0
On Order of Chief Judges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	174	4	16	0	23	3	7	31	16	7	25	31	11	0	0	0
District	598	0	48	17	63	24	55	98	58	27	24	99	47	38	0	0
National Courts	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Judges	30	0	0	1	2	2	0	3	2	1	2	16	0	1	0	0
Magistrate Judges	229	0	1	4	11	5	6	64	14	4	10	69	30	11	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	69	0	0	0	26	4	3	11	3	0	2	5	0	15	0	0
Physical Disability	6	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	34	0	0	0	2	1	4	0	5	3	1	14	1	3	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	254	0	1	2	7	45	17	4	9	10	16	91	27	25	0	0
Prejudice/Bias	360	2	15	8	34	20	16	28	41	15	23	85	32	41	0	0
Conflict of Interest	29	0	0	0	5	1	6	4	0	0	2	6	2	3	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	104	0	0	4	10	26	4	4	3	1	2	44	0	6	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	80	0	5	0	0	6	6	2	5	2	2	30	18	4	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	108	1	0	0	3	5	3	0	6	0	2	71	2	15	0	0
Other	288	0	2	0	3	62	0	143	25	7	4	26	8	8	0	0
Complaints Concluded	826	2	18	12	57	63	53	184	82	31	45	163	50	66	0	0
Action by Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	27	0	4	0	0	0	6	0	8	1	4	4	0	0	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	300	2	0	5	19	12	21	31	24	14	11	84	28	49	0	0
Frivolous	66	0	5	2	19	0	6	6	1	3	3	16	4	1	0	0

Table S-23. (September 30, 1999—Continued)

							Cir	cuits								tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT
Appropriate Action Already Taken	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of																
Intervening Events	10	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	2	1	0	0
Complainant Withdrawn	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Subtotal	406	2	9	7	41	12	34	37	34	19	18	107	35	51	0	0
ction by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	416	0	9	5	16	51	19	147	46	12	27	54	15	15	0	0
Withdrawn	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	420	0	9	5	16	51	19	147	48	12	27	56	15	15	0	0
omplaints Pending on September 30, 1999	183	0	1	6	65	19	2	15	18	0	10	27	11	9	0	0

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT.

²CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*} REVISED.

^{**} EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c) for the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2000

							Cir	cuits							C	ational Courts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Complaints Pending on September 30, 1999*	181	0	1	5	65	19	2	18	15	0	7	27	11	11	0	0
Complaints Filed	696	2	18	21	59	53	61	113	56	44	51	111	32	73	2	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	695	2	18	21	59	53	61	113	56	44	51	111	31	73	2	0
On Order of Chief Judges	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	191	4	4	4	9	10	14	23	4	11	45	35	15	13	0	0
District	522	0	17	20	41	36	62	60	50	29	52	92	26	37	0	0
National Courts	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Judges	26	0	0	1	2	6	1	2	2	2	2	5	2	1	0	0
Magistrate Judges	135	0	0	3	7	2	10	28	13	6	6	32	6	22	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	26	0	0	0	2	6	6	5	0	1	3	2	0	1	0	0
Physical Disability	12	0	0	1	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	13	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	1	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	272	0	0	10	29	25	29	43	9	23	20	38	16	30	0	0
Prejudice/Bias	257	1	13	8	28	17	15	24	28	13	17	39	25	29	0	0
Conflict of Interest	48	1	0	0	11	9	1	5	1	0	3	8	1	8	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	83	0	0	2	21	12	8	4	0	2	6	22	2	4	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	75	0	2	1	11	6	6	7	5	3	3	16	4	11	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	61	0	0	0	1	7	8	3	1	3	5	31	0	2	0	0
Other	188	0	7	1	5	66	0	50	4	7	13	20	9	6	0	0
Complaints Concluded	715	2	15	17	80	67	60	123	48	44	51	104	39	65	0	0
Action by Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	29	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	9	1	0	12	1	0	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	264	2	4	3	29	31	26	23	21	11	23	38	15	38	0	0
Frivolous	50	0	4	1	0	0	2	8	2	12	8	9	2	2	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2000—Continued)

							Circ	cuits							1	tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of																
Intervening Events	7	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	359	2	8	8	30	31	34	37	32	24	31	60	20	42	0	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judge Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	354	0	7	9	50	36	26	86	16	20	20	42	19	23	0	0
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	356	0	7	9	50	36	26	86	16	20	20	44	19	23	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2000	162	0	4	9	44	5	3	8	23	0	7	34	4	19	2	0

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT.

²CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*} REVISED

^{**} EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 372(c)
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2001

							Cir	cuits								ational ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
			'													
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2001*	150	0	4	9	33	5	3	9	23	1	6	32	4	18	3	0
Complaints Filed	766	0	31	22	102	50	63	100	97	43	52	102	32	70	1	1
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	766	0	31	22	102	50	63	100	97	43	52	102	32	70	1	1
On Order of Chief Judge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	273	0	15	16	31	13	25	23	12	16	33	53	16	20	0	0
District	563	0	16	26	52	23	45	50	86	37	69	104	25	30	0	0
National Court	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Bankruptcy Judges	34	0	0	2	2	6	2	2	1	3	0	12	2	2	0	0
Magistrate Judges	143	0	3	1	17	8	12	25	17	3	10	20	9	18	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	29	0	0	0	5	4	1	3	3	1	2	5	0	5	0	0
Physical Disability	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	31	0	0	1	14	2	1	0	1	4	2	5	0	1	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	200	0	3	3	28	3	35	28	1	13	21	33	15	16	1	0
Prejudice/Bias	266	0	18	11	24	9	17	31	36	13	11	43	14	38	1	0
Conflict of Interest	38	0	0	0	10	4	3	8	1	1	0	5	4	2	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	61	0	0	0	2	5	4	6	1	1	1	33	3	5	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	60	0	0	0	6	6	3	11	2	6	4	15	0	7	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	50	0	0	2	5	8	3	3	7	0	1	20	0	1	0	0
Other	186	0	8	1	0	50	4	47	16	3	8	32	7	10	0	0
Complaints Concluded	668	0	18	16	75	53	61	108	68	39	41	100	30	58	1	0
Action by Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	13	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	0	0	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	235	0	2	3	17	26	25	42	20	14	18	27	14	27	0	0
Frivolous	103	0	0	2	13	0	6	13	14	12	7	31	2	3	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2001—Continued)

							Circ	cuits							1	tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of	7	O	O	O	O		O	O	O	•		O		O	O	O
Intervening Events	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	363	0	3	6	34	28	31	55	35	29	28	62	17	35	0	0
Gubiotai	303	U	3	O	34	20	31	55	55	23	20	02	"	33	O	U
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judge Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	303	0	15	10	40	25	30	53	33	10	13	38	12	23	1	0
Withdrawn	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	305	0	15	10	41	25	30	53	33	10	13	38	13	23	1	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2001	248	0	17	15	60	2	5	1	52	5	17	34	6	30	3	1

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT. ²CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{**} EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

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Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 372(c)
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2002

							Cir	cuits								ational ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2001*	262	0	17	15	60	3	5	19	44	5	17	36	6	31	3	1
Complaints Filed	657	0	20	14	62	51	59	81	77	28	54	105	47	54	5	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	656	0	20	13	62	51	59	81	77	28	54	105	47	54	5	0
On Order of Chief Judge	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	353	0	47	6	10	4	17	26	52	11	52	114	11	3	0	0
District	548	0	13	20	41	35	68	32	72	29	43	127	36	32	0	0
National Courts	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Bankruptcy Judges	57	0	1	1	1	6	4	2	2	0	3	27	2	8	0	0
Magistrate Judges	152	0	1	2	10	6	8	21	11	2	21	48	11	11	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	33	0	0	0	4	1	3	2	6	1	3	11	2	0	0	0
Physical Disability	6	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	17	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	7	0	3	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	327	0	1	7	57	6	29	49	14	13	19	71	17	41	3	0
Prejudice/Bias	314	0	34	16	40	13	20	35	51	11	20	36	19	16	3	0
Conflict of Interest	46	0	1	0	18	9	2	3	2	0	4	3	1	3	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	63	0	0	0	15	0	4	6	8	0	5	20	1	4	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	75	0	1	0	15	3	3	5	3	7	10	15	7	6	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	45	0	0	2	2	1	7	1	9	0	6	16	1	0	0	0
Other	129	0	4	2	0	46	3	16	8	2	4	32	9	3	0	0
Complaints Concluded	780	0	35	25	93	48	61	98	98	30	57	124	47	61	3	0
Action By Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity with Statute Directly Related to Decision	27	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	7	0	1	9	1	3	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	249	0	6	5	23	17	24	36	31	14	11	36	22	22	2	0
Frivolous	110	0	9	2	9	2	13	7	5	7	10	36	7	3	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2002—Continued)

	Circuits															tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
A A A				_		•	_		_							
Appropriate Action Already Taken	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of	•		•	•		•										•
Intervening Events	6	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	8	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Subtotal	403	0	16	10	37	20	41	44	45	22	23	82	30	30	3	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	375	0	19	15	56	28	20	54	51	8	34	42	17	31	0	0
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	377	0	19	15	56	28	20	54	53	8	34	42	17	31	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2002	139	0	2	4	29	6	3	2	23	3	14	17	6	24	5	1

¹CC = U.S. CLAIMS COURT.

 $^{^{2}}$ CIT = COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*} REVISED

^{**} EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDICIAL OFFICERS. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 351-364
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2003

							Cir	cuits								ational courts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
								•			•				•	
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2002*	141	0	3	4	29	6	3	7	22	4	15	16	6	20	5	1
Complaints Filed	835	2	11	36	69	41	67	107	73	28	97	146	47	110	0	1
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	835	2	11	36	69	41	67	107	73	28	97	146	47	110	0	1
On Order of Chief Judges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	204	6	4	19	8	4	16	27	15	2	26	43	12	22	0	0
District	719	0	14	24	49	28	54	54	53	34	157	156	39	57	0	0
National Courts	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bankruptcy Judges	38	0	0	2	1	3	1	2	5	2	1	16	3	2	0	0
Magistrate Judges	257	0	0	5	11	6	21	24	21	3	91	40	7	28	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	26	0	0	1	6	4	5	1	0	1	2	5	0	1	0	0
Physical Disability	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0
Demeanor	21	0	0	1	4	3	1	4	0	1	1	3	1	1	1	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	239	1	0	7	20	3	29	22	2	6	30	59	14	45	0	1
Prejudice/Bias	263	2	12	9	20	14	21	26	29	11	36	37	14	29	2	1
Conflict of Interest	33	0	0	1	3	5	3	2	2	1	2	7	3	4	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	87	0	0	1	4	6	10	6	15	0	20	22	0	3	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	81	0	0	3	9	6	6	4	3	5	25	16	2	1	0	1
Incompetence/Neglect	47	0	0	3	3	2	8	2	3	0	15	6	1	4	0	0
Other	131	0	0	0	4	37	4	45	0	9	2	13	14	0	3	0
Complaints Concluded	682	2	12	18	42	40	69	94	53	31	87	117	42	69	4	2
Action by Chief Judges																
Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	39	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	17	2	9	6	0	0	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	230	2	3	2	14	13	30	24	10	15	15	46	9	46	1	0
Frivolous	77	0	0	0	7	1	3	6	0	7	25	21	1	6	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2003—Continued)

							Circ	cuits							1	tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
A A A T .		_		•			_		0							
Appropriate Action Already Taken	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of	_	_	_		_	_	_		_	_	_		_	_	_	_
Intervening Events	8	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	1	0	0	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	2	0	1	0	0
Subtotal	365	2	4	3	22	15	37	31	27	24	59	77	10	53	1	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dismissed the Complaint	316	0	8	15	20	25	32	63	26	7	28	40	32	16	3	1
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0														
Subtotal	317	0	8	15	20	25	32	63	26	7	28	40	32	16	3	2
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2003	294	0	2	22	56	7	1	20	42	1	25	45	11	61	1	0

¹CC = U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS.

²CIT = U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*}REVISED.

*** EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDGES. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 351-364
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2004

	Circuits															ationa courts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT
Cummary or Morrity	Total			101	2	0.4		0		7		0				
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2003*	249	0	2	19	34	3	10	19	22	1	29	38	11	61	0	0
Complaints Filed	712	2	31	30	23	40	63	95	72	34	77	146	41	58	0	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	712	2	31	30	23	40	63	95	72	34	77	146	41	58	0	0
On Order of Chief Judges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	240	6	20	16	4	6	23	16	24	8	14	84	13	6	0	0
District	539	0	39	21	15	22	52	51	69	27	55	128	23	37	0	0
National Courts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Judges	28	0	0	8	1	2	1	2	4	1	0	6	2	1	0	0
Magistrate Judges	149	0	1	5	3	10	18	26	7	3	25	26	11	14	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	34	0	0	4	3	5	4	4	2	0	1	10	0	1	0	0
Physical Disability	6	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	34	0	1	1	6	0	4	3	0	1	7	9	1	1	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	251	1	3	11	6	0	42	2	4	2	71	59	22	28	0	0
Prejudice/Bias	334	2	19	27	35	14	22	35	42	7	38	52	20	21	0	0
Conflict of Interest	67	0	5	8	4	6	3	3	2	0	5	22	7	2	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	93	0	0	9	5	10	5	3	1	0	25	33	0	2	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	70	0	2	7	5	7	4	10	2	5	8	13	4	3	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	106	0	0	9	3	8	2	3	0	0	18	16	0	47	0	0
Other	224	0	1	1	33	30	10	89	3	24	0	24	9	0	0	0
Complaints Concluded	784	2	28	40	51	34	73	99	56	35	94	135	42	95	0	0
Action By Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	27	0	4	0	6	0	5	0	4	1	5	0	0	2	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	295	2	9	7	18	13	31	38	16	21	37	65	8	30	0	0
Frivolous	112	0	8	4	3	0	1	11	3	5	18	5	4	50	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2004—Continued)

							Circ	cuits								tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	
Action No Longer Necessary Because of	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ	•	· ·	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ		•	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ	ŭ
Intervening Events	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Subtotal	449	2	21	11	29	13	37	51	23	27	63	72	13	87	0	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges Only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	335	0	7	29	22	21	36	48	33	8	31	63	29	8	0	0
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	335	0	7	29	22	21	36	48	33	8	31	63	29	8	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2004	177	0	5	9	6	9	0	15	38	0	12	49	10	24	0	0

¹CC = U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS. ²CIT = U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

^{*}REVISED.

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Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 351-364
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2005

							Cir	cuits								ational Courts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2004*	212	0	4	9	57	9	8	16	30	1	13	30	8	25	2	0
Complaints Filed	642	1	33	19	36	58	43	99	55	15	38	122	36	85	2	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	642	1	33	19	36	58	43	99	55	15	38	122	36	85	2	0
On Order of Chief Judges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	177	1	18	1	7	4	28	10	7	6	2	80	7	6	0	0
District	456	0	21	15	23	41	32	52	51	11	22	102	27	59	0	0
National Courts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bankruptcy Judges	31	0	0	4	0	5	1	2	3	1	2	9	2	2	0	0
Magistrate Judges	135	0	1	4	6	8	9	35	5	2	13	27	7	18	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	22	0	1	2	3	2	2	3	0	0	0	6	0	1	2	0
Physical Disability	9	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	1	0
Demeanor	20	0	0	3	0	2	0	2	0	1	2	8	1	1	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	206	1	7	13	3	5	26	6	3	4	28	57	0	52	1	0
Prejudice/Bias	275	1	12	19	43	21	9	16	40	5	15	57	15	20	2	0
Conflict of Interest	49	0	2	5	5	11	2	1	3	1	2	13	3	1	0	0
Bribery/Corruption	51	0	0	3	2	1	2	2	1	0	4	32	0	4	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	65	0	0	6	8	8	2	9	2	0	4	14	7	5	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	52	0	2	4	4	3	2	3	0	1	8	22	1	1	1	0
Other	260	0	2	1	80	40	11	80	0	7	1	19	18	0	1	0
Complaints Concluded	667	1	22	23	91	47	48	90	47	16	45	120	33	81	3	0
Action by Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	21	0	1	0	5	0	1	0	2	0	3	5	3	1	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	319	1	8	8	46	18	20	30	12	6	29	57	16	65	3	0
Frivolous	41	0	1	3	1	0	4	6	3	8	5	10	0	0	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2005—Continued)

							Circ	uits								tional ourts
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of	3	U	U	U	U	'	U		U	U	U	2	U	'	U	U
Intervening Events	8	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	6	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	400	1	11	11	54	20	26	39	17	14	38	76	19	71	3	0
Subtotal	400	'	11	11	54	20	20	39	17	14	30	76	19	7 1	3	U
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	267	0	11	12	37	27	22	51	30	2	7	44	14	10	0	0
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	267	0	11	12	37	27	22	51	30	2	7	44	14	10	0	0
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2005	187	0	15	5	2	20	3	25	38	0	6	32	11	29	1	0

NOTE: EXCLUDES COMPLAINTS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE CIRCUITS BECAUSE THEY DUPLICATED PREVIOUS FILINGS OR WERE OTHERWISE INVALID FILINGS.

¹CC = U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS.

²CIT = U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. * REVISED.

^{**} EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDGES. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Table S-22.
Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. 351-364
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006

	Circuits												Nationa Courts			
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
															<u> </u>	
Complaints Pending on September 30, 2005*	210	0	3	5	31	20	12	21	42	3	6	29	2	35	1	0
Complaints Filed	643	1	16	31	14	43	47	76	72	35	44	133	49	79	3	0
Complaint Type																
Written by Complainant	555	1	16	0	0	0	47	76	72	35	44	133	49	79	3	0
On Order of Chief Judges	88	0	0	31	14	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Officials Complained About**																
Judges																
Circuit	141	1	14	13	0	3	7	6	14	16	3	34	24	6	0	0
District	505	0	17	50	10	31	36	45	68	31	32	99	40	46	0	0
National Courts	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Bankruptcy Judges	33	0	0	2	0	1	2	5	2	3	0	12	2	4	0	0
Magistrate Judges	159	0	0	26	4	6	18	20	14	1	8	31	8	23	0	0
Nature of Allegations**																
Mental Disability	30	0	3	4	1	3	1	4	0	1	0	11	2	0	0	0
Physical Disability	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Demeanor	35	0	0	0	0	4	2	4	1	1	1	17	5	0	0	0
Abuse of Judicial Power	234	1	6	18	0	0	38	22	4	2	21	63	14	44	1	0
Prejudice/Bias	295	1	3	22	28	22	16	35	50	9	18	45	14	31	1	0
Conflict of Interest	43	0	1	6	1	15	2	2	0	0	4	9	2	0	1	0
Bribery/Corruption	40	0	0	8	2	4	2	0	3	0	3	16	0	2	0	0
Undue Decisional Delay	53	0	0	2	2	8	5	5	2	5	2	11	1	10	0	0
Incompetence/Neglect	37	0	1	5	0	3	1	2	0	0	7	15	0	3	0	0
Other	200	0	0	2	38	41	4	59	0	23	4	9	18	0	2	0
Complaints Concluded	619	1	13	26	45	46	59	74	58	38	35	102	37	81	4	0
Action By Chief Judges Complaint Dismissed																
Not in Conformity With Statute Directly Related to Decision	25	0	2	1	8	0	2	0	3	2	2	3	2	0	0	0
or Procedural Ruling	283	1	2	5	15	26	24	35	25	13	21	46	17	51	2	0
Frivolous	63	0	4	4	3	0	3	4	5	18	4	7	4	7	0	0

Table S-22. (September 30, 2006—Continued)

	Circuits													National Courts		
Summary of Activity	Total	Fed	DC	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	CC1	CIT ²
Appropriate Action Already Taken	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
Action No Longer Necessary Because of																
Intervening Events	6	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0
Complaint Withdrawn	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0
Subtotal	391	1	9	10	28	27	30	41	34	34	28	59	24	64	2	0
Action by Judicial Councils																
Directed Chief District Judge to																
Take Action (Magistrate Judges only)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Certified Disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Requested Voluntary Retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Temporary Suspension																
of Case Assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Privately Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Publicly Censured	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ordered Other Appropriate Action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dismissed the Complaint	227	0	4	16	17	19	29	33	24	4	7	43	13	16	2	0
Withdrawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Referred Complaint to Judicial																
Conference	0	0	0													
Subtotal	228	0	4	16	17	19	29	33	24	4	7	43	13	17	2	0
omplaints Pending on September 30, 2006	234	0	6	10	0	17	0	23	56	0	15	60	14	33	0	0
pecial Investigating Committees Appointed	7	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0


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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 19, 2006

For Further Information Contact: Kathy Arberg 202-479-3211

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., today released the Report of the Judiciary's Committee to study the implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. In May 2004 the Chief Justice's predecessor, William H. Rehnquist, responding to concerns expressed by members of Congress, appointed the Committee to study the Judiciary's implementation of the Act and to report its findings to him. Chief Justice Roberts asked the Committee to continue its work. Justice Stephen Breyer, who chairs the Committee, transmitted the report to the Chief Justice yesterday. The other members of the Committee are Pasco M. Bowman, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit, Sarah Evans Barker, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, U.S. Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit, D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge, District of Maine, and Sally M. Rider, Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice. Staff work was performed principally by three senior members of the Federal Judicial Center and one from the Administrative Office. The Committee received no special funding.

The Committee and staff studied a sample consisting of approximately 700 complaint files drawn for the most part from about 2200 complaints terminated over a three year period (2001-2003). The members of the Committee established a set of standards to assess how the complaints were handled and examined in-depth the complaint files in about 200 individual cases.

In releasing the report, the Chief Justice said, "The Committee has engaged in a thorough and comprehensive study of the judiciary's implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, and I thank the members for their work. The report finds that overall, the judiciary has done an excellent job of handling complaints in accordance with the Act, but that in respect to a small number of highly visible cases, improvement is needed. The Committee has identified concrete steps we can take to improve the handling of all cases, and in particular, those that are highly visible. For example, one major recommendation is a more vigorous role for the Judicial Conference committee with overall responsibility for the administration of the Act, including creating a mechanism so that chief judges consider, in appropriate circumstances, transferring a case to another circuit for handling. I have asked that the report's recommendations be referred to the appropriate committees of the Judicial Conference for thorough consideration and prompt action."

The report is available electronically on the Supreme Court's Web site, www.supremecourtus.gov, under Public Information. Copies of the report may also be obtained from the Public Information Office: 202-479-3211.

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For Public Comment: Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings

On July 16, 2007, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States released its draft *Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings* for 90 days of public comment, **to conclude on October 15, 2007**. From this web page, you may review those rules and submit your comments by e-mail.

- Review Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings (pdf)
- E-mail your comments to <u>JudicialConductRules@ao.uscourts.gov</u>

With any comments you submit, please specify your:

- 1. Name,
- 2. Mailing address,
- 3. Organization, if any, and
- 4. Occupation (federal judge, state judge, lawyer in private practice, government lawyer, professor, or non-lawyer).

Although submissions will not receive a response, those that are timely will be considered by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Committee as it prepares the draft rules for Judicial Conference consideration.

The draft rules were developed at the direction of the Judicial Conference as a means of ensuring that the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364, operates consistently throughout the federal court system. If adopted by the Conference, they will constitute binding guidance for chief judges, circuit judicial councils, and circuit staff on the full spectrum of issues noted in *Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, A Report to the Chief Justice*, 239 F.R. D. 116 (September 2006) ("Breyer Committee Report"). Those issues, and the historical and policy context of these rules, are discussed fully in that report.

You may also comment on these rules at a public hearing being planned for that purpose, to commence at 10:00 a.m. on September 27, 2007, in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York. Requests to appear and testify at the hearing must be e-mailed by August 27 to the Office of the General Counsel, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at JudicialConductRules@ao.uscourts.gov. Those who submit such requests will be asked to give a written indication of the testimony they intend to provide.

This web page and its links are for use only in reviewing, and commenting upon, the draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings. No complaints and no communication on any other topic will be accepted here.



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Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal

Robert W. Kastenmeier (Chair)

1993, 210 pages

(Out of Print: Archival Copy on File)

In 1990, Congress created the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, who's charge included investigation of problems related to the discipline and removal of life-tenured federal judges, and evaluation of alternatives to current arrangements for judicial discipline and removal, including statutory and constitutional amendments. The Commission was instructed to submit its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States. The Commission held six public hearings during 1992 and 1993, and submitted its final report on August 2, 1993.

The Federal Judicial Center serves as repository for the Commission's published materials. Although paper copies of the Commission's final report are no longer available, the report is reprinted at 152 Federal Rules Decisions 265 (1994).

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Judges of the United States Courts

Impeachments of Federal Judges

John Pickering, U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives on March 2, 1803, on charges of mental instability and intoxication on the bench; Trial in the U.S. Senate, March 3, 1803, to March 12, 1803; Convicted and removed from office on March 12, 1803.

Samuel Chase, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives on March 12, 1804, on charges of arbitrary and oppressive conduct of trials; Trial in the U.S. Senate, November 30, 1804, to March 1, 1805; Acquitted on March 1, 1805.

James H. Peck, U.S. District Court for the District of Missouri.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives on April 24, 1830, on charges of abuse of the contempt power; Trial in the U.S. Senate, April 26, 1830, to January 31, 1831; Acquitted on January 31, 1831.

West H. Humphreys, U.S. District Court for the Middle, Eastern, and Western Districts of Tennessee.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, May 6, 1862, on charges of refusing to hold court and waging war against the U.S. government; Trial in the U. S. Senate, May 7, 1862, to June 26, 1862; Convicted and removed from office, June 26, 1862.

Mark W. Delahay, U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, February 28, 1873, on charges of intoxication on the bench; Resigned from office, December 12, 1873, before opening of trial in the U.S. Senate. pr:45

Charles Swayne, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, December 13, 1904, on charges of abuse of contempt power and other misuses of office; Trial in the U.S. Senate, December 14, 1904, to February 27, 1905; Acquitted February 27, 1905.

Robert W. Archbald, U.S. Commerce Court.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, July 11, 1912, on charges of improper business relationship with litigants; Trial in the U.S. Senate, July 13, 1912, to January 13, 1913; Convicted and removed from office, January 13, 1913.

George W. English, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, April 1, 1926, on charges of abuse of power; resigned office November 4, 1926; Senate Court of Impeachment adjourned to December 13, 1926, when, on request of the House manager, impeachment proceedings were dismissed.

Harold Louderback, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, February 24, 1933, on charges of favoritism in the appointment of bankruptcy receivers; Trial in the U.S. Senate, May 15, 1933, to May 24, 1933; Acquitted, May 24, 1933.

Halsted L. Ritter, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, March 2, 1936, on charges of favoritism in the appointment of bankruptcy receivers and practicing law while sitting as a judge; Trial in the U.S. Senate, April 6, 1936, to April 17, 1936; Convicted and removed from office, April 17, 1936.

Harry E. Claiborne, U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, October 9, 1986, on charges of income tax evasion and of remaining on the bench following criminal conviction; Trial in the U.S. Senate, October 7, 1986, to October 9, 1986; Convicted and removed from office, October 9, 1986.

Alcee L. Hastings, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, August 3, 1988, on charges of perjury and conspiring to solicit a bribe; Trial in the U.S. Senate, October 18, 1989, to October 20, 1989; Convicted and removed from office, October 20, 1989.

Walter L. Nixon, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives, May 10, 1989, on charges of perjury before a federal grand jury; Trial in the U.S. Senate, November 1, 1989, to November 3, 1989; Convicted and removed from office, November 3, 1989.

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as of October 11, 2007

The Supreme Court Justices and the Chief Judges Have Semi-annually Received Official Information About the Self-immunizing Systematic Dismissal of Judicial Conduct Complaints, But Have Tolerated It With Disregard for the Consequent Abuse of Power and Corruption

For decades since before the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. §351 et seq.)¹, the Supreme Court has known of the lack of an effective judicial impeachment mechanism (ToEC:60>Comment, C:1384):² In the 217 years since the U.S. Constitution of 1789, only 7 federal judges³ have been impeached and removed. Since the Act's passage, they have known also of the break down of its self-discipline mechanism (ToEC:24>Comment, C:573). To know it, Late Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was also the presiding member of the Judicial Conference (28 U.S.C §331¶1), the body of last resort under the Act (id. §354(b)), need not read the Annual Reports on the Act produced by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (id. §604(h)(2)) or the Conference's reports (C:1771). He knew that in the 24 years since the Act the Conference had issued under it only 15 orders! (C:1611) Yet he waited until May 2004 to charge Justice Stephen Breyer with chairing a committee to study it. (C:574-577) The Breyer Committee held no hearings (cf.ToEC:66§L) and took over 27 months only to issue a report that clears his lower peers of the systematic dismissal of complaints apparent from the official reports.

All the justices are also circuit justices of the circuits to which they have been allotted (28) U.S.C. §42, 45(b); C:149) so they may attend (C:980y-83; cf. 980z-10) their councils' meetings where misconduct complaints are discussed (C:980y-84, z-76) and can learn the nature and number of orders related thereto, which must be reported to the Administrative Office (28 U.S.C. §332(c-d, g); C:980y-87, z-79). Hence, they know that such complaints are systematically dismissed. Actually, the justices must be presumed to have realized from the cases that they deal with daily at the Supreme Court that 'power corrupts and in the absence of any control over its exercise, power becomes absolute and corrupts absolutely, So they could not have reasonably believed that while wielding power over life, liberty, and property, the 2,133 federal judges would remain immune to the type of "Culture of Corruption", in the words of House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, that has engulfed the 535 members of Congress. Did the justices or the circuit judges of the courts of appeals, who appoint bankruptcy judges to renewable 14-year terms (28 U.S.C. §152(a)(1)), believe for a moment that even in the absence of any supervision and discipline and without the deterrence of impeachment bankruptcy judges would resist the temptation to mishandle the \$billions that are at stake in bankruptcies and whose disposition they determine? (D:458§V, Add:621§1) Since the justices and circuit judges cannot have ignored ongoing misconduct of judges abusing their uncontrolled power, why have they tolerated it?

¹ All the references to legal authority are found at:

 $http://judicial\text{-}discipline\text{-}reform.org/Authorities\%20Cited.htm\#VII.A.3._Table_of_Authorities.$

² All the references with the format 'letter:#' are found at: http://judicial-discipline-reform.org/Bank%20of%20Links.htm#Table_of_Exhibits.

³ http://www.fjc.gov/history/home/nsf >Judges of the US >Impeachments of Federal Judges.

⁴ The Dynamics of Organized Corruption in the Courts, http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/corruption.pdf.

A reasonable person is assumed to intend the normal consequences of his or her acts, just as they are assumed to engage in rational behavior in furtherance of what they conceive to be their interests. Consequently, it must be assumed that when the justices and circuit judges engaged or acquiesced in the systematic dismissal of misconduct complaints against judges they intended to allow their peers and themselves to wield uncontrolled power and engage in its normal consequence of abuse of power and corruption. Since this in turn would normally give rise to complaints leading to prosecution, the dismissal of such complaints became necessary to immunize themselves from such prosecution. The facts do not allow the justices of the Supreme Court to deny that this was their intention.

Indeed, they know how litigious our society is, for the number of filings in the Supreme Court went from 7,924 in the 2001 Term to 9,608 in the 2005 Term⁵! Hence, they could not assume for a second that it was a normal occurrence that *for years in a row* not a single complaint, all denied by a circuit chief judge or dismissed by any of the 13 circuit councils, made it up as a petition for review to the Judicial Conference under 28 U.S.C.§§354(b) or 357(a). The latter is the highest policy-making body of the federal judiciary (§331), the Third Branch of Government, that must ensure the proper functioning and integrity of the courts and its judges.

It would be patently untenable to pretend that not even one of all the complainants to the circuit chief judges was so dissatisfied with a chief judge's final order concerning his complaint under 28 U.S.C. §351 as to petition the respective circuit council for review thereof under §352(c). It would be just as untenable to allege that not a single petitioner to any of the 13 councils was "aggrieved" under §357(a) by a council's action so as to be entitled to petition the Conference for review thereof. It would be equally untenable to suggest that of all the complaints filed during the course of years there has not been even one meritorious enough for any of the councils to refer under §354(b)(1) or (2)to the Conference.

Consequently, it necessarily follows that the occurrence of "no pending petitions for review of judicial council action on misconduct orders" is the result of the non-coincidental, intentional, and coordinated determination of the judges of the 13 councils, with the conniving approval of those who are also members of the Conference, and its presiding member, the chief justice, both to prevent complaints, not to mention their own actions on them, from being reviewed and to put an end to them at the earliest stage possible. The Supreme Court is responsible for ensuring respect for the rule of law through its application not only by, but also to, judges. Hence, it too is to blame for having allowed the entrenchment of the attitude of flagrant disregard by judges, chief judges, and their councils and Conference, of the legal duty imposed on them under §351 et seq. to handle effectively complaints against them and to discipline themselves as well as for having tolerated its deleterious effect on the integrity of judicial process: abuse of power and corruption. (Cf. A:1662\sqrt{S}D; ToEC:>C:973 and Comment thereunder)

⁵ Table A-1 Supreme Court cases, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, Annual Reports for 1997-2006 of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html, collected and with links to the originals in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/statistics/cases_filed_90-06.

⁶ Reports of the Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders; see sample at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/no_pending_petitions.pdf. These Reports are reflected in the section dedicated to the Committee in the Report of the Proceedings [in March and September of each year] of the Judicial Conference of the United States, collected at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/JConf_Reports.pdf.

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Unimpeachable Judges are Judges Above the Law

Chief Justice John Roberts is the seventeenth chief justice of the Supreme Court since John Jay became the first chief justice in 1789 upon his nomination by President George Washington. In the same 217 years comprising the whole judicial history of the United States under the Constitution of 1789, only thirteen federal judges have been impeached in Congress. This means that a federal judge has a higher statistical chance of becoming the next chief justice of the Supreme Court than of being impeached.

In addition, there is the pattern of the chief judges of the courts of appeals and the judges of the circuit councils systematically dismissing² judicial misconduct complaints under 28 U.S.C. §351 et seq.³ In practice this means that judges protecting their own have rendered useless that mechanism of judicial self-discipline entrusted to the federal judiciary; official statistics of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts⁴ proves it. By so doing, judges have intentionally and through coordination violated the constitutional mandate that they "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour".⁵ (emphasis added)

As a result, federal judges are not subject to any effective system of supervision and discipline. Without any such control, their exercise of judicial power becomes absolute. Thereby the condition for the application of the aphorism ensues: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". It makes possible for a federal judgeship to become a safe haven for wrongdoing and for federal judges to become a class of wrongdoers immune to the principle inscribed on the frieze below the pediment of the Supreme Court building, "Equal Justice Under Law". Federal judges are the only ones in our society that, as a matter of historic fact and established practice, ⁶ are people above the law and beyond prosecution. (cf.A:1662§D)

¹ Only seven federal judges have been removed. Federal Judicial Center at http://www.fjc.gov/>Federal Judicial History>Judges of the United States Courts> Impeachments of Judges (http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf). Cf. "In the years since [1805] the Chase trial [of Justice Samuel Chase], eleven federal judges have been impeached. Of those, three were acquitted, two resigned rather than face trial, and six were convicted. One conviction -- that of Judge West H. Humphreys in 1862 -- was by default since he had accepted appointment as a Confederate judge in Tennessee. The other five convictions were for offenses involving financial improprieties, income tax evasion, and perjury -- misconduct far removed from judicial acts." Remarks of the Chief Justice [William Rehnquist] Federal Judges Association Board of Directors Meeting May 5, 2003 (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/CJ_Rehnquist_impeachments.pdf)

² The Supreme Court Justices and the Chief Judges Semi-annually Receive Official Information About the Self-immunizing Systematic Dismissal of Judicial Conduct Complaints, But Tolerate It With Disregard for the Consequent Abuse of Power and Corruption (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/SCt_knows_of_dismissals.pdf)

³ Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc351_Conduct_complaints.pdf)

⁴ Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Administrative_Office_statistics.pdf

⁵ U.S. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/US_Constitution.pdf)

⁶ But as a matter of law, judicial immunity is not a protection attached to a federal judgeship by the Constitution. Cf. Federal Judges Have No Grant of Immunity From The Constitution: In a system of "Equal Justice Under Law" they must be liable to prosecution as defendants in a class action like anybody else (http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/no_judicial_immunity.pdf)

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September 19, 2007

Circuit Judge Ralph Winter Chair, Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability Office of the General Counsel Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Washington, D.C. 20544

tel.(202)502-1100

e-mailed to: JudicialConductRules@ao.uscourts.gov

Re: Request for 20 minutes to comment on Draft Rules at hearing and use of PowerPoint

Dear Judge Winter,

Thank you for your e-mail of August 30 acknowledging and granting my request to appear and testify at the hearing, planned to commence at 10:00 a.m. on September 27, 2007, in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, on the Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings released by the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

To satisfy the requirement that together with the request to appear at the hearing a requester give a written indication of the testimony that he intends to provide on that occasion, I timely submitted a draft of some of the comments that I, as an attorney at Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org, intend to present at the hearing and in writing to the Committee. For every useful purpose, you will find reproduced hereunder the indication of my intended comments.

In your e-mail, you stated that after September 17 you would determine the order in which the witnesses will speak at the hearing. I would appreciate it if you would let me know at your earliest convenience when I will testify.

Moreover, since there is no statement on your part on the length of the testimony and given the structured nature and length of my intended comments, I respectfully request that to make my comments I be given 20 minutes.

I would also like to know:

- a) whether the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, where the hearing will be held, can make available the necessary equipment to make a PowerPoint presentation; if so,
- b) the type of media, such as a CD or DVD, on which I can bring my PowerPoint file, and
- c) whether I can arrive at 9:00 a.m. on day of the hearing to test the equipment.

I look forward to hearing from you and meantime remain,

yours sincerely,

Dr. Richard Cordero, Esa.

Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.

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August 23, 2007

(see the final, timely submitted version of October 13, 2007, at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_draft_rules.pdf)

Indication of the Comments

On the Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings intended to be made at the hearing on September 27, 2007, in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York,

by

Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.

- I. Comments on the Rules (see samples below)
- II. Whether the Rules' underlying basis, the Report of the Breyer Committee, provided any analysis not already available in, and not in contradiction with, the statistics since 1996 of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on complaints filed under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
 - A. The system of handling judicial conduct and disability complaints is fundamentally flawed due to judges' bias and dominating interest in self-preservation because it is based on the chief circuit judges reviewing complaints against their peers and friends
 - B. The conflict of interests inherent in a chief circuit judge reviewing a complaint against the circuit court's or even his own appointee, that is, a bankruptcy judge appointed under 28 U.S.C. §152(a)(1) or (3), respectively
- III. Whether the Rules or the Breyer Report deal with the fundamental institutional problems that have affected the application of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act since its enactment in 1980
 - A. The fundamental problem of lack of checks and balances to control the conduct of federal judges and the dynamics of interdependent survivability of members of close and powerful groups, two factors that have prevented the removal of any federal judges from the bench except seven judges in the 218 years since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, by the count of the Federal Judicial Center (www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf >Judges of the United States>Impeachments of Judges)
- IV. Whether the Rules have the potential to render effective the Federal Judiciary's current mechanism of self-discipline by requiring that the Judiciary and its members be accountable for their administration of justice and perform their duty to safeguard the integrity of judicial process

- A. Evidence that the Supreme Court has tolerated for years the systematic dismissal of misconduct complaints, thereby signaling that neither the Act nor the Rules were to be taken seriously
- B. The Judicial Conference has known that the Act and the current rules for its implementation are ineffective given that in the 27 years of the Act it has issued only 15 opinions under it, and that for years in a row the judicial councils have not allowed a single complaint to make it even to its Committee for the Review of Judicial Council Conduct and Disability Decisions (now known as the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability)
- C. How self-discipline through peer review is ineffective to prevent that judges appointed for life and as a matter of fact unimpeachable elevate themselves above the law, where they enjoy the privilege of having justice applied to them in private given that complaints against them are treated confidentially and by peer judges, who lack impartiality due to their reputational interest, or even self-preservation interest, in their complained-about peers being found above reproach
- D. The need for an independent board of citizens neither appointed by nor related to the judiciary, otherwise for a panel of three retired judges from circuits other than that of the complained-about judge, to enforce in public proceedings rules of judicial discipline and accountability aimed at providing persons injured by complained-about judges an effective remedy, that is, compensation, and at holding judges to the standard of "Equal Justice Under Law"

I. Comments on the Rules (Sample)

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 1. Scope, p2, L3, and purpose

1. The Rules¹ are designed by federal judges to protect their own position above both the law and the other two branches of the federal government, that is, the Executive and the Legislative. They are not designed to enable the attainment of the objective reasonably pursued by a person who bothers to write a complaint and thereby exposes himself to retaliation from the complained-against individual, namely, to cause that individual, here a judge, to cease and desist his complaint-causing conduct and to require such judge or his employer, the Judicial Branch, to compensate the complainant for the harm that he caused the complainant.

¹ Drafts Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings, released for public comment by the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States; hereinafter the Rules.

- 2. This is due to the Act²'s "largely based...administrative perspective", p11, L40, cf. p26, L37-38. This means that the Act is conceived as a set of housekeeping instructions for the internal management by the Federal Judiciary of its personnel, the judges. Neither the Act nor the Rules attempt to provide a system of checks and balances on the exercise by judges of judicial power. Hence, judges are allowed to exercise their considerable power over property, liberty, and even life not only "during Good Behaviour", U.S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 1, but as a matter of fact also 'during Bad Behaviour' for the rest of their lives.
- 3. The fact is that in the 217 years since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, only seven judges have been removed from the bench, according to the Federal Judicial Center (www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf>Judges of the United States>Impeachments of Judges). So, they can behave badly while enjoying the assurance that they will not pay any price therefore because their salary cannot be diminished while they hold office, U.S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 1, or even hold on to office after retirement to protect their sinecure. Hence, power exercised for life without any checks and balances becomes absolute power. Such absolute power has a known effect on those who exercise it: It corrupts them absolutely. Such corruption is not limited to the taking of bribes or rendering decisions that protect or advance their economic interests, such as their stockholdings, but also includes the complicit toleration of the wrongdoing that they see other peers practice and that they aid and abet through their silence in exchange for the emotional and social benefit of their friendship and continued camaraderie.
- 4. Neither the Act nor the Rules recognize the right of complainants to obtain an effective remedy, as the Judiciary, which is part of government, would have to do if it did not in fact hold itself, unlike the two 'lesser' branches of government, above the law, including the First Amendment, which provides "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the Government for a redress of grievances". Rather, they allow the chief circuit judge to dismiss a complaint without more; if he does not do that, whatever he does is not aimed at providing redress to the complainant, but simply to do something that is "best able to influence a judge's future behavior in constructive ways", p11, L42. There is no attempt to remedy through compensation the harm that the complainant may have suffered at the hands of a judge who showed bias against him or disregarded the law, thereby causing him the loss of rights, property, or liberty and forcing him either to give up the prosecution of his case or to continue litigating in court at enormous additional material and emotional cost.

Rule 2. Effect and Construction, p3, L4

5. A chief circuit judge can suspend the new Rules if he only "finds expressly that

² Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §351 et seq.; hereinafter the Act.

³ "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely"; Lord Acton in his Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 3, 1887.

exceptional circumstances render the application of a Rule in a particular proceeding manifestly unjust or manifestly contrary to the purposes of 28 U.S.C. $\S\S$ 351-**364 or these Rules"**, p3, L11-13.

- 6. Rule 2 exhibits the same defect that the Breyer Committee⁴ found regarding the evaluation of the original Rules, namely, a lack of "interpretive standards", p22, L22-25. None of the competent entities for the implementation of the Act through the Rules⁵ is required to provide a reasoned statement equivalent to conclusions of law under FRCivP 52(a) of what makes the application of the Rules "manifestly unjust or contrary to the purpose of the Act or the Rules".
- 7. Note that when the Rule drafters wanted to require the chief circuit judge to state reasons for his conduct, they did so expressly: "The Act authorizes the chief circuit judge, by written order stating reasons, to identify a complaint and thereby dispense with the filing of a written complaint", p9, L4-5.
- 8. Given the perfunctory decisions by which chief circuit judges systematically dismiss complaints, not to mention the mere forms used by a judicial council to deny review, there is every evidence to support the concern that under the Rules chief circuit judges will continue to dismiss complaints by finding at will and without stating their reasons that in the complaint at hand the Rules are inapplicable due to "exceptional circumstances".
- 9. Since a district judge cannot suspend the FRCivP just because he deems their application "manifestly unjust or contrary" to the purpose of the law or the FRCivP, why should the chief circuit judge be allowed to do so with respect to the application of the Rules to one of his peers or even to one of his bankruptcy appointees?
- 10. In any event, once the chief circuit judge finds the Rules inapplicable, what does he do?: dismiss the complaint for lack regulatory authority or just make up his own rules as he goes along to the detriment of the complainant, who filed her complaint in reliance on those Rules?
- 11. What the final sentence of Rule 2 does in effect is turn the Rules into suggestions that the chief circuit judge can disregard whenever pressure from his peers or a conflict of interests makes it expedient to do so.

Dr Richard Cordero's request of 8/23/7, rev., to AO General Counsel to testify at hearing on Draft Rules

⁴ The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, appointed in 2004 by the Late Chief Justice Rehnquist and chaired by Associate Justice Breyer. It presented a report, known as the "Breyer Report," 239 F.R.D. 116 (Sept. 2006).

⁵ These entities are the chief circuit judge, the special committee, the judicial council, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Committee, and the Judicial Conference.

ARTICLE II. INITIATION OF A COMPLAINT

Rule 5. Identification of a Complaint, p8, L7

- 12. "(2) A chief judge:...(B) need not identify a complaint if it is clear on the basis of the total mix of information available to the chief circuit judge that the review provided in Rule 11 will result in a dismissal under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e). However, a chief circuit judge may identify a complaint in such circumstances in order to assure the public that highly visible allegations have been investigated. In such a case, appointment of a special committee under Rule 11(f) may not be necessary", p8L9, 24-30
- 13. In all but so many words, this Rule allows the chief circuit judge to mislead the public by pretending that he has identified a complaint against a judge and will investigate the information constituting an identifiable complaint, when in fact he has already decided that there is not going to be any such investigation and that the complaint is as good as dismissed but for the signing of the order to that effect.
- 14. What kind of trust in the integrity of the process did the drafters intend to build in judges, complainants, and the public when they authorized the handling of complaints through deceit? Would stockholders bring a cause of action for negligence, deceit, and mounting a cover up against an investment bank that announced, not just once, but rather as part of an express policy, that it had opened a file on a complaint that some of its officers had engaged in inside trading, falsifying profit figures, and operating illegal offshore accounts, when in fact it had not only not opened any such file, but also never intended to investigate the complaints at all? What would a jury find?
- 15. This Rule disregards the first and second Laws of Sloth, which precede those of Newton as well as the Magna Carta: first, a person shall not do any work that he can avoid doing; and second, whenever a person, particularly one on a fixed salary, is afforded an excuse not to take onerous action required to perform her duty, especially one that will increase her discomfort by affecting her interests adversely, she will invoke that excuse to minimize discomfort and maximize comfort, her duty notwithstanding. This Law is also known by its popular name, that is, take the easy way out and enjoy your piña colada.

Rule 6. Filing a Complaint, p9, L10

20. "The name of the subject judge should not appear on the envelope"⁶, p.11, L1-2. This is an example of unequal justice, since a complaint against any member of the other two

⁶ "Subject judge" is the term of art for 'complained about judge', or as the Rules define it, "The term "subject judge" means any judge described in Rule 4 who is the subject of a complaint", p4, L23-25.

branches of government is not shrouded in such secrecy. The secrecy protecting the name of a peer only makes it easier for the chief circuit judge to dismiss the complaint at will without any review or examination whatsoever.

- 21. Such secrecy is misused when it is a means for the Judiciary to protect its reputation interest in appearing not to have rogue judges in its midst. Bad or rotten apples appear in every organization where human beings, with all their virtues and vices, are present. Actually, if "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely", then one would expect to find an above average number of cases of absolute corruption in an institution such as the Federal Judiciary, whose members wield power of over the property, liberty, and life of everybody else and do so for life so long as their peers pretend that theirs is "good Behaviour".
- 22. Secrecy may be necessary to protect the complainant, for as the drafters recognize, complainants may fear retaliation by judges against people who make statements accusing them of misconduct, such as "an attorney who practices in federal court, and that [insists on remaining an] unnamed witness...unwilling to be identified or to come forward", p17, L35-36. But such secrecy should be maintained at the option of the complainant, to the extent that it does not detract from the basic notion of fairness that ensures any person the right to confront his accusers.
- 23. However, the secrecy that the drafters require is not for the protection of the complainant, but rather for that of the Judiciary and its judges. This is shown by the fact that if the complainant does not agree to remain quiet about her complaint beyond the fact of filing it, she will be penalized by the special committee not letting her know what one could reasonably expect a complainant to be entitled to know if the filing of the complaint were conceived as an act of a victim of a judge's misconduct seeking a remedy, namely, to know with what zeal, competency, and completeness the judiciary investigated one of its own and to that end, receive as of right a copy of the report of the investigation conducted by the special committee.
- 24. Under Rule 16(e), by contrast, the possibility –not the certainty- of receiving such report is a carrot dangled in front of the complainant. She may be allowed to eat it depending on "the degree of the complainant's cooperation in preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings, including the identity of the subject judge", p26, L30-31. The drafters put it even blunter terms in their Commentary: "In exercising their discretion regarding the role of the complainant, the special committee and the judicial council should protect the confidentiality of the complaint process. As a consequence, Subsection (e) provides that a special committee may consider the degree to which a complainant has cooperated in preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings in determining what role beyond the minimum required by these Rules should be given to that complainant", p27, L13-17.

- 25. This means that the drafters accord a higher value to keeping the identity of the subject judge secret than to obtaining the benefit that can result for the Judiciary as well as for the complainant from the latter publicizing her complaint, namely, to cause witnesses and other persons similarly injured by the subject judge come forward. Thereby the complainant can buttress her complaint and ensure that it is not dismissed out of hand by the chief circuit judge and that he not only appoints a special committee, but that the one appointed conducts its investigation as broadly and deeply as the real extent of the problem warrants, which redounds to the benefit of the Judiciary by enabling it to correct the problem...but this could entail finding the subject judge at fault and even having to reprimand her publicly, which impairs the Judiciary's reputational interests and can threaten the chief circuit judge's and his peers' self-preservation interests... 'uhm, better the complainant keep quiet or she will be made to pay a price by not being allowed to learn about the handling of her complaint "beyond the minimum required by these Rules", p27, L17. Secrecy trumps efficiency and fairness.
- 26. The Rules' requirement of secrecy and its denial of any meaningful remedy to the complainant for the harm caused her by a subject judge (see comments on Rule 11(d), ¶52 et seq. below) show that the Rules treat the complainant as a mere informant whose only role is to assist a "process view[ed] as fundamentally administrative and inquisitorial, [so that] these rules do not give the complainant the rights of a party to litigation, and leave the complainant's role largely to the discretion of the special committee", p26, L37-39. In light of these circumstances, why should a potential complainant ever bother to file a complaint against a judge since there is nothing in it for her except the implicitly acknowledged well-founded fear of retaliation by, not only the subject judge, but also every other judge "in federal court", p17, L35-36 and ¶22 above,?

Rule 7. Where to Initiate Complaints, p11, L13

- 27. "With an exception for judges sitting by designation, the Rule requires the identifying or filing of a misconduct or disability complaint in the circuit in which the judge holds office, largely based on the administrative perspective of the Act. Given the Act's emphasis on the future conduct of the business of the courts, the circuit in which the judge holds office is the appropriate forum because that circuit is likely best able to influence a judge's future", p11, L38-42, "behavior in constructive ways", p12, L1. (emphasis added)
- 28. There are no standards setting forth the circumstances under which a non-home circuit can transfer a complaint to the subject judge's home-circuit, except "where allegations also involve a member of the bar -- ex parte contact between an attorney and a judge, for example -- it may often be desirable to have the judicial and bar misconduct proceedings take place in the same venue. Rule 7(b), therefore,

- allows transfer to, or filing or identification of a complaint in, the non-home circuit. The proceeding may be transferred by the judicial council of the filing or identified circuit to the other circuit", p12, L4-9.
- 29. There is no consideration of the concerns that warrant the application of the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, or of the practical inconvenience for the complainant who resides in the subject judge's non-home circuit to pursue his complaint against the local lawyer if the nonhome judicial circuit decides nevertheless to split the complaint and transfer the part against the subject judge to his home-circuit. The complainant's views on the issue of transfer are not taken into consideration because, after all, the Act takes an "administrative perspective" on complaints and considers them merely an internal matter to be decided, not in order to render justice to the complainant, let alone to punish the subject judge, but simply to improve "the future conduct of the business of the courts", ¶27. If fault the subject judge committed in the past, it has already been forgiven and largely forgotten because the Act is not dealing with even the fault's impact on the present, but rather with how the subject judge's conduct may affect other people in the future. Is the complainant supposed to endure all the considerable emotional and material 'inconvenience' of filing a complaint and petitions against the statistically overwhelmingly frequent dismissal and denial of review just as a public service for the benefit of others? Would it be from the peers of the subject judge that she would receive the example of such altruism?

Rule 8. Action by Clerk, p12, L11

- 30. "(b) Distribution of Copies", p12, L13. Rule 8 does not require the chief circuit judge to discuss the complaint with the subject judge before dismissing it. The accuracy of this statement is corroborated by Rule 11(f), which provides that "Before appointing a special committee, the chief circuit judge must invite the subject judge to respond to the complaint either orally or in writing if such an opportunity was not given during the limited inquiry", p15, L27-29. The drafters justify the chief circuit judges taking this initiative at this time on behalf of their peers because the drafters validate the chief circuit judges' prejudice against complaints, that is, their preconceived judgment that complaints are meritless and not worthy of subject judges' time since "many complaints are clear candidates for dismissal even if their allegations are accepted as true, and there is no need for the subject judge to devote time to a defense", p19, L31-33.
- 31. Hence, Rule 8 does not require the subject judge to take cognizance of the complaint and put in writing his or her response, which at the very least would have a cautionary effect by giving notice to the subject judge that somebody took exception to his or her conduct. Likewise, it does not require the chief judge of the court on which the subject judge sits to do absolutely anything with the copy of the complaint that the clerk is required to send him; he does not even

- have to bother to read it since he does not have to take a position on it at all. The complaint may well be received by the clerk of his court and systematically sent to the slush pile.
- 32. Constructive knowledge of the complaint may be imputed to such chief judge by the fact of just having been sent a copy of it. However, requiring that such chief judge certify that she has actually received and in fact taken cognizance of the complaint against one of the judges in her court would have the salutary effect of alerting her to a problem with the subject judge in her court or even in her court as a whole. Knowing the complaint's content would afford her the opportunity to take appropriate administrative measures to deal with the problem, if not at the earliest opportunity because she already knew or by exercising her supervisory function with due diligence would have known about such problem, at least from then on. What is more, such knowledge would impose on her an affirmative duty to deal with the problem, similar to that which every single judge is under pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3057 Bankruptcy investigations, that is, the chief judge would have the duty to communicate to the chief circuit judge 'any reasonable grounds that she had for believing either that the subject judge engaged in the conduct or had the disability complained about or that an investigation should be had in connection with the complaint'.
- 33. The absence in Rule 8(b), ¶30 above, of any required action by either the subject judge or the chief judge of his court upon receipt of the complaint is in faithful compliance with a corollary to the second Law of Sloth, namely: Do not waste your effort doing anything that you are not required to do because if neither the law, nor the rules, nor a code of conduct requires you to do it, then by the definition it is not important and you have nothing to gain from doing it. This corollary has been translated from legalese into plain English as "do not go looking for trouble; let them chase after you, and if they catch you, then do the minimum indispensable to get away with it".
- 34. As far as the complaint goes, nobody but the chief circuit judge may ever have to know that a complaint was filed. Consequently, the Rules do not provide for the complainant to be informed of the subject judge's reaction to the complaint, for no such reaction is required. As a result, the complaint may be dismissed by the chief circuit judge under Rule 11 without either the complainant, the subject judge, or his chief judge becoming any the wiser for it.
- 35. What is more, if reaction there is on the part of the subject judge because the chief circuit judge uses his faculty under Rule 11(b) whereby he "may communicate orally or in writing with...the subject judge", p14, L35-36, the complainant may not know of the tenor of it since the chief circuit judge is not even required to notify the complainant of such communication with the subject judge...and all the better, for what would the chief circuit judge notify about his communication with the subject judge?, which is likely to go off thus:

- CCJ: Hey Nicky, how are you!?
- SJ: Joey!, How's'it going?
- CSJ: Real good. I wanted to let you know again how much I enjoyed that last judicial junket.
- SJ: Me too. I learned a lot about fly fishing.
- CCJ: Listen, my wife just got the photos. I think Millie will like them too.
- SJ: You'r right. My wife is making the album for all of us this time.
- CCJ: I'll send them to you right away by courier. By the way, I found this thing about you that has been lying on my desk for months, you know...What's the story 'bout it?
- SJ: You mean the complaint? Well, so long ago. I think one of the clerks told me that one of those had come in. Joey, there is not'ing to it. You know how things go. These little people come into your court out of their wits 'cause they got sued or are revved up by a petty offense they just whipped up from a tea pot into a stormy lawsuit and they're nervous and misunderstand everything you say and exaggerate everything you do and don't understand not'ing about how things are done in the local practice of a real courtroom.
- CCJ: Nicky, you don't have to tell me. If remember how things were when I was in district. Today I just give'em a summary order: Affirmed! Affirmed! Affirmed! and move on.
- SJ: How I envy you!, Joey. I try as much I can to get rid of these pesky mud slingers to work on the cases with pedigree names. Anyway, you can't shortchange the honchos with big law firms. They have the means to go up and make you look like a hack...
- CCJ: and you end up calling in your IOUs to fix it! Nicky, Nicky! I know the drill. Well, I'm so glad we have discussed this matter fully. Sorry I even mentioned it. But don't you sweat it. I'll give this complaint the good shot; I have a form for them too: Dismissed! Dismissed! Dismissed!
- SJ: You do that and thank you so much, I really appreciate what you'r doing for me with those photos. Send them right away. I think you gotta one when Harry was startled awake by his first fish ever...and fell from the boat into the lake! We'r gonna be teasing him until we meet you guys at the circuit conference!
- CCJ: You are such a jerk...I'll help you! I'll write a note on the back of that photo that it has been submitted in a disability complaint against him as evidence he also falls asleep on the bench. Make sure the gang is with him when he reads it. With his leaky bladder after dozing for years at boring squabblers, he'll do it in his pampers laughing!
- SJ: You genius!
- 36. Did the Rule drafters honestly expect CCJ Joey to be "administrative and inquisitorial", p5, L5-6, when he called SJ Nicky to fully discuss the complaint against him? Would he be Torquemada inquiring with piercing fact questions the conscience of a heretic who practiced

- conduct in opposition to that prescribed in the code of conduct for judges? Or precisely because such code is as weak a basis for any disciplinary action as are other regulations on judicial conduct, p5-L27/p6, L6, would CCJ instead call to administer reassurance to his long-standing friendship with colleagues that he has known for 10, 15, 20 years?
- 37. During those many years, CCJ has 'worked' with his colleagues, not only at judicial junkets and circuit conferences, but also in judicial council meetings and those of the Judicial Conference as well as in several of the many Judicial Conference committees, just as in committees to renovate the courthouse, in those appointed by the Chief Justice to review judicial salary or discipline; at weekend retreats to induct a new judge, or ceremonies to bid farewell to a retiring judge or celebrate taking of office as chief judge; in delegations to other countries to teach at seminars on the American judicial system or to receive foreign delegates, and with whom he shared memorable moments at the wedding of a daughter, trying moments of accident and death, and made plans to go together with the gang on a Caribbean cruise next...stop it right there! 'cause Dick Schmock just filed a complaint alleging misconduct on SJ Nicky's part so CCJ Joey, who was nominated by the President solely because of his integrity and legal acumen, and was made incorruptible when confirmed by the Senate, as are made all other federal judges, is going to call SJ Nicky to roast on an inquisitorial skewer his motives, impartiality, and respect for the law, regardless of how that incident will char CCJ's relationship to SJ and to all the other judges for the rest of CCJ's career, but Dick Schmock's one-off complaint is so worth it that...Nonsense! Pure wishful thinking or a knowingly deceitful scenario, for it is contrary to human nature and the evidence of the 218 year history of the federal judiciary and its grand total of seven removals from the bench.
- 38. This means that if the chief circuit judge does communicate with the subject judge to consider the complaint however circumspectly, the former will go in with the need to believe the latter, who will be aware that the communication is pro forma and his role is simply to satisfy that favorable prejudice with a story believable on its face. After all, like the Act, "these rules do not give the complainant the rights of a party to litigation", p26, L38, where in an adversarial confrontation with the subject judge in public before an impartial arbiter determined to allow a clash of their respective version of the events the complainant would try to establish his as true and actionable. Instead, the Act and the Rules require the complainant to let his complaint be revealed to the subject judge, while not requiring that he be informed whether the subject judge bothered to give any answer to it, let alone the content of any that he may have given to his friendly colleague, the chief circuit judge.
- 39. The role of the chief circuit judge is not to let 'sunshine be the best revealer of truth'; but rather to maintain the confidentiality of not only the proceedings, p26, L29-31, but also of even the name of the subject judge, p15, L35-36, in order to "encourage informal disposition", p42, L8-9, of the complaint at its earliest stage by her "suggesting", p18, L33, easy terms of disposition to facilitate the subject judge's acceptance of "voluntary corrective action",

p42, L6-7, involving no individual or institutional liability or compensation whatsoever. Does this have anything to do with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice through due process of law, or is it a device crafted to let 'friendship be the best cover up for infectious judicial conduct'?

Rule 10. Abuse of the Complaint Procedure, p13, L17

- 40. "(b) Orchestrated Complaints. Where large numbers of essentially identical complaints from different complainants are received and appear to be part of an orchestrated campaign, the judicial council may, on the recommendation of the chief circuit judge, issue a written order instructing the clerk of the court of appeals to accept only one or more of such complaints for filing and to refuse to accept subsequent complaints. A copy of the order shall be sent to the complainants whose complaints were not accepted", p13, L27-33
- 41. With this Rule, the judges protect themselves from the equivalent of a class action. No provision is made for the possibility that many people may have had the same cause for complaining against the subject judge or that their complaints may add evidentiary weight to the common tenor of the complaints. Nor is the likelihood considered that the review of similar complaints could allow the detection of a pattern of conduct on the part of the subject judge, much less the possibility that in addition to all the elements common to all complaints, each could contain particular elements so that "on the basis of the total mix of information", p5, L24-25, a more detailed picture may be drawn of the subject judge, his conduct, personality, working conditions, and characteristics of complainants.
- 42. Moreover, how can all complainants regardless of their number, except "only one or more", p13, L31, be deprived of their right to complain against a judge simply because to the latter's peers it just "appears" that their complaints are "part of an orchestrated campaign", p13, L29,? Where does the law permit the view that 'orchestrating a campaign' to recall a governor of a state or a member of the legislature is a permissible exercise of the right "to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances", U.S. Const, First Amend., because limited to the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government, but if mounted to complain against a federal judge it becomes a conspiratorial act of people scheming an inherently meritless attack on an unfairly target judge and creating such clear and present danger to the Judiciary itself, the Branch above the Constitution, that both need to be protected by breaking the "orchestrated campaign" before the complaints are even filed, let alone reviewed?
- 43. What logic, let alone principle of law, allows the drafters to conclude that if people use "the Internet or other technology", p14, L3-4, to search for other people with "essentially identical complaints against the same judge or judges", p14, L1-2, and "dozens or

- hundreds", p14, L1, respond and decide to assemble to petition for redress jointly, then they reveal themselves as "orchestrators" of complaints carrying the virus of mean-spiritedness and frivolousness requiring that they be deleted in bulk lest they infect the Judiciary?
- 44. Why not eliminate the thousands of complaints against ENRON and its financial backers, or Dow Corning, the manufacturer of leaky silicone breast implants, or the pharmaceutical company Pfizer that marketed the potentially fatal anti-arthritis Vioxx and Celebrex pills, by applying to them the drafters' rationale for blocking the filing of "orchestrated" complaints?: "If each complaint submitted as part of such a campaign were accepted for filing and processed according to these rules, there would be a serious drain on court resources without any benefit to the adjudication of the underlying merits", p14, L4-7.
- 45. If after "the first complaint or complaints have been dismissed on the merits,... further, essentially identical, submissions follow", p14, L11-12, why did the drafters not draw from that fact the conclusion that it was necessary for the chief circuit judge to 'take from among "We the People" out there "an objective view of the appearance of the judicial conduct in question", p18, L32-33, as improper, biased, or otherwise complainable, and that the "People" view should be dealt with by allowing their complaints to be filed and reviewing them in order to understand what gave rise to it? Such course of action would show that responsiveness is "preferable to sanctions", p18, L31, which "We the People", not only the subject judge, deserve to be spared because a judiciary that cares to understand public concerns and, if found valid, corrects the underlying problems and, if found invalid, educates the public on why they are so and should be dealt with through other means of action, promotes trust in the courts and in the integrity of their process to administer "Equal Justice Under Law".
- 46. It would appear from this Rule that the drafters too are judges who just overdid it with their orchestration of tunes for the protection of the vested interests of their above the law class of judges...but that's only a thought.

ARTICLE III. REVIEW OF A COMPLAINT BY THE CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE, p14, L18

Rule 11. Review by the Chief Circuit Judge, p14, L20

47. **Rule 11 "(c) Dismissal.** A complaint must be dismissed in whole or in part to the extent that the chief circuit judge concludes that the complaint: ", p14, L41-42, is what he prejudged many complaints to be, that is, 'clearly' dismissable. This impermissible bias on the part of a chief circuit judge against the merits of complaints about his peers is nevertheless validated by the drafters in their astonishing statement that "many complaints

- are clear candidates for dismissal even if their allegations are accepted as true, and there is no need for the subject judge to devote time to a defense", p19, L31-33.
- 48. This means that out of expediency, a subject judge can skip filing any answer to a complaint against him by simply relying on the chance that it will be dismissed, for he knows that his silence will not be construed as an admission and that the complaint will not be investigated by default, contrary to what happens in lawsuits among people "Under Law" and FRCivP 4(a) and 8(d). Now consider that also out of expediency, a chief circuit judge together with his court routinely disposes of whole appeals by having a blank in a summary order form filled in with "Affirmed" and likewise disposes of motions by having a circle made around either the word "Denied", mostly, or "Granted", rarely, on the Motion Information Statement, which is another form for the movant to summarize her motion so that the judge does not have to read it. That same expediency has generated a bias in that same chief circuit judge toward prejudging as many complaints as he can "clear candidates for dismissal" and dismissing them without any inquiry or investigation.
- 49. The chief circuit judge must also dismiss the complaint if he concludes that it "(5) is otherwise not appropriate for consideration under the Act", p15, L10. This is a vague and standardless catch-all that allows the chief circuit judge to dismiss a complaint for any reason and no reason. Indeed, Rule 11(g)(1) provides only this: "(g) Notice of Chief Circuit Judge's Action; Petitions for Review. (1) If the complaint is disposed of under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e), the chief circuit judge must prepare a supporting memorandum that sets forth the reasons for the disposition", p15, L32-35. This requirement can conceivably be satisfied by the chief circuit judge simply quoting the Rule in his memorandum, where he states that 'the complaint is dismissed because it is no appropriate for consideration under the Act'.
- 50. By contrast, when a plaintiff files a complaint against a lesser defendant 'Under Law' and the FRCivP, her complaint can be dismissed summarily before discovery only if the defendant publicly files a motion or a pleading stating its reasons for requesting dismissal, such as those provided under FRCivP 12(b). Thereupon the plaintiff has the opportunity to argue against dismissal, challenging in open court or in a publicly filed answer the factual and legal basis of the defendant's dismissal grounds.
- 51. It can happen that the district judge dismisses the complaint but fails to perform his duty to state his findings of facts or conclusions of law with sufficient detail to satisfy the purpose of such duty. In such event, the complainant can on appeal at least point to the defendant's reason for dismissal in its motion or pleading, where they would presumably be as detailed and well grounded as the defendant was capable to provide with a view to prevailing in the context of a public adversarial proceeding. However, 'subject' judges are not subject to such proceedings, for they are above the law and entitled to the best defense possible, namely, his peer chief

- circuit judge, who can summarily dismiss the complaint because it is just "not appropriate for consideration under the Act", p15, :10.
- 52. **Rule 11 "(d) Corrective Action.** The chief circuit judge may conclude the complaint proceeding in whole or in part if the chief circuit judge determines that appropriate corrective action that acknowledges and remedies the problems raised by the complaint has been voluntarily taken by the subject judge;" p15, L14-18.
- 53. This section of Rule 11 provides no standard for determining what is "appropriate" or what action 'corrects' the complained-about conduct of the subject judge, particularly since the subject judge 'volunteers' a remedy that suits him but that has nothing to do with any remedy that the complainant may have requested in his complaint.
- 54. This means that all is needed from the penitent judge is for him to choose his own penance through his "participation [with the chief circuit judge] in formulating the directive...of remedial action', p18, L36-37, and the chief circuit judge will grant him absolution; in other words: "-O.K., O.K., I won't do it again. –Then go in peace, my son, and be good". After all, the chief circuit judge is only interested in doing something that is "best able to influence a judge's future behavior in constructive ways", p11, L42, not in providing a remedy for the harm that his peer inflicted upon the complainant in the past. That harm can be considerable, for it can include the loss of rights and the expense of an enormous amount of effort, time, and money trying to recover them and the suffering of tremendous intentional emotional distress caused by the subject judge due to, for example, his bias against out of town pro se litigants that do not play by the rules of 'local practice' and insist on applying the law of the land of Congress.
- 55. That harm constitutes injury in fact. Hence, to offer only to "redress the harm, if possible, such as by an apology, recusal from a case, and a pledge to refrain from similar conduct in the future", p19, L3-4, is nothing but insincere lip-service. Moreover, to say in the same breath that "any corrective action should, to the extent possible, serve to correct a specific harm to an individual, if such harm can reasonably be remedied", p19, L5-6, is disingenuous. By not including among the remedies the payment of compensation to the complainant by the subject judge or his institutional employer, the Judiciary, for the injury that either or both have caused the complainant, the drafters exempt the judge and the institution from all liability. Apologetic words by a subject judge are cheap, as are those of "a private or public reprimand", p19, L13-14, of him by the chief circuit judge. Why is it, by contrast, that the "extent possible" of the remedy that a company can be required to provide is so vast that it may even force the company into bankruptcy to compensate the victims of its officers' conduct?, e.g. Pan Am had to file for bankruptcy after being ordered to compensate the victims of the downing of its Boeing 747 on Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland.

- 56. This divergent 'extent of the possible' reveals a double standard of justice: a compensatory one for "We the People Under Law" and an exonerating one for the judicial class above the law. Just as is the sanction of the subject judge by a mere reprimand, a remedy for the complainant of a mere apology is a mockery of justice.
- 57. There is no "Equal Justice Under Law" when the subject judge can voluntarily choose his remedy for the future and leave the complaint holding the bag of damages that the judge caused the complainant in the past. Nor is the chief circuit judge under the same law and its tort principles that would require him to hold the Judiciary to its institutional responsibility for the harm caused to a party to a lawsuit by one of its employees during the performance of his duties in the course of business.
- 58. The fact is that judges are not employees of the Federal Judiciary; rather, they are independent contractors that hold office in their own right "during good Behaviour", U.S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 1. Not even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States can remove from the bench a judge due to his 'bad Behaviour', not to mention that "Neither the chief circuit judge nor an appellate court has authority under the Act to impose a formal remedy or sanction", p18, L38-39, and a judicial council cannot be used as proxy to dock his compensation, "which shall not be diminished during [his] Continuance in Office", Const., id.
- 59. The only real sanction that has any meaningful impact on the subject judge is a referral for impeachment to the House of Representatives...a very risky move, indeed. It may lead to the subject judge adopting the retaliatory position "If you bring me down, I take you with me!" and to that end, pointing the finger in turn at the judges higher up in the judicial hierarchy either for the wrongdoing that they actively participated in for their benefit or quietly tolerated out of fear of being ostracized as treasonous pariahs, which could cause them to point the finger at those even higher up. Thereby a domino effect could be triggered that would threaten the Judiciary's reputational interests and the independence that through the Act and the Rules' mechanism of self-discipline it enjoys from effective control by law enforcement agencies or Congressional judicial committees. Given such dismal prospect, some conciliatory and appeasing words, uttered against the continued bass of self-preservation, such as "Then go in peace, my son, and let you and me be good to each other", sound, oh!, so much more reasonable and promising.
- 60. In light of those circumstances, the best a chief circuit judge can do is forgive and forget and hope that the subject judge will behave better in future...and tough luck for the complainant, for his injuries are in the past and nobody is here now to ensure that "appropriate corrective action....remedies" them, p15, L15-16. "Because the Act deals with the conduct of judges, the emphasis is on correction of the judicial conduct that was the subject of the complaint", p18, L28-30. The Rules have been drafted to ensure self-preservation, not to

- establish checks and balances between "We the People Under Law" and the class of federal judges above the law, let alone to provide "Equal Justice" for both.
- 61. **"Commentary to Rule 11**: The chief circuit judge is not required to act solely on the face of the complaint. The power to conclude a complaint proceeding on the basis that corrective action has been taken implies some power to determine whether the facts alleged are true. But the boundary line of that power -- the point at which a chief circuit judge invades the territory reserved for special committees -- is unclear." P17, L10-14.
- 62. What a pertinent opportunity the drafting of this Rules was to render "clear" such boundary line by providing "authoritative interpretive standards" together with examples in order to cure the "lack of" them found by the Breyer Committee, p2, L22-25. If the drafters did not have the authority or will to provide such needed clarification, what exactly could and did they provide other than cosmetic touch-ups?
- 63. So rare and inconsequential for complainants are the Rules' 'new' provisions that when the drafters did provide something of some relevant novelty, they had to celebrate their accomplishment by pointing it out. This is what they did with a provision concerning, not complainants and the effectiveness of their complaints, but rather a committee for the administration of the Rules: "The provision requiring clerks to send copies of all complaints to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability is new. It is necessary to enable the Committee to monitor administration of the Act, to anticipate upcoming issues, and to carry out its new jurisdictional responsibilities under Article VI"; p13, L1-4.
- 64. **Rule 11 "(e) Intervening Events.** The chief circuit judge may conclude the complaint proceeding in whole or in part if the chief circuit judge determines that intervening events render some or all allegations of the complaint moot or remedial action impossible"; p15, L19-22.
- 65. This provision is illustrative of how the federal judiciary has managed to place itself above the law applicable to the rest of "We the People": The latter's complainants in civil lawsuits may seek damages against a party even after the party's death by suing its estate and may even recover against the estate. This means that not even the death of the defendant renders 'impossible" a remedy claimed against people "Under Law" and thus, of lesser statute than a subject judge.
- 66. By contrast, this Rule allows the chief circuit judge to dismiss a complaint whenever the chief circuit judge deems that "remedial action [is] impossible", without having to state specifically what remedial action the chief circuit judge considered to be impossible, let alone

- why it is "impossible". Nor does the chief circuit judge have to give the complainant the opportunity to state how that 'impossible remedial action' could be rendered possible or what alternative remedial action is possible.
- 67. Moreover, the absence of any obligation on the chief circuit judge to identify specifically what "remedial action" she considered in connection with the complaint and why she deemed it "impossible" deprives the complainant of the possibility to challenge in a petition for review to the judicial council the chief circuit judge's application of that ground of dismissal to dismiss the complaint. Consequently, how could a judicial council reviewing an order of dismissal effectively determine whether an undetermined "remedial action" was possible or "impossible"? Lacking such information, the judicial council has nothing on which to base its determination other than its bias toward its peer.

Sincerely,

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For Public Comment: Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings

On July 16, 2007, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States released its draft *Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings* for 90 days of public comment, **to conclude on October 15, 2007**. From this web page, you may review those rules and submit your comments by e-mail.

- Review Draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings (pdf)
- E-mail your comments to JudicialConductRules@ao.uscourts.gov

With any comments you submit, please specify your:

- Name,
- Mailing address,
- Organization, if any, and
- Occupation (federal judge, state judge, lawyer in private practice, government lawyer, professor, or nonlawyer).

Although submissions will not receive a response, those that are timely will be considered by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Committee as it prepares the draft rules for Judicial Conference consideration.

The draft rules were developed at the direction of the Judicial Conference as a means of ensuring that the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364, operates consistently throughout the federal court system. If adopted

by the Conference, they will constitute binding guidance for chief judges, circuit judicial councils, and circuit staff on the full spectrum of issues noted in *Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, A Report to the Chief Justice*, 239 F.R.D. 116 (September 2006) ("Breyer Committee Report"). Those issues, and the historical and policy context of these rules, are discussed fully in that report.

You may also comment on these rules at a public hearing being planned for that purpose, to commence at 10:00 a.m. on September 27, 2007, in the U.S. Courthouse at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York. Requests to appear and testify at the hearing must be e-mailed by August 27 to the Office of the General Counsel, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at JudicialConductRules@ao.uscourts.gov. Those who submit such requests will be asked to give a written indication of the testimony they intend to provide.

This web page and its links are for use only in reviewing, and commenting upon, the draft Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings. No complaints and no communication on any other topic will be accepted here.

RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364

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RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY

Preface

These Rules and accompanying Commentaries were promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States, after public comment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 358, to establish standards and procedures for addressing complaints filed, or identified by chief circuit judges, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364.

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 1. Scope.

These Rules govern the conduct of proceedings undertaken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 regarding whether a covered judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts or is unable to discharge the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability.

Commentary to Rule 1

In September 2006, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, appointed in 2004 by Chief Justice Rehnquist and known as the "Breyer Committee," presented a report, known as the "Breyer Report," 239 F.R.D. 116 (Sept. 2006), to Chief Justice Roberts that evaluated implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (hereinafter "the Act") 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364. The Committee had been formed in response to criticism from the public and the Congress regarding the effectiveness of the Act's implementation. The Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference directed the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability to consider the recommendations made by the Breyer Committee and to report on their implementation to the Conference.

The Breyer Committee found that it could not evaluate implementation of the Act without establishing interpretive standards, Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 132, and that a major problem faced by chief circuit judges in implementing the Act was the lack of authoritative interpretive standards. See id. at 212-15. The Breyer Committee then established standards to guide its evaluations, some of which were new formulations and some of which were taken from the "Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability," discussed below. The principal standards used by the Breyer Committee are in Appendix E of its Report. Id. at 238.

Based on the findings of the Breyer Committee, the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability concluded that there was a need for the Judicial Conference to exercise its power under the Act to fashion standards to provide guidance to the various officers and bodies who must exercise responsibility under the Act. To that end, the Judicial Conference Committee proposed rules that were based largely on Appendix E of the Breyer Report and the Illustrative Rules.

The Illustrative Rules were originally prepared in 1986 by the Special Committee of the Conference of Chief Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals, and were subsequently revised and amended, most recently in 2000, by the predecessor to the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The Illustrative Rules were adopted, with minor variations, by circuit judicial councils, to govern complaints under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.

After being submitted for public comment, the present Rules were promulgated by the Judicial Conference on .

Rule 2. Effect and Construction.

Notwithstanding any rule of a circuit to the contrary, these Rules are to be deemed mandatory, and the accompanying Commentaries are to be deemed authoritative interpretations of the Rules, unless a chief circuit judge, a special committee, a judicial council, the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, or Judicial Conference of the United States, in the performance of acts authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 and these Rules, deems and expressly finds that exceptional circumstances render the application of a Rule in a particular proceeding manifestly unjust or manifestly contrary to the purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 or these Rules.

Commentary to Rule 2

 Unlike the Illustrative Rules, these Rules provide mandatory and nationally uniform provisions governing the substantive and procedural aspects of misconduct and disability proceedings under the Act. However, the final sentence of Rule 2 recognizes that unforeseen and exceptional circumstances may call for a different approach in particular cases.

Rule 3. Definitions.

(a) Complaint.

A complaint is:

(1) a document filed by any person pursuant to Rule 6; or(2) information from any source, including a document described in (a)(1),

 known to a chief circuit judge, constituting reasonable grounds to inquire into possible misconduct or disability on the part of a covered judge whether or not the information is framed as, or intended to be, an allegation of misconduct or disability.

(b) Misconduct.

(1) Misconduct is conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. Misconduct includes, but is not limited to, use of the judge's office to obtain special treatment for friends and relatives, acceptance of bribes, gifts, or other personal favors related to the judicial office, improperly engaging in discussions with lawyers or parties to cases in the absence of representatives of opposing parties, treating litigants or attorneys in an unnecessarily hostile manner, engaging in partisan political activity or statements, participating in organizational fundraising, and other violations of the standards of judicial conduct, regulation of gifts, restrictions on outside income, 8financial disclosure obligations, or abuses of judicial office.

Conduct occurring outside the performance of official duties is not excluded if it might have a prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts, including, but not limited to, a lowering of public confidence in the courts among reasonable persons.

(A) Exclusions.

- (i) Allegations that are directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling are excluded from the definition of misconduct. Any allegation that calls into question the correctness of a ruling of a judge, including a failure to recuse, without more, is merits related. However, a complaint that involves both the merits and an improper motive, e.g., a bribe, ex parte contact, racial or ethnic bias, or improper conduct in rendering a decision or ruling, such as personally derogatory remarks irrelevant to the issues, is excluded only to the extent it attacks the merits. (ii) A complaint about delay in rendering a decision or ruling is excluded.
- (ii) A complaint about delay in rendering a decision or ruling is excluded.

 However, a complaint involving habitual delay in a number of unrelated cases or an improper motive in delaying a particular decision is not excluded.

(c) Disability.

Disability is a temporary or permanent condition rendering a judge unable to discharge the duties of the particular judicial office. Examples of disability include, but are not limited to, substance abuse, the inability to stay awake during court proceedings, or a severe impairment of cognitive abilities.

(d) Subject Judge.

The term "subject judge" means any judge described in Rule 4 who is the subject of a complaint.

(e) Chief Circuit Judge.

The term "chief circuit judge" includes the chief judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, United States Court of International Trade, and United States Court of Federal Claims.

(f) Judicial Council and Circuit.

The terms "judicial council" and "circuit," where appropriate, includes the courts mentioned in 28 U.S.C. § 363.

Commentary on Rule 3

Rule 3 is derived and adapted from the Breyer Committee Report and the Illustrative Rules.

Unless otherwise specified or the context otherwise indicates, the term "complaint" is used in these Rules to refer both to complaints identified by a chief circuit judge under Rule 5 and to complaints filed by complainants under Rule 6.

Under the Act, a "complaint" may be filed by "any person" or "identified" by a chief circuit judge . See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) and (b). Generally, the word "complaint" brings to mind the commencement of an adversary proceeding in which the contending parties are left to present the evidence and legal arguments, and judges play the role of an essentially passive arbiter. The Act, however, establishes an administrative, inquisitorial process in which, even absent a complaint under Rule 6, chief circuit judges are often expected to trigger the process -- "identify a complaint," see Rule 5 -- and conduct an investigation without becoming a party. See Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 214; Illustrative Rule 2(j). Even when a complaint is filed by someone other than the chief circuit judge, the complainant lacks many rights that a party to litigation would have, and the chief circuit judge, instead of being limited to the "four corners of the complaint," must "identify a complaint" under Rule 5 where the complainant reveals information of misconduct or disability but does not claim it as such. See Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 183-84.

An allegation of misconduct or disability filed under Rule 6 is most assuredly a "complaint," and the Rule so provides in (a)(1). But both the nature of the process and the use of the term "identify" suggest that the word "complaint" covers more than a document formally triggering the process. The process relies on chief circuit judges considering known information and triggering the process when appropriate. "Identifying" a "complaint," therefore, is best understood as concluding -- "identifying" -- that information known to a chief circuit judge constitutes reasonable grounds for an inquiry into possible misconduct or disability -- a "complaint" -- whether or not the information is framed as, or intended to be an accusation. This definition is codified in (a)(2).

The term "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" is not subject to precise definition, and the Rule therefore provides some specific examples. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges may provide standards of conduct applicable to proceedings under the Act, although it is not intended that disciplinary action be appropriate for every violation of the Code's provisions. As noted in the Introduction to the Code:

"Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the violation, the intent of the judge, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system. Many of the proscriptions in the Code are necessarily cast in general terms, and it is not suggested that disciplinary action is appropriate where reasonable judges might be uncertain as to whether or not the conduct is proscribed. Furthermore, the Code is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. Finally, the purpose of the Code would be subverted if the Code

were invoked by lawyers for mere tactical advantage in a proceeding."

Similarly, the regulations governing the receipt of gifts by judges, outside earned income, and financial disclosure obligations provide guidance in proceedings under the Act, although disciplinary action may not be appropriate for every violation of the regulations.

 An allegation can meet the statutory standard even though the judge's alleged conduct did not occur in the course of the performance of official duties. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges expressly covers a wide range of extra-official activities, and some of these activities may constitute misconduct. For example, allegations that a judge participated in fundraising for a charity or a partisan political event are cognizable under the Act.

On the other hand, judges are entitled to some leeway in extra-official activities. For example, misconduct may not include a judge being repeatedly and publicly discourteous to a spouse (not including physical abuse) even though this might be an embarrassment to other judges.

Rule 3(b)(1)(A)(i) tracks the Act in excluding from the definition of misconduct allegations "[d]irectly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling." The complaint procedure is not a means for a collateral attack on the substance of a judge's rulings. This exclusion also preserves the independence of judges in the exercise of judicial power. Any allegation that calls into question the correctness of an official action of a judge -- without more -- is merits-related. The phrase "decision or procedural ruling" is not limited to rulings issued in deciding Article III cases or controversies. Thus, a complaint challenging the correctness of a chief circuit judge's determination to dismiss a prior misconduct complaint would be properly dismissed as merits-related -- i.e., as challenging the substance of the judge's administrative determination to dismiss the complaint -- even though it does not concern the judge's rulings in Article III litigation. Similarly, an allegation that a judge had incorrectly declined to approve a Criminal Justice Act voucher is merits-related under this standard.

Conversely, an allegation -- however unsupported -- that a judge conspired with a prosecutor to make a particular ruling is not merits-related, even though it "relates" to a ruling in a colloquial sense. Such an allegation attacks the propriety of conspiring with the prosecutor and goes beyond a challenge to the correctness -- "the merits" -- of the ruling itself. Similarly, an allegation that a judge ruled against the complainant because the complainant was a member of a particular racial or ethnic group, or because the judge dislikes the complainant personally, is not merits-related. Such an allegation attacks the propriety of arriving at rulings with an illicit or improper motive.

The same standard applies to allegations concerning a judge's failure to recuse. An allegation that a judge should have recused is merits-related. The very different allegation that the

judge failed to recuse for improper reasons is not merits-related. Similarly, an allegation that a judge used an inappropriate term to refer to a class of people is not merits-related even if the judge used it on the bench or in an opinion. The correctness of the judge's rulings is not at stake. An allegation that a judge was rude to counsel or others while on the bench is also not merits-related.

2 3

The existence of an appellate remedy is irrelevant to whether an allegation is merits-related. The merits-related ground for dismissal exists to protect judges' independence in making rulings, not to protect or promote the appellate process. A complaint alleging an incorrect ruling is merits-related even though the complainant has no recourse from that ruling. By the same token, an allegation that is otherwise cognizable under the Act should not be dismissed merely because an appellate remedy appears to exist (e.g., vacating a ruling that resulted from an improper ex parte communication).

Because of the special need to protect judges' independence in deciding what to say in an opinion or ruling, a somewhat different standard applies to determine the merits-relatedness of a non-frivolous allegation that a judge's language in a ruling reflected an improper motive. If the judge's language was relevant to the case at hand -- for example a statement that a claim is legally or factually "frivolous" -- then the judge's choice of language is presumptively merits-related and excluded, absent evidence apart from the ruling itself suggesting an improper motive. If, on the other hand, the challenged language does not seem relevant on its face, then an additional inquiry under Rule 11 is necessary.

With regard to Rule 3(b)(1)(A)(ii), a complaint of delay in a single case is excluded as merits-related. Such an allegation may be said to challenge the correctness of an official action of the judge, i.e., assigning a low priority to deciding the particular case. But, by the same token, an allegation of a habitual pattern of delay in a significant number of unrelated cases, or an allegation of deliberate delay in a single case arising out of an illicit motive, is not merits-related.

Rule 3(c) relates to disability and provides only the most general definition, recognizing that a fact-specific approach is the only one available.

Rule 4. Covered Judges.

A complaint under these Rules may concern the actions or capacity only of judges of United States courts of appeals, judges of United States district courts, judges of United States bankruptcy courts, United States magistrate judges, and judges of the courts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 363.

Commentary on Rule 4

This Rule tracks the statute. Rule 8(c) and (d) contain provisions as to the handling of

complaints against persons not covered by the Act, such as other court personnel, or against both covered judges and non-covered persons.

ARTICLE II. INITIATION OF A COMPLAINT

Rule 5. Identification of a Complaint.

(a) Identifying a Complaint.

- (1) Subject to Rule 7, where information known to a chief circuit judge meets the standard of Rule 3(a)(2) and no complaint containing such information has been filed under Rule 6, a chief circuit judge must identify a complaint and, by written order stating the reasons, begin the review provided in Rule 11. Where a complaint filed under Rule 6 contains information constituting an identifiable complaint of misconduct or disability but the complainant does not claim it as such, the chief circuit judge must identify a complaint.
- (2) A chief circuit judge:
 - (A) may not decline to identify a complaint:
 - (i) because the chief circuit judge deems otherwise cognizable allegations not to be credible, unless the sole source of information has been unreliable in the past; or
 - (ii) because the person or persons making such allegations have not filed a complaint under Rule 6.
 - (B) need not identify a complaint if it is clear on the basis of the total mix of information available to the chief circuit judge that the review provided in Rule 11 will result in a dismissal under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e). However, a chief circuit judge may identify a complaint in such circumstances in order to assure the public that highly visible allegations have been investigated. In such a case, appointment of a special committee under Rule 11(f) may not be necessary.
 - (C) may decline to identify a complaint if the matter has been resolved by informal means.
- (3) Complaints filed under Rule 6 that do not comply with Rule 6(d) must be considered under this Rule.

Commentary to Rule 5

This Rule is adapted from the Breyer Report. See Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 245-46.

The phrase "Subject to Rule 7" in (a)(1) is intended to establish that only: (i) the chief circuit judge of the home circuit of a potential subject judge, or (ii) the chief circuit judge of a circuit in which misconduct is alleged to have occurred in the course of official business while

the potential subject judge was sitting by designation, shall have power or a duty under this Rule to identify a complaint.

The Act authorizes the chief circuit judge, by written order stating reasons, to identify a complaint and thereby dispense with the filing of a written complaint. A chief circuit judge who has identified a complaint will not be considered a complainant and need not automatically recuse from further proceedings on the complaint. The identification of a complaint merely begins the process described in Rule 11, leaving the chief circuit judge with the same options available in the case of a complaint filed under Rule 6. Where a complaint has been filed under Rule 6, the ordinary doctrines of waiver do not apply, and a chief circuit judge must identify as a complaint any misconduct or disability issues implicitly presented even if the complainant makes no claim with regard to those issues. For example, a claim limited to misconduct in fact-finding that mentions periods during a trial when the judge was asleep must be identified as a complaint regarding disability. The identification may occur as a new complaint under Rule 5 or as a formal expansion by written order of an inquiry under Rule 11, but some formal order giving notice of the expanded scope of the proceeding to the subject judge and reviewing tribunal is necessary.

 The chief circuit judge's decision whether to identify a complaint under Rule 5 is fundamentally different from the decision whether to appoint a special committee under Rule 11. The threshold under Rule 5 is much lower. If an identified complaint is ultimately dismissed without appointment of a special committee, this does not mean that the complaint should not have been identified. However, a chief circuit judge may determine not to identify a complaint under circumstances in which the total mix of information available to the chief circuit judge makes it clear that such a complaint would be dismissed under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e). For example, when the sole source of information's identity or even existence is unknown, a chief circuit judge may, depending on the entire circumstances and the seriousness of the issues, decline to identify a complaint.

A chief circuit judge should not decline to identify a complaint solely on the basis that allegations that appear cognizable under the statute, for which there appears to be some potential evidentiary support, are not deemed by the chief circuit judge to be credible. However, when allegations are based solely on the word of one who has been unreliable in prior misconduct or disability proceedings, a chief circuit judge may decline to act without more. Nor should a chief circuit judge decline to identify a complaint solely on the basis that the unfiled allegations could be raised by one or more persons in a filed complaint, but none of these persons has opted to do so.

A chief circuit judge may properly treat identifying a complaint as a resort to be considered after informal approaches at a resolution, if feasible, have failed. However, in high-visibility situations, it may be particularly desirable for the chief circuit judge to identify a complaint (and then, if the circumstances warrant, dismiss or conclude the identified complaint

without appointment of a special committee) in order to assure the public that the allegations have not been ignored.

Rule 11 provides that once the chief circuit judge has identified a complaint, the chief circuit judge, subject to the disqualification provisions of Rule 25, will perform, with respect to that complaint, all functions assigned to the chief circuit judge for the determination of complaints filed by a complainant.

Rule 6. Filing a Complaint.

(a) Brief Statement of Facts.

A complaint must contain a concise statement setting forth with particularity the facts on which the claim of misconduct or disability is based. The statement should not be longer than five standard pages. The statement of facts should include:

- (1) a statement of what occurred;
- (2) the time and place of the occurrence or occurrences;
- (3) all available information that would assist an investigator in checking the facts, including, but not limited to, relevant documents and the names and addresses of witnesses. If documents are submitted, the statement of facts should refer to the specific pages in the documents on which relevant material appears; and
- (4) in the case of an allegation of disability, any facts forming the basis of that allegation not included in the above.

(b) Form.

- (1) Complaints may be filed on a form reproduced in the appendix to these rules or a form designated by the rules of the circuit in which the complaint is filed. The complaint form is to be made available on each court of appeals website, and may be obtained from the clerk of the court of appeals, district court, or bankruptcy court within the circuit. Failure to use the complaint form is not grounds for rejecting or dismissing the complaint so long as the information described in (a) is provided.
- (c) Legibility; Number of Copies.

Complaints should be typewritten if possible. If not typewritten, they must be legible. An illegible complaint will be returned to the complainant with a request to resubmit it in legible form, failing which the complaint will not be considered. If the complaint is about a single judge of the court of appeals, the complainant must provide three copies of the complaint, the statement of facts, and any documents submitted. If it is about a single district judge or magistrate judge, four copies must be provided; if about a single bankruptcy judge, five copies. If the complaint is about more than one judge, copies must be provided for the clerk of the court, the chief judge of the circuit, each subject judge, and each judge to whom the clerk must send a copy under Rule 8(b). Complaints under this Rule should be in an envelope marked "Complaint of Misconduct" or

"Complaint of Disability." The name of the subject judge should not appear on the envelope.

(d) Signature.

The form must be signed and the truth of the statements verified in writing under penalty of perjury. The complainant's address must also be provided. Failure to comply with this subsection will not be grounds for rejecting a complaint, but no further review shall take place unless the chief circuit judge identifies a complaint under Rule 5.

Commentary to Rule 6

The Rule is adapted from the Illustrative Rules and is self-explanatory.

Rule 7. Where to Initiate Complaints.

(a) Where to File.

Complaints against judges of United States courts of appeals, judges of United States district courts, judges of United States bankruptcy courts, or United States magistrate judges must be filed with the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the judicial circuit in which the subject judge holds office. Complaints against judges of the United States Court of International Trade or United States Court of Claims must be filed with the respective clerks of those courts. Complaints against judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must be filed with the Circuit Executive of that court. Where appropriate, the term "clerk of the court of appeals" or "clerk," as used in these Rules, includes all the officers mentioned.

(b) Transfer; Misconduct in Another Circuit.

If a complaint alleges misconduct in the course of official business while the subject judge was sitting on a court by designation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-93 and 294(d), the complaint may be filed or identified with the clerk of the court of appeals of that circuit or the subject judge's home circuit. The proceeding will continue in the circuit of the first filed or identified complaint. However, the judicial council of the circuit in which the complaint was first filed or identified may transfer the complaint to the subject judge's home circuit or circuit where the alleged misconduct occurred, as the case may be.

Commentary to Rule 7

Section 351 uses the term "the circuit" in a way that suggests that either the home circuit of the subject judge or the circuit in which misconduct is alleged to have occurred is the proper venue for complaints. With an exception for judges sitting by designation, the Rule requires the identifying or filing of a misconduct or disability complaint in the circuit in which the judge holds office, largely based on the administrative perspective of the Act. Given the Act's emphasis on the future conduct of the business of the courts, the circuit in which the judge holds office is the appropriate forum because that circuit is likely best able to influence a judge's future

behavior in constructive ways.

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However, when judges sit by designation, the non-home circuit has a strong interest in redressing misconduct in the course of official business, and where allegations also involve a member of the bar -- ex parte contact between an attorney and a judge, for example -- it may often be desirable to have the judicial and bar misconduct proceedings take place in the same venue. Rule 7(b), therefore, allows transfer to, or filing or identification of a complaint in, the non-home circuit. The proceeding may be transferred by the judicial council of the filing or identified circuit to the other circuit.

Rule 8. Action by Clerk.

(a) Receipt of Complaint.

On receipt of a complaint against a judge filed under Rules 5 or 6, the clerk of the court of appeals must open a file, assign a docket number, and acknowledge receipt.

(b) Distribution of Copies.

The clerk must promptly send copies of a complaint filed under Rule 6 to the chief circuit judge of the circuit or the judge authorized to act as chief circuit judge under Rule 25(f), and complaints filed under Rules 5 or 6 to each subject judge. Such complaints must also be sent to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The original complaint must be retained by the clerk. If a district judge or magistrate judge is the subject of a complaint, the clerk must also send a copy of the complaint to the chief judge of the district court in which the judge or magistrate judge holds his or her appointment. If a bankruptcy judge is the subject of a complaint, the clerk must send copies to the chief judges of the district court and the bankruptcy court. However, if the chief judge of a district court or bankruptcy court is a subject of the complaint, the chief judge's copy must be sent to the judge of such court in regular active service who is most senior in date of commission among those who are not subjects of the complaint.

(c) Complaints Against Non-Covered Persons.

If the clerk receives a complaint about a person not holding an office described in Rule 4, the clerk must not accept the complaint for filing under these Rules.

(d) Receipt of Complaint about a Judge and Another Non-Covered Person.

If a complaint is received about a judge described in Rule 4 and a person not holding an office described in Rule 4, the clerk must accept the complaint for filing under these Rules only with regard to the judge and must advise the complainant accordingly.

Commentary to Rule 8

This Rule is adapted from the Illustrative Rules and is largely self-explanatory. Complaints against non-covered persons are not to be accepted for processing under these Rules but may, of course, be accepted under other circuit rules or procedures for grievances.

The provision requiring clerks to send copies of all complaints to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability is new. It is necessary to enable the Committee to monitor administration of the Act, to anticipate upcoming issues, and to carry out its new jurisdictional responsibilities under Article VI.

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Rule 9. Time for Filing or Identifying a Complaint.

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(a) No Time Limitations.

A complaint may be filed or identified at any time. However, where the passage of time has made an accurate and fair investigation of a complaint impractical, the complaint must be dismissed under Rule 11(c)(3).

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Commentary to Rule 9

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This Rule is adapted from the Act and the Illustrative Rules.

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Rule 10. Abuse of the Complaint Procedure.

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(a) Abusive Complaints.

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A complainant who has filed repetitive, harassing, or frivolous complaints, or has otherwise abused the complaint procedure, may be restricted from filing further complaints. After giving the complainant an opportunity to show cause in writing why his or her ability to file further complaints should not be limited, a judicial council may prohibit, restrict, or impose conditions on the complainant's use of the complaint procedure. On written request of the complainant, the judicial council may revise or withdraw any prohibitions, restrictions or conditions imposed.

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(b) Orchestrated Complaints.

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Where large numbers of essentially identical complaints from different complainants are received and appear to be part of an orchestrated campaign, the judicial council may, on the recommendation of the chief circuit judge, issue a written order instructing the clerk of the court of appeals to accept only one or more of such complaints for filing and to refuse to accept subsequent complaints. A copy of the order shall be sent to the complainants whose complaints were not accepted.

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Commentary on Rule 10

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This Rule is adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

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Rule 10(a) provides a mechanism for a judicial council to restrict the filing of further complaints by a single complainant who has abused the complaint procedure. In some instances, however, the complaint procedure may be abused in a different manner, for which the remedy provided in Rule 10(a) may not be appropriate. Some circuits have been inundated with

submissions of dozens or hundreds of essentially identical complaints against the same judge or judges, all submitted by different complainants. In many of these instances, persons with grievances against a particular judge or judges used the Internet or other technology to orchestrate mass complaint-filing campaigns against them. If each complaint submitted as part of such a campaign were accepted for filing and processed according to these rules, there would be a serious drain on court resources without any benefit to the adjudication of the underlying merits.

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> A circuit may respond to such mass filings under Rule 10(b) by declining to accept repetitive complaints for filing, regardless of the fact that the complaints are nominally submitted by different complainants. Where the first complaint or complaints have been dismissed on the merits, when further, essentially identical, submissions follow, the judicial council may issue a second order noting that these are identical or repetitive complaints, directing the clerk not to accept these complaints or any further such complaints for filing, and directing the clerk or the circuit executive to send each putative complainant copies of both orders.

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ARTICLE III. REVIEW OF A COMPLAINT BY THE CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE

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Rule 11. Review by the Chief Circuit Judge.

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(a) Purpose of Chief Circuit Judge's Review.

When a complaint is filed or is identified by the chief circuit judge, the chief circuit 23 judge, subject to Rule 25, must review the complaint and determine whether it should be: 24 25

- (1) dismissed;
- (2) concluded on the ground that corrective action has been taken;
- (3) concluded because intervening events have made action on the complaint no longer necessary; or
- (4) referred to a special committee.
- (b) Inquiry by Chief Circuit Judge.

In determining what action to take under Rule 11(a), the chief circuit judge may conduct a limited inquiry. In conducting such an inquiry, the chief circuit judge may not make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute or determinations concerning the credibility of the complainant or putative witnesses. The chief circuit judge, or a designee, may communicate orally or in writing with the complainant, the subject judge, and any others who may have knowledge of the matter and review transcripts or other relevant documents. The chief circuit judge may make findings of fact to the extent that the limited inquiry shows that the factual allegations are frivolous under (c)(3) of this Rule.

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(c) Dismissal.

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A complaint must be dismissed in whole or in part to the extent that the chief circuit judge concludes that the complaint:

- (1) alleges conduct that, even if true, is not prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts and does not indicate a mental or physical disability resulting in inability to discharge the duties of judicial office;
- (2) is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling;
- (3) is frivolous because it is based on allegations that are wholly unsupported, plainly untrue, refuted by objective evidence, or incapable of being established through investigation;
- (4) has been filed in the wrong circuit under Rule 7; or
- (5) is otherwise not appropriate for consideration under the Act.

A complaint may not be dismissed solely because it repeats allegations of a previously dismissed complaint if it contains material information not previously considered and does not constitute harassment of the subject judge.

(d) Corrective Action.

The chief circuit judge may conclude the complaint proceeding in whole or in part if the chief circuit judge determines that appropriate corrective action that acknowledges and remedies the problems raised by the complaint has been voluntarily taken by the subject judge.

(e) Intervening Events.

The chief circuit judge may conclude the complaint proceeding in whole or in part if the chief circuit judge determines that intervening events render some or all allegations of the complaint moot or remedial action impossible.

(f) Appointment of Special Committee.

If some or all of the complaint is not dismissed or concluded, the chief circuit judge must promptly appoint a special committee to investigate the complaint or relevant portion thereof and to make recommendations to the judicial council. Before appointing a special committee, the chief circuit judge must invite the subject judge to respond to the complaint either orally or in writing if such an opportunity was not given during the limited inquiry. In the discretion of the chief circuit judge, separate complaints may be joined and assigned to a single special committee; similarly, a single complaint about more than one judge may be severed and more than one special committee appointed.

- (g) Notice of Chief Circuit Judge's Action; Petitions for Review.
 - (1) If the complaint is disposed of under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e), the chief circuit judge must prepare a supporting memorandum that sets forth the reasons for the disposition. The memorandum must not include the name of the complainant or of the subject judge. The order and the supporting memorandum must be provided to the complainant, the subject judge, any judge entitled to receive a copy of the complaint pursuant to Rule 8(b), and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The complainant and subject judge must be notified of the right to petition the judicial council for review of the decision under (g)(2) of this Rule. If a petition for review is filed as provided in Rule 18(a), the chief circuit judge must

promptly transmit all materials obtained in connection with the inquiry under Rule 11(b) to the clerk of the court of appeals for transmittal to the judicial council.

- (2) If the chief circuit judge disposes of a complaint under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e), the complainant or subject judge may petition the judicial council of the circuit for review of that disposition, as provided in Rule 18.
- (3) If a special committee is appointed, the chief circuit judge must notify the complainant, the subject judge, and any judge entitled to receive a copy of the complaint pursuant to Rule 8(b) that the matter has been referred to a special committee, and must inform them of the membership of the committee.
- (h) Public Availability of Chief Circuit Judge's Decision.

The chief circuit judge's decision must be made public at the time and in the manner provided in Rule 24.

(i) Report to the Judicial Council.

The chief circuit judge must report to the judicial council of the circuit on all actions taken under this Rule.

Commentary to Rule 11

Subsection (a) lists the actions available to a chief circuit judge in reviewing a complaint.

Subsection (b) describes the nature of the chief circuit judge's inquiry. It is based largely on the Breyer Committee Report. See Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 243-45. The Act states that dismissal is appropriate "when a limited inquiry ... demonstrates that the allegations in the complaint lack any factual foundation or are conclusively refuted by objective evidence." Section 352(b)(1)(B). At the same time, however, section 352(a) states that "[t]he chief judge shall not undertake to make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute." These two statutory standards should be read together, so that a matter is not "reasonably" in dispute if a limited inquiry shows the allegations to lack any factual foundation or to be conclusively refuted by objective evidence.

In conducting a limited inquiry, the chief circuit judge must avoid credibility determinations, which are ordinarily left to a special committee and the judicial council. An allegation is not "conclusively refuted by objective evidence" simply because the subject judge denies it. The limited inquiry must reveal something more in the way of refutation before it is appropriate to dismiss a complaint that is not inherently incredible. If it is literally the complainant's word against the subject judge's -- there is simply no other significant evidence -- then there must be a special committee investigation. Such a credibility issue is a matter "reasonably in dispute" within the meaning of the Act.

However, dismissal following a limited inquiry may occur where the complaint refers to transcripts or to witnesses and when the chief circuit judge determines that the transcripts and

witnesses all support the subject judge. For example, consider a complaint alleging that the subject judge said X, where the complaint mentions, or it is independently clear, that five people may have heard what the judge said. The chief circuit judge is told by the judge complained against and one witness that the judge did not say X, and the chief circuit judge dismisses the complaint without questioning the other four possible witnesses. In this example, the matter remains reasonably in dispute. If all five witnesses say the judge did not say X, dismissal is called for. But if potential witnesses, reasonably accessible, have not been questioned, then the matter remains reasonably in dispute.

The chief circuit judge is not required to act solely on the face of the complaint. The power to conclude a complaint proceeding on the basis that corrective action has been taken implies some power to determine whether the facts alleged are true. But the boundary line of that power -- the point at which a chief circuit judge invades the territory reserved for special committees -- is unclear. Rule 11(b) allows the chief circuit judge to determine whether the facts alleged in a complaint are "frivolous" as the term is used in Subsection (c)(3), but also states that the chief circuit judge will not undertake to make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute.

Subsection (c) describes the grounds on which a complaint may be dismissed. These are adapted from the Act and the Breyer Committee Report. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b); Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 239-45. Subsection (c)(1) permits dismissal of an allegation that, even if true, does not constitute misconduct or disability under the statutory standard. The proper standards are set out in Rule 3 and discussed in the Commentary to that Rule. Subsection (c)(2) permits dismissal of complaints related to the merits of a decision by a subject judge, also governed by Rule 3 and accompanying Commentary.

Subsection (c)(3) implements the statutory standard allowing dismissal of complaints that are "frivolous, lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred." The standard is intended to cover situations where the only source of evidence is unidentified or unavailable. For example, a complaint alleges that an unnamed attorney told the complainant that the judge did X. The subject judge denies it. The chief circuit judge requests that the complainant (who does not purport to have observed the judge do X) identify the unnamed witness, or that the unnamed witness come forward so that the chief circuit judge can learn the unnamed witness's account. The complainant responds that he has spoken with the unnamed witness, that the unnamed witness is an attorney who practices in federal court, and that the unnamed witness is unwilling to be identified or to come forward. The allegation is then properly dismissed as incapable of being established through investigation.

Another example would be a complainant who alleges an impropriety and asserts that he knows of it because it was observed and reported to him by a person who is identified. The judge denies that the event occurred. When contacted, the source also denies it. In such a case, the chief circuit judge's proper course of action may well turn on whether the source had any role

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in the allegedly improper conduct. If the complaint were based on a lawyer's statement that he or she had had an improper <u>ex parte</u> contact with a judge, the lawyer's denial of the impropriety might not be taken as wholly persuasive, and it would be appropriate to conclude that a real factual issue is raised. On the other hand, if the complaint quoted a disinterested third party and the disinterested party denied that the statement had been made, there would be no value in opening a formal investigation. In such a case, it would be appropriate to dismiss the complaint as frivolous because there is no support for the allegation of misconduct.

If, however, the situation involves a simple credibility conflict, the matter should proceed. For example, the complainant alleges an impropriety and alleges that he or she observed it and there were no other witnesses; the subject judge denies that the event occurred. Unless the complainant's allegations are inherently incredible, it would appear that a special committee must be appointed because there is a factual question that is reasonably in dispute.

Similar situations may arise when a complaint is filed so long after an alleged event that memory loss, death, or changes to unknown residences prevent a proper investigation.

Subsection (c) also indicates that the investigative nature of the process prevents the application of claim preclusion principles where new and material evidence becomes available. However, it also recognizes that at some point a renewed investigation may constitute harassment of the subject judge and should be foregone, depending of course on the seriousness of the issues and the weight of the new evidence.

 Rule 11(d) implements the Act's provision for dismissal if "appropriate corrective action" has been taken. It is adapted from the Breyer Committee Report. Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. 244-45. The Act authorizes the chief circuit judge to conclude the proceedings if "appropriate corrective action has been taken." Under Rule 11(d), action taken is "appropriate" when it serves to acknowledge and remedy the problem raised by the complaint. Because the Act deals with the conduct of judges, the emphasis is on correction of the judicial conduct that was the subject of the complaint. Terminating a complaint based on corrective action is premised on the implicit understanding that voluntary self-correction of misconduct is preferable to sanctions. The chief circuit judge may facilitate this process by giving the subject judge an objective view of the appearance of the judicial conduct in question and by suggesting appropriate corrective measures.

"Corrective action" means voluntary action taken by the subject judge. A remedial action directed by the chief circuit judge or by an appellate court without the participation of the subject judge in formulating the directive or by the subject judge's subsequent agreeing to such action does not constitute the requisite voluntary corrective action. Neither the chief circuit judge nor an appellate court has authority under the Act to impose a formal remedy or sanction; only the judicial council can impose a formal remedy or sanction under 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2). Compliance with a previous council order may serve as corrective action allowing conclusion of a later complaint about the same behavior.

Where a judge's conduct has resulted in identifiable, particularized harm to the complainant or another individual, appropriate corrective action should include steps taken by that judge to acknowledge and redress the harm, if possible, such as by an apology, recusal from a case, and a pledge to refrain from similar conduct in the future. While the Act is generally forward-looking, any corrective action should, to the extent possible, serve to correct a specific harm to an individual, if such harm can reasonably be remedied. Ordinarily, corrective action will not be "appropriate" to justify conclusion of a complaint unless the complainant or other individual harmed is meaningfully apprised of the nature of the corrective action in the chief circuit judge's order, in a direct communication from the judge complained against, or otherwise.

Voluntary corrective action should be proportionate to any plausible allegations of misconduct in the complaint. The form of corrective action should also be proportionate to any sanctions that a judicial council might impose under Rule 20(b), such as a private or public reprimand or a change in case assignments. In other words, minor corrective action will not suffice to dispose of a serious allegation.

 Rule 11(e) implements Section 352(b)(2) of the Act, which permits the chief circuit judge to "conclude the proceeding," if "action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening events," such as a resignation from judicial office. Ordinarily, however, stepping down from an administrative post such as chief circuit judge, judicial council member, or court committee chair does not constitute an event rendering unnecessary any further action on a complaint alleging judicial misconduct. As long as the subject of the complaint performs judicial duties, a complaint alleging judicial misconduct must be addressed.

If a complaint is not disposed of pursuant to Rule 11(c), (d), or (e), a special committee must be appointed. Rule 11(f) states that a subject judge will be invited to respond to the complaint before a special committee is appointed, if no earlier response was invited.

 Subject judges, of course, receive copies of complaints at the same time that they are referred to the chief circuit judge, and they are free to volunteer responses to them. Under Rule 11(b), the chief circuit judge may request a response if it is thought necessary. However, many complaints are clear candidates for dismissal even if their allegations are accepted as true, and there is no need for the subject judge to devote time to a defense.

 The Act requires that the order dismissing a complaint or concluding the proceeding contain a statement of reasons and that a copy of the order be sent to the complainant. Rule 24, dealing with availability of information to the public, contemplates that the order will be made public, usually without disclosing the names of the complainant or the judge involved. If desired for administrative purposes, more identifying information can be included in a non-public version of the order.

When complaints are disposed of by chief circuit judges, the statutory purposes are best

served by providing the complainant with a full, particularized, but concise explanation, giving reasons for the conclusions reached. <u>See also</u> the Commentary to Rule 24, dealing with public availability.

Rule 11(g) also provides that the complainant and subject judge must be notified, in the case of a disposition by the chief circuit judge, of the right to petition the judicial council for review. A copy of a chief circuit judge's order and memorandum disposing of a complaint must be sent by the clerk to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.

ARTICLE IV. INVESTIGATION AND REPORT BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Rule 12. Composition of Special Committees.

(a) Membership.

Except as provided in (e), a special committee appointed pursuant to Rule 11(f) must consist of the chief circuit judge and equal numbers of circuit and district judges. If the complaint is about a district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge, the district judge members of the committee must be from districts other than the district of the subject judge.

(b) Presiding Officer.

At the time of appointing the committee, the chief circuit judge must designate one of its members (who may be the chief circuit judge) as the presiding officer. When designating another member of the committee as the presiding officer, the chief circuit judge may also delegate to such member the authority to direct the clerk of the court of appeals to issue subpoenas related to proceedings of the committee.

(c) Bankruptcy Judge or Magistrate Judge as Adviser.

If the judicial officer complained about is a bankruptcy judge or magistrate judge, the chief circuit judge may designate a bankruptcy judge or magistrate judge, as the case may be, to serve as an adviser to the committee. The chief circuit judge must designate such an adviser if, within ten days of notification of the appointment of the committee, the subject bankruptcy judge or magistrate judge requests that an adviser be designated. The adviser must be from a district other than the district of the subject bankruptcy judge or subject magistrate judge. The adviser will not vote but will have the other privileges of a member of the committee.

(d) Provision of Documents.

The chief circuit judge must certify to each other member of the committee and to the adviser, if any, copies of the complaint form and statement of facts in whole or relevant part, and any other documents on file pertaining to the complaint or to the relevant part referred to the special committee.

(e) Continuing Qualification of Committee Members.

A member of a special committee who was qualified to serve at the time of

appointment may continue to serve on the committee even though the member relinquishes the position of chief circuit judge, active circuit judge, or active district judge, as the case may be, but only if the member continues to hold office under Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States.

(f) Inability of Committee Member to Complete Service.

In the event that a member of a special committee can no longer serve because of death, disability, disqualification, resignation, retirement from office, or other reason, the chief circuit judge must determine whether to appoint a replacement member, either a circuit or district judge as needed under (a). However, no special committee appointed under these rules may function with only a single member, and the voting requirements for a two-member committee must be applied as if the committee had three members.

(g) Voting.

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All actions by a committee shall be by vote of a majority of all members of the committee.

Commentary on Rule 12

This Rule is adapted from the Act and the Illustrative Rules.

Rule 12 leaves the size of a special committee flexible, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The question of committee size is one that should be weighed with care in view of the potential for consuming the members' time; a large committee should be appointed only if there is a special reason to do so.

Although the Act requires that the chief circuit judge be a member of each special committee, it does not require that the chief circuit judge preside.

The Act provides that a special committee will have subpoena powers as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 332(d). This section provides that subpoenas will be issued on behalf of judicial councils by the clerk of the court of appeals "at the direction of the chief judge of the circuit or his designee." Rule 12(b) allows the chief circuit judge, when designating someone else as presiding officer, to make an explicit delegation of the authority to direct the issuance of subpoenas related to committee proceedings.

Rule 12(c) provides that the chief circuit judge may appoint a bankruptcy judge or magistrate judge as an adviser to a special committee, either <u>sua sponte</u> or at the request of the subject judge.

The Rule provides that the adviser will have all the privileges of a member of a committee except a vote. The adviser may therefore participate in all deliberations of the committee, may question witnesses at hearings, and may write a separate statement to accompany the report of the special committee to the judicial council.

 Rule 12(e) provides that a member of a special committee who remains an Article III judge may continue to serve on the committee even though the member's status otherwise changes. Thus, a committee that originally consisted of the chief circuit judge and an equal number of circuit and district judges, as required by the law, may continue to function even though changes of status alter that composition. This provision reflects the belief that stability of membership will contribute to the quality of the work of such committees.

Stability of membership is also the principal concern animating Rule 12(f), which deals with the case in which a special committee loses a member before its work is complete. The rule would permit the chief circuit judge to determine whether a replacement member should be appointed. Generally, appointment of a replacement member is desirable in these situations unless the committee has conducted evidentiary hearings before the vacancy occurs. However, cases may arise in which a committee is in the late stages of its work, and in which it would be difficult for a new member to play a meaningful role. The Rule preserves the collegial character of the committee process by prohibiting a single surviving member from serving as a committee and by providing that a committee of two surviving members will, in essence, operate under a unanimity rule.

Rule 12(g) provides that actions of a special committee will be by vote of a majority of all the members. All the members of a committee should participate in committee decisions. In that circumstance, it seems reasonable to require that committee decisions be made by a majority of the membership, rather than a majority of some smaller quorum.

Rule 13. Conduct of an Investigation.

(a) Extent and Methods of Special Committee Investigation.

Each special committee must determine the extent and methods of the investigation as it deems appropriate in light of the allegations of the complaint. If, in the course of the investigation, the committee has cause to believe that the subject judge may have engaged in misconduct or has a disability that is beyond the scope of the complaint, the committee must, with written notice to the subject judge, expand the scope of the investigation or refer the new matter to the chief circuit judge for action under Rule 5 or Rule 11.

(b) Criminal Conduct.

In the event the complaint alleges criminal conduct or the committee becomes aware of possible criminal conduct, the committee must consult with the appropriate prosecutorial authorities to the extent permitted by 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 in an effort to avoid compromising any criminal investigation. However, the committee has final authority regarding the timing and extent of its investigation and formulation of its recommendations.

(c) Staff.

The committee may arrange for staff assistance in the conduct of the investigation.

It may use existing staff of the judicial branch or may arrange, through the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for the hiring of special staff to assist in the investigation.

(d) Delegation.

The authority to exercise the committee's subpoena powers may be delegated to the presiding officer. In the case of failure to comply with such subpoena, the judicial council or special committee may institute a contempt proceeding consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 332(d).

Commentary on Rule 13

This Rule is adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

Rule 13 and the three rules that follow are concerned with the way in which a special committee carries out its mission. They reflect the view that a special committee has two roles that are separated in ordinary litigation. First, the committee has an investigative role of the kind that is characteristically left to executive branch agencies or discovery by civil litigants. Second, it has a formalized fact-finding and recommendation-of-disposition role that is characteristically left to juries, judges, or arbitrators. Rule 13 generally governs the investigative stage. Even though the same body has responsibility for both roles under the Act, it is important to distinguish between them in order to ensure that appropriate rights are afforded at appropriate times to the subject judge.

One of the difficult questions that can arise under the Act is the relationship between proceedings under this statute and criminal investigations. Rule 13(b) assigns coordinating responsibility to the special committee in cases in which criminal conduct is suspected but gives the committee the authority to determine the appropriate pace of its activity in light of any criminal investigation. A special committee may be barred from disclosing some information to a prosecutor or grand jury under the Act. This provision is discussed in the Commentary to Rule 23.

Rule 13(d) permits the committee, in its discretion, to delegate any of its duties to subcommittees, individual committee members, or staff. This is consistent with the general principle, expressed in Rule 13(a), that each special committee will determine the methods of conducting the investigation that are appropriate in light of the allegations of the complaint. The ultimate duty of adopting a report may not be delegated. Rule 13(d) suggests that, where the chief circuit judge designates someone else as presiding officer of a special committee, the presiding officer also be delegated the authority to direct the clerk of the court of appeals to issue subpoenas related to committee proceedings. That is not intended to imply, however, that the decision to use the subpoena power is exercisable by the presiding officer alone. Under Rule 13(d), the committee must decide whether to delegate that decision-making authority.

(a) Purpose of Hearings.

(b) Committee Witnesses.

(c) Counsel for Witnesses.

Rule 14. Conduct of Hearings by Special Committee.

judge, it may, in its discretion, hold joint or separate hearings.

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All persons who are believed to have material, non-redundant evidence must be called as witnesses. Such witnesses may include the complainant and the subject judge. In the committee's discretion, the witnesses may be questioned by committee members, staff, or both.

Whether witnesses may have counsel present when they testify is left to the discretion of the special committee.

(d) Witness Fees.

Witness fees must be paid as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1821.

All testimony taken at such a hearing must be given under oath or affirmation.

The committee may hold hearings to take testimony and receive other evidence, to

hear argument, or both. If the committee is investigating allegations against more than one

(f) Rules of Evidence.

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to special committee hearings.

(g) Record and Transcript.

A record and transcript must be made of any hearing held.

Commentary on Rule 14

This Rule is adapted from the Act and the Illustrative Rules.

Rule 14 is concerned with the conduct of fact-finding hearings. Special committee hearings will normally be held only after the investigative work has been completed and the committee has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a formal fact-finding proceeding. Special committee proceedings are primarily inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to such hearings. Inevitably, a hearing will have something of an adversary character. Nevertheless, that tendency should be moderated to the extent possible. Even though a proceeding will commonly have investigative and hearing stages, committee members should not regard themselves as prosecutors one day and judges the next. Their duty -- and that of their staff -- is at all times to be impartial seekers of the truth.

Rule 14(b) contemplates that all witnesses with material evidence will be called by the committee. Staff or others who are organizing the hearings should regard it as their role to present the entire picture, and not to act as prosecutors. The subject judge should normally be called as a committee witness. Cases may arise in which the judge will not testify voluntarily. In such cases, subpoena powers are available, subject to the normal testimonial privileges.

Although Rule 15(b) affords the statutory right of the subject judge to call witnesses on his or her own behalf, exercise of this right should not usually be necessary.

Rule 15. Rights of Subject Judge.

(a) Notice.

a) Nonce

The subject judge is entitled to written notice of the appointment of a special committee under Rule 11(f) and, written notice of expansion of the scope of an investigation under Rule 13(a). The subject judge must be given notice in writing of any hearing under Rule 14, its purposes, the names of any witnesses whom the committee intends to call, and the text of any statements that have been taken from such witnesses. The subject judge may suggest additional witnesses to the committee. The subject judge must be sent the report of the special committee at the time it is filed with the judicial council.

(b) Presentation of Evidence.

At any hearing held pursuant to Rule 14, the subject judge has the right to present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. At the request of the subject judge, the chief circuit judge or his designee must direct the clerk of the court of appeals to issue a subpoena to a witness in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). The subject judge must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine committee witnesses, in person or by counsel.

(c) Presentation of Argument.

The subject judge may submit written argument to the special committee, and must be given a reasonable opportunity to present oral argument at an appropriate stage of the investigation.

(d) Attendance at Hearings.

The subject judge must have the right to attend any hearing held pursuant to Rule 14 and to receive copies of the transcript and any documents introduced, as well as to receive copies of any written arguments submitted by the complainant to the committee.

(e) Representation by Counsel.

The subject judge may choose to be represented by counsel in the exercise of any of the rights enumerated in this Rule. The costs of such representation may be borne by the United States as provided in Rule 20(e).

Commentary on Rule 15

This Rule is adapted from the Act and the Illustrative Rules.

The Act states that these rules must contain provisions requiring that "the judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint . . . be afforded an opportunity to appear (in person or by counsel) at proceedings conducted by the investigating panel, to present oral and documentary evidence, to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present argument orally or in writing." 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(2). To

implement this provision, Rule 15(d) gives the judge the right to attend any hearing for the purpose of receiving evidence of record or hearing argument under Rule 14.

The Act does not require that the subject judge be permitted to attend all proceedings of the special committee. Accordingly, the rules do not give a right to attend other proceedings, <u>e.g.</u>, meetings at which the committee is engaged in investigative activity, such as interviewing a possible witness or examining for relevance purposes documents delivered pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, or meetings in which the committee is deliberating on the evidence or its recommendations.

The complainant is entitled to written notice of the investigation as provided in Rule

Rule 16. Rights of Complainant in Investigation.

(a) Notice.

complainant must be notified of the filing. The judicial council may, in its discretion, provide a copy of the report of a special committee to the complainant.

(b) Opportunity to Provide Evidence.

 The complainant must be interviewed by a representative of the committee. If the complainant has material evidence, the complainant must be called as a witness.

11(g)(3). When the special committee's report to the judicial council is filed, the

(c) Presentation of Argument.

 The complainant may submit written argument to the special committee. In the discretion of the special committee, the complainant may be permitted to offer oral argument.

(d) Representation by Counsel.

A complainant may submit written argument through counsel and, if permitted to offer oral argument, may do so through counsel.

(e) Cooperation.

 In the exercise of discretion under this Rule, a special committee may take into account the degree of the complainant's cooperation in preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings, including the identity of the subject judge.

Commentary on Rule 16

This Rule is adapted from the Act and the Illustrative Rules.

In accordance with the view of the process as fundamentally administrative and inquisitorial, these rules do not give the complainant the rights of a party to litigation, and leave the complainant's role largely to the discretion of the special committee. However, Rule 16(b) provides that, where a special committee has been appointed, the complainant will be interviewed by a representative of the committee. Such an interview may, of course, be in person or by telephone, and the representative of the committee may be either a member or staff.

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Rule 16 does not contemplate that the complainant will ordinarily be permitted to attend proceedings of the special committee except when testifying or presenting oral argument. A special committee may exercise its discretion to permit the complainant to be present at its proceedings, or to permit the complainant, individually or through counsel, to participate in the examination or cross-examination of witnesses.

The Act authorizes an exception to the normal confidentiality provisions where the judicial council in its discretion provides a copy of the report of the special committee to the complainant and to the subject judge. The rules do not accord the complainant the rights of a litigant and do not entitle the complainant to a copy of the report of the special committee.

In exercising their discretion regarding the role of the complainant, the special committee and the judicial council should protect the confidentiality of the complaint process. As a consequence, Subsection (e) provides that a special committee may consider the degree to which a complainant has cooperated in preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings in determining what role beyond the minimum required by these Rules should be given to that complainant.

Rule 17. Special Committee Report.

(a) Report.

The committee must file with the judicial council a comprehensive report of its investigation, including findings and recommendations for council action. The report must be accompanied by a statement of the vote by which it was adopted, any separate or dissenting statements of committee members, and the record of any hearings held pursuant to Rule 14. A copy of the report and accompanying statement must be sent to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.

Commentary to Rule 17

This Rule is adapted from the Illustrative Rules and is self-explanatory. The provision for sending a copy of the special committee report and accompanying statement to the Judicial Conference Committee is new.

ARTICLE V. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REVIEW

Rule 18. Petitions for Review of Chief Circuit Judge Dispositions Under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e).

(a) Petitions for Review.

A complainant or subject judge aggrieved by an order of the chief circuit judge

under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e) may petition the judicial council of the circuit for review of the order. A judicial council may, by rules promulgated under 28 U.S.C. § 358, refer a petition for review filed under this Rule to a panel of no less than 5 members of the council, at least 2 of whom must be district judges.

(b) Time; Form; Where to File.

A petition for review must be filed in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the clerk's letter to the complainant and subject judge transmitting the chief circuit judge's order. The petition should be in letter form, addressed to the clerk of the court of appeals, and in an envelope marked "Misconduct Petition" or "Disability Petition" but without the name of the subject judge. The letter should begin "I hereby petition the judicial council for review of . . . ," should be typewritten or otherwise legible, and be signed. The letter should state the reasons why the petition should be granted.

(c) Receipt and Distribution of Petition.

On receipt of a petition for review filed within the time allowed and in proper form under these Rules, the clerk of the court of appeals must acknowledge receipt of the petition and send copies to all persons entitled to notice under Rule 8(b). The clerk must promptly send to each member of the judicial council, except for any member disqualified under Rule 25, copies of the complaint, all materials obtained by the chief circuit judge in connection with the chief circuit judge's inquiry, the chief circuit judge's order disposing of the complaint, any memorandum in support of the chief circuit judge's order, the petition for review, and an appropriate ballot. The clerk must send copies of the materials obtained by the chief circuit judge and the petition for review to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.

(d) Receipt of Untimely Petition.

The clerk must refuse to accept a petition that is received after the deadline set forth in (b).

(e) Receipt of Timely Petition not in Proper Form.

On receipt of a petition filed within the time allowed but in a form that is improper to a degree that would substantially impair its consideration by the judicial council, including a document that is ambiguous about whether a petition for review is intended, the clerk must acknowledge receipt of the petition, call the petitioner's attention to the deficiencies, and give the petitioner the opportunity to correct the deficiencies within fifteen days of the date of the clerk's letter or within the original deadline for filing the petition, whichever is later. If the deficiencies are corrected within the time allowed, the clerk will proceed in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (c) of this Rule. If the deficiencies are not corrected, the clerk must reject the petition.

Commentary on Rule 18

Rule 18 is adapted largely from the Illustrative Rules.

Rule 18(b) contains a time limit of 30 days to file a petition for review. It is important to establish a time limit on petitions for review of chief circuit judges' dispositions in order to provide finality to the process. If the complaint requires an investigation, the investigation should proceed; if it does not, the subject judge should know that the matter is closed.

The standards for timely filing under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be applied to petitions for review. See F.R.A.P. 25(a)(2)(A) and 25(a)(2)(C).

Rule 18(e) provides for an automatic extension of the time if a person files a petition that is rejected for failure to comply with formal requirements.

Rule 19. Judicial Council Disposition of Petitions for Review.

(a) Rights of Subject Judge.

subject judge may file a written response with the clerk of the court of appeals. The clerk must promptly distribute copies of the response to each member of the judicial council who is not disqualified under Rule 25, to the chief circuit judge, to the complainant, and to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The judge may not otherwise communicate with individual council members about the matter.

(1) At any time after the filing of a petition for review by a complainant, the

(2) The subject judge must be provided with copies of any communications to the judicial council by the complainant.

(b) Judicial Council Action.

Upon consideration of a petition for review and after consideration of the materials before it, a judicial council may:

(1) affirm the chief circuit judge's disposition;

 (2) return the matter to the chief circuit judge with directions to conduct a further inquiry under Rule 11(b) or to identify a complaint under Rule 5;

(3) return the matter to the chief circuit judge with directions to appoint a special committee under Rule 11(f); or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, take other appropriate action.(c) Notice of Council Decision.

The order of the judicial council, together with any accompanying memorandum in support of the order or separate concurring or dissenting statements, must be provided to the complainant, the subject judge, any judge entitled to receive a copy of the complaint pursuant to Rule 8(b), and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.

(d) Memorandum of Council Decision.

 If the order of the council affirms the chief circuit judge's disposition, a supporting memorandum must be prepared only if the judicial council concludes that there is a need to supplement the chief circuit judge's explanation. A memorandum supporting a council

order must not include the name of the complainant or the subject judge.

(e) Review of Judicial Council Decision.

If the judicial council's decision is adverse to the petitioner and no member of the council dissented on the ground that a special committee should be appointed pursuant to Rule 11(f), the complainant must be notified that there is no right of review of the decision. If there was such a dissent, the petitioner must be informed that he or she can file a petition for review under Rule 21(b) solely of the issue of whether a special committee should be appointed.

(f) Public Availability of Judicial Council Decision.

Materials related to the council's decision must be made public at the time and in the manner set forth in Rule 24.

Commentary to Rule 19

This Rule is largely adapted from the Act and is self-explanatory.

The council should ordinarily review the decision of the chief circuit judge on the merits, treating the petition for review for all practical purposes as an appeal. The judicial council may respond to a petition by affirming the chief circuit judge's order, remanding the matter, or, in exceptional cases, taking other appropriate action. The "exceptional cases" language would, inter alia, permit the council to deny review rather than affirm in a case in which the process was obviously being abused.

Rule 20. Judicial Council Consideration of Reports and Recommendations of Special Committees.

(a) Rights of Subject Judge.

Within twenty-one days after the filing of the report of a special committee, the subject judge may send a written response to the members of the judicial council. The judge must also be given an opportunity to present oral argument to the council, personally or through counsel. The judge may not otherwise communicate with council members about the matter.

(b) Judicial Council Actions.

Subject to the rights of the subject judge in Subsection (a), the judicial council, acting on the basis of the report and recommendations of, and record before, the special committee, may:

- (1) dismiss the complaint because:
 - (A) the claimed conduct, even if the claim is true, is not conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts and does not indicate a mental or physical disability resulting in inability to discharge the duties of office;
 - (B) the complaint is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural

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1	ruling;				
2	(C) the facts on which the complaint is based have not been established; or				
3	(D) the complaint is otherwise not appropriate for consideration under 28				
4	U.S.C. §§ 351-364.				
5	(2) conclude the proceeding because appropriate action has already been taken				
6	to remedy the problem identified in the complaint, or intervening events make				
7	such action unnecessary.				
8	(3) in its discretion, refer the complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United				
9	States with the council's recommendations for action. A judicial council must				
10	refer a complaint to the Judicial Conference if the council determines that a				
11	circuit judge or district judge may have engaged in conduct:				
12	(A) that might constitute ground for impeachment; or				
13	(B) that, in the interest of justice, is not amenable to resolution by the judicia				
14	council.				
15	(4) take remedial action to ensure the effective and expeditious administration of				
16	the business of the courts, including but not limited to:				
17	(A) censuring or reprimanding the subject judge, either by private				
18	communication or by public announcement;				
19	(B) ordering that, for a fixed temporary period, no new cases be assigned to				
20	the subject judge;				
21	(C) in the case of a magistrate judge, ordering the chief judge of the district				
22	court to take action specified by the council, including the initiation of				
23	removal proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 631(i);				
24	(D) in the case of a bankruptcy judge, removing the judge from office				
25	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 152(e);				
26	(E) in the case of a circuit or district judge, requesting the judge to retire				
27	voluntarily with the provision (if necessary) that ordinary length-of-service				
28	requirements will be waived; and				
29	(F) in the case of a circuit or district judge who is eligible to retire but does				
30	not do so, certifying the disability of the judge under 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) so				
31	that an additional judge may be appointed.				
32	(5) take any combination of actions described in (b)(1)-(4) of this Rule that is				
33	within its power.				
34	(c) Inadequate Basis for Decision.				
35	If the judicial council finds that the report, recommendations, and record of a				
36	special committee provide an inadequate basis for decision, it may return the matter to the				
37	committee for further investigation and a new report or conduct such further investigation				
38	as it deems appropriate. If the judicial council decides to conduct additional investigation,				
39	the subject judge must be given adequate prior notice in writing of that proposed decision				
40	and of the general scope and purpose of the additional investigation. The conduct of the				
41	additional investigation must be generally in accordance with the procedures and powers				

set forth in Rules 13 through 16 for the conduct of an investigation by a special committee.

(d) Council Vote.

Council action must be taken by a majority of those members of the council who are not disqualified, except that a decision to remove a bankruptcy judge from office requires a majority of all the members of the council.

(e) Recommendation for Fee Reimbursement.

On the request of a subject judge, the judicial council may, if the complaint has been finally dismissed or concluded under (b)(1) or (2) of this Rule, recommend that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts award reimbursement, from funds appropriated to the Judiciary, for those reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by that judge during the investigation, including a successful defense or prosecution of a proceeding under Rule 21(a) or (b), which would not have been incurred but for the requirements of the Act and these Rules.

(f) Council Action.

Council action must be by written order. Unless the council finds that, for extraordinary reasons, it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the order must be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth the factual determinations on which it is based and the reasons for the council action. The memorandum must not include the name of the complainant or of the subject judge. The order and the supporting memorandum must be provided to the complainant, the subject judge, any judge entitled to receive a copy of the complaint pursuant to Rule 8(b), and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. However, if the complaint has been referred to the Judicial Conference of the United States under (b)(3) of this Rule and the council determines that disclosure would be contrary to the interests of justice, such disclosure need not be made. The complainant and the judge must be notified of any right to review of the judicial council's decision as provided in Rule 21(b).

(g) Public Availability of Council Action.

Materials related to the council's action must be made public at the time and in the manner set forth in Rule 24.

Commentary on Rule 20

This Rule is largely adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

Within twenty-one days after the filing of the report of a special committee, the subject judge may address a written response to all of the members of the judicial council. The subject judge must also be given an opportunity to present oral argument to the council, personally or through counsel. The subject judge may not communicate with individual council members about the matter, either orally or in writing.

If the judicial council decides to conduct an additional investigation, the subject judge must be given adequate prior notice in writing of that decision and of the general scope and purpose of the additional investigation. The conduct of the investigation will be generally in

accordance with the procedures set forth in Rules 13 through 16 for the conduct of an investigation by a special committee. However, if hearings are held, the council may limit testimony or the presentation of evidence to avoid unnecessary repetition of testimony and evidence before the special committee.

Council action must be taken by a majority of those members of the council who are not disqualified, except that a decision to remove a bankruptcy judge from office requires a majority of all the members of the council as required by 28 U.S.C. § 152(e). However, it is inappropriate to apply a similar rule to the less severe actions that a judicial council may take under the Act. If some members of the council are disqualified in the matter, their disqualification should not be given the effect of a vote against council action.

With regard to Rule 20(e), the judicial council, on the request of the subject judge, may recommend to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that the subject judge be reimbursed for reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred. The judicial council has the authority to recommend such reimbursement where, after investigation by a special committee, the complaint has been finally dismissed or concluded under Subsection (b)(1) or (2) of this Rule. It is contemplated that such reimbursement may be provided for the successful prosecution or defense of a proceeding under Rule 21(a) or (b), i.e., one that results in a Rule 20(b)(1) or (2) dismissal or conclusion.

Rule 20(f) requires that council action normally be supported with a memorandum of factual determinations and reasons and that notice of the action be given to the complainant and the subject judge. Rule 20(f) also requires that the notification to the complainant and the subject judge include notice of any right to petition for review of the council's decision under Rule 21(b).

ARTICLE VI. REVIEW BY JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON CONDUCT AND DISABILITY

Rule 21. Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.

(a) Review by Committee.

The Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability will consist of seven members. It will consider and dispose of all petitions for review under (b) of this Rule, in conformity with the Committee's jurisdictional statement. The Committee's disposition of petitions for review will ordinarily be final. However, the Judicial Conference of the United States, in its sole discretion, may review any such Committee decision. The Judicial Conference's authority in this regard does not give a complainant or subject judge a right to such review.

(b) Reviewable Matters.

 (1) A complainant or subject judge may petition the Committee for review of an order of a judicial council entered:

- (A) pursuant to Rule 20(b)(1), (2), (4) or (5); or
- (B) pursuant to Rule 19(b)(1) or (4), if one or more members of the judicial council dissented from the order on the ground that a special committee should be appointed under Rule 11(f). In such a case, the Committee's review will be limited to the issue of whether a special committee should be appointed.
- (2) The Committee may, at its initiative and in its sole discretion, review any order of a judicial council entered pursuant to Rule 19(b)(1) or (4), but only as to whether a special committee should be appointed. Before undertaking such a review, the Committee must invite that judicial council to explain why it believes the appointment of a special committee unnecessary, unless the reasons are clearly stated in the judicial council's order denying the petition for review. If the Committee believes that it would benefit from a submission by the subject judge, it may issue an appropriate request. If the Committee determines that a special committee should be appointed, the Committee must issue a written decision giving its reasons.

(c) Committee Vote.

Committee decisions under (b) of this Rule shall be by majority vote of the members of the Committee not from the same circuit as the subject judge. If only six members are qualified to vote on a petition for review, the decision shall be made by a majority of a panel of five members drawn from a randomly selected list that rotates after each decision by a panel drawn from the list. If only four members are qualified to vote, the Chief Justice must appoint an ex-member of the Committee, if available, or other United States judge, if not, to consider the petition.

(d) Additional Investigation.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Committee will not conduct an additional investigation. However, the Committee may return the matter to the judicial council with directions to undertake an additional investigation. Should the Committee conduct an additional investigation, it will exercise the powers of the Judicial Conference under 28 U.S.C. § 331.

(e) Oral Argument; Personal Appearance.

There will ordinarily be no oral arguments or personal appearances before the Committee. In its discretion, the Committee may permit written submissions from the petitioner, complainant, or subject judge.

(f) Committee Decisions.

Committee decisions under this Rule shall be transmitted promptly to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Other distribution will be by the Administrative Office at the direction of the Committee chair. Such orders must be maintained as public documents by the Administrative Office and by the clerk of the court for the circuit in which the complaint arose.

(g) Finality.

All orders of the Judicial Conference or of the Committee (when the Conference

does not exercise its power of review) are final and conclusive.

Commentary on Rule 21

This Rule is largely self-explanatory.

Rule 21(a) is intended to clarify that the delegation of power to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability to dispose of petitions does not preclude review of such dispositions by the Conference. However, there is no right to such review in any party.

Rules 21(b)(1)(B) and (2) are intended to fill a jurisdictional gap as to review of dismissals or conclusions of complaints under Rule 19(b)(1) or (4). Where one or more members of a judicial council reviewing a petition have dissented on the ground that a special committee should have been appointed, the complainant or subject judge has the right to petition for review by the Committee but only as to that issue. Under Rule 21(b)(2), the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability may review such a dismissal or conclusion in its sole discretion, whether or not such a dissent occurred, and only as to appointment of a special committee. No party has a right to such review, and such review will be rare.

Rule 21(c) provides for review only by Committee members from circuits other than that of the subject judge. To avoid tie votes, the Committee will decide petitions for review by rotating panels of five when only six members are qualified. If only four members are qualified, the Chief Justice must appoint an additional judge to consider that petition for review.

Rule 22. Procedures for Review.

(a) Filing a Petition for Review.

A petition for review of a decision of the judicial council may be filed by sending a brief written statement to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, addressed to:

Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability

Attn: Office of General Counsel

Administrative Office of the United States Courts

Washington, D.C. 20544

(b) Form and Contents of Petition for Review.

No particular form is required. The petition must contain a short statement of the basic facts underlying the complaint, the history of its consideration before the appropriate judicial council, a copy of the decision of the judicial council, and the grounds on which the petitioner seeks review. The petition for review must specify the date and docket number of the order of the judicial council for which review is sought. The petitioner may attach any documents or correspondence arising in the course of the proceeding before the

judicial council or its special committee that the petitioner deems essential or useful to the

prompt disposition of the review petition. A petition should not normally exceed 20 pages, plus necessary attachments.

(c) Time.

A petition must be submitted within 60 days of the date of the order for which review is sought.

(d) Copies.

Five copies of the petition for review must be submitted, at least one of which must be signed by the petitioner or his or her attorney. If the petitioner submits a signed declaration of inability to pay the expense of duplicating the petition, the Administrative Office must accept the original petition and must reproduce copies at its expense.

(e) Action on Receipt of Petition for Review.

The Administrative Office must acknowledge receipt of a petition for review submitted under this Rule, and must notify the chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The Administrative Office must distribute the petition to the members of the Committee for their deliberation.

Commentary on Rule 22

Rule 22 is self-explanatory.

ARTICLE VII. MISCELLANEOUS RULES

Rule 23. Confidentiality.

(a) General Rule.

The consideration of a complaint by the chief circuit judge, a special committee, the judicial council, or the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability is confidential. Information about such consideration must not be disclosed by any judge or employee of the judicial branch or by any person who records or transcribes testimony except in accordance with these rules.

(b) Files.

All files related to complaints must be separately maintained with appropriate security precautions to ensure confidentiality.

(c) Disclosure in Decisions.

Written decisions of the chief circuit judge, the judicial council, or Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, and dissenting opinions or separate statements of members of the council or Committee, may contain such information and exhibits as the authors deem appropriate, and such information and exhibits may be made public pursuant to Rule 24.

(d) Availability to Judicial Conference.

On request of the Judicial Conference or its Committee on Judicial Conduct and

 Disability, the clerk of a court of appeals must furnish any records related to a complaint that are requested.

(e) Availability to District Court.

In the event that the judicial council directs the initiation of proceedings for removal of a magistrate judge under Rule 20(b)(4)(C), the clerk of the court of appeals must provide to the chief judge of the district court copies of the report of the special committee and any other documents and records that were before the judicial council at the time of its determination. On request of the chief judge of the district court, the judicial council may authorize release to that chief judge of any other records relating to the investigation.

(f) Impeachment Proceedings.

If the Judicial Conference determines that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, it must transmit the record of all relevant proceedings to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(g) Consent of Subject Judge.

Any materials from the files may be disclosed to any person on the written consent of both the subject judge and the chief circuit judge. In any such disclosure, the chief circuit judge may require that the identity of the complainant, or of witnesses in an investigation conducted by a special committee or the judicial council, not be revealed.

(h) Disclosure in Special Circumstances.

The Judicial Conference, its Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, or a judicial council may authorize disclosure of information about the consideration of a complaint, including the papers, documents, and transcripts relating to the investigation, to the extent that such disclosure is justified by special circumstances and is not prohibited by the Act. Such disclosure may be made to Judiciary researchers engaged in the study or evaluation of experience under the Act and related modes of judicial discipline, but only where such study or evaluation has been specifically approved by the Judicial Conference or by the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. Appropriate steps must be taken to protect the identities of the judge complained against, the complainant, and witnesses from public disclosure, and other appropriate safeguards to protect against the dissemination of confidential information may be imposed.

(i) Disclosure of Identity by Subject Judge.

Nothing in this Rule precludes the subject judge from acknowledging that he or she is the judge referred to in documents made public pursuant to Rule 24.

(j) Assistance and Consultation.

Nothing in this Rule precludes the chief circuit judge or judicial council, for purposes of acting on a complaint filed under the Act, from seeking the assistance of qualified staff, or from consulting other judges who may be helpful in the process of complaint disposition.

Commentary on Rule 23

Rule 23 was adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

The Act applies a rule of confidentiality to "papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to investigations conducted under this chapter" and states that they may not be disclosed "by any person in any proceeding," with enumerated exceptions. Three questions arise: Who is bound by the confidentiality rule, what proceedings are subject to the rule, and who is within the circle of people who may have access to information without breaching the rule?

With regard to the first question, Rule 23(a) provides that judges, employees of the judicial branch, and those persons involved in recording proceedings and preparing transcripts are obliged to respect the confidentiality requirement. This of course includes subject judges who do not consent to identification under Rule 23(i).

With regard to the second question, Rule 23(a) applies the rule of confidentiality broadly to consideration of a complaint at any stage.

With regard to the third question, there is no barrier of confidentiality among a chief circuit judge, judicial council, the Judicial Conference, and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. Each may have access to any of the confidential records for use in their consideration of a referred matter, a petition for review, or monitoring the administration of the Act. It is clear that a district court may have similar access if the judicial council orders the district court to initiate proceedings to remove a magistrate judge from office, and Rule 23(e) so provides.

The confidentiality requirement does not prevent the chief circuit judge from "communicat[ing] orally or in writing with . . . [persons] who may have knowledge of the matter," as part of a limited inquiry conducted by the chief circuit judge under Rule 11(b).

In addition, chief circuit judges and judicial councils may seek staff assistance or consult with other judges who may be helpful in the process of complaint disposition. Rule 23(j) provides that the confidentiality requirement does not preclude this. The chief circuit judge, for example, may properly seek the advice and assistance of another judge who the chief circuit judge deems to be in the best position to communicate with the subject judge in an attempt to bring about corrective action. As another example, a new chief circuit judge may wish to confer with a predecessor to learn how similar complaints have been handled. In consulting with other judges, of course, the chief circuit judge should disclose information regarding the complaint only to the extent the chief circuit judge deems necessary under the circumstances.

On the other hand, the Act makes it clear that there is a barrier of confidentiality between the judicial branch and the legislative. It provides that material may be disclosed to Congress only if it is believed necessary to an impeachment investigation or trial of a judge.

The Act provides that confidential materials may be disclosed if authorized in writing by

the subject judge and by the chief circuit judge.

Rule 23 recognizes that there must be some exceptions to the Act's confidentiality requirement. For example, the Act requires that certain orders and the reasons for them must be made public. Rule 23(c) makes it explicit that memoranda supporting chief circuit judge and council orders, as well as dissenting opinions and separate statements, may contain references to information that would otherwise be confidential and that such information may be made public.

Section 355(b) of the Act requires the Judicial Conference to transmit the record of the proceeding to the House of Representatives if the Conference believes that impeachment of a subject judge may be appropriate. Rule 23(f) implements this requirement.

Rule 23(h) permits disclosure of additional information in circumstances not enumerated. For example, disclosure may be appropriate to permit a prosecution for perjury based on testimony given before a special committee. Another example might involve evidence of criminal conduct by a judge discovered by a special committee.

Rule 23(h) specifically permits the authorization of disclosure of information about the consideration of a complaint, including the papers, documents, and transcripts relating to the investigation, to Judiciary researchers engaged in the study or evaluation of experience under the Act and related modes of judicial discipline.

The Rule envisions disclosure of information from the official record of complaint proceedings to a limited category of persons for appropriately authorized research purposes only, and with appropriate safeguards to protect individual identities in any published research results that ensue. In authorizing disclosure, the judicial council may refuse to release particular materials when such release would be contrary to the interests of justice, or that constitute purely internal communications. The Rule does not envision any disclosure of purely internal communications between judges and their colleagues and staff.

Once the subject judge has consented to the disclosure of confidential materials related to a complaint, the chief circuit judge ordinarily will refuse consent only to the extent necessary to protect the confidentiality interests of the complainant or of witnesses who have testified in investigatory proceedings or who have provided information in response to a limited inquiry undertaken pursuant to Rule 11. It will generally be necessary, therefore, for the chief circuit judge to require that the identities of the complainant or of such witnesses, as well as any identifying information, be shielded in any materials disclosed, except insofar as the chief circuit judge has secured the consent of the complainant or of a particular witness to disclosure, or there is a demonstrated need for disclosure of the information that, in the judgment of the chief circuit judge, outweighs the confidentiality interest of the complainant or of a particular witness (as may be the case where the complainant was delusional or where the complainant or a particular witness has already demonstrated a lack of concern about maintaining the confidentiality of the

proceedings).

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Rule 24. Public Availability of Decisions.

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(a) General Rule; Specific Cases.

When final action on a complaint has been taken and is no longer subject to review, all orders entered by the chief circuit judge and judicial council, including any supporting memoranda and any dissenting opinions or separate statements by members of the judicial council, must be made public. However:

- (1) If the complaint is finally dismissed under Rule 11(c) without appointment of a special committee, or if it is concluded because of voluntary corrective action, the publicly available materials must not disclose the name of the subject judge without his or her consent.
- (2) If the complaint is concluded because of intervening events, or dismissed at any time after the appointment of a special committee, the judicial council must determine whether the name of the subject judge is to be disclosed.
- (3) If the complaint is finally disposed of by a privately communicated censure or reprimand, the publicly available materials must not disclose either the name of the subject judge or the text of the reprimand.
- (4) If the complaint is finally disposed of by any action other than private censure or reprimand taken pursuant to Rule 20(b)(4), the text of the dispositive order must be included in the materials made public, and the name of the subject judge must be disclosed.
- (5) The name of the complainant must not be disclosed in materials made public under this rule unless the chief circuit judge orders such disclosure.
- (b) Manner of Making Public.

The orders described in (a) must be made public by placing them in a publicly accessible file in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals or by placing such orders on the court's public website. In cases in which such orders appear to have precedential value, the chief circuit judge may cause them to be published. In addition, the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability must make available on the judiciary website, www.uscourts.gov, selected illustrative orders described in paragraph (a), appropriately redacted, to provide additional information to the public on how complaints are addressed under the Act.

(c) Orders of Judicial Conference Committee.

To the extent consistent with the policy of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, orders of that Committee relating to complaints arising from a particular circuit must also be made available to the public in the office of the clerk of the relevant court of appeals. The Committee also must make its public orders available on the judiciary website, www.uscourts.gov.

(d) Complaints Referred to the Judicial Conference of the United States. If a complaint is referred to the Judicial Conference pursuant to Rule 20(b)(3),

materials relating to the complaint will be made public only as may be ordered by the Judicial Conference.

Commentary on Rule 24

Rule 24 is adapted from the Illustrative Rules and the recommendations of the Breyer Committee.

The Act requires the circuits to make available only written orders of a judicial council or the Judicial Conference imposing some form of sanction. The Judicial Conference, however, has long recognized the desirability of public availability of a broader range of orders and other materials. In 1994, the Judicial Conference "urge[d] all circuits and courts covered by the Act to submit to the West Publishing Company, for publication in Federal Reporter 3d, and to Lexis all orders issued pursuant to [the Act] that are deemed by the issuing circuit or court to have significant precedential value to other circuits and courts covered by the Act." Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Mar. 1994, at 28. Following this recommendation, the 2000 revision of the Illustrative Rules contained a public availability provision very similar to Rule 24. In 2002, the Judicial Conference again voted to encourage the circuits "to submit non-routine public orders disposing of complaints of judicial misconduct or disability for publication by on-line and print services." Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 2002, at 58. The Breyer Report further emphasized that "[p]osting such orders on the judicial branch's public website would not only benefit judges directly, it would also encourage scholarly commentary and analysis of the orders." Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 216. With these considerations in mind, Rule 24 provides for public availability of a wide range of materials.

Rule 24 provides for public availability of orders of the chief circuit judge, the judicial council, and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability and the texts of any memoranda supporting their orders, together with any dissenting opinions or separate statements by members of the judicial council. However, these orders and memoranda are to be made public only when final action on the complaint has been taken and any right of review has been exhausted. The provision that decisions will be made public only after final action has been taken is designed in part to avoid public disclosure of the existence of pending proceedings. Whether the name of the subject judge is disclosed will then depend on the nature of the final action. If the final action is an order predicated on a finding of misconduct or disability (other than a privately communicated censure or reprimand) the name of the judge must be made public. If the final action is dismissal of the complaint, or a conclusion of the proceeding by the chief circuit judge on the basis of corrective action taken, the name of the subject judge must not be disclosed.

If a complaint is dismissed as moot, or because intervening events have made action on the complaint unnecessary, after appointment of a special committee, Rule 24(a)(2) allows the

judicial council to determine whether the subject judge will be identified. In such a case, no final decision has been rendered on the merits, but it may be in the public interest -- particularly if a judicial officer resigns in the course of an investigation -- to make the identity of the judge known.

Rule 24(a)(1) provides that where a proceeding is concluded by the chief circuit judge on the basis of voluntary corrective action, the name of the subject judge must not be disclosed. Shielding the name of the subject judge in this circumstance should encourage informal disposition. Once a special committee has been appointed, and a proceeding is concluded by the full council on the basis of a remedial order of the council, Rule 24(a)(4) provides for disclosure of the name of the subject judge.

 Finally, the Rule provides that the identity of the complainant will be disclosed only if the chief circuit judge so orders. Identifying the complainant when the subject judge is not identified would increase the likelihood that the identity of the subject judge would become publicly known, thus circumventing the policy of nondisclosure. It may not always be practicable to shield the complainant's identity while making public disclosure of the judicial council's order and supporting memoranda; in some circumstances, moreover, the complainant may consent to public identification.

Rule 25. Disqualification.

(a) Complainant.

If the complaint is filed by a judge, that judge will be disqualified from participation in any consideration of the complaint except to the extent that these rules provide for participation by a complainant. A chief circuit judge who has identified a complaint under Rule 5 will not be automatically disqualified from participating in the consideration of the complaint but may consider in his or her discretion whether the circumstances warrant disqualification.

(b) Subject Judge.

A subject judge will be disqualified from participating in any consideration of the complaint except to the extent that these rules provide for participation by a subject judge.

(c) Disqualification of Chief Circuit Judge on Consideration of a Petition for Review of a Chief Circuit Judge's Order.

If a petition for review of a chief circuit judge's order entered under Rule 11(c), (d), or (e) is filed with the judicial council pursuant to Rule 18, the chief circuit judge must not participate in the council's consideration of the petition. In such a case, the chief circuit judge may address a written communication to all of the members of the judicial council, with copies provided to the complainant and to the subject judge. The chief circuit judge may not otherwise communicate with council members about the matter.

(d) Member of Special Committee not Disqualified.

A member of the judicial council who serves on a special committee, including the

chief circuit judge, will not be disqualified from participating in council consideration of the committee's report.

(e) Subject Judge Following Appointment of a Special Committee.

On appointment of a special committee, the subject judge will automatically be disqualified from participation in any proceeding arising under the Act or these Rules by serving on any special committee, the judicial council of the circuit, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. The disqualification will continue until all proceedings regarding the complaint against the subject judge are finally terminated, with no further right of review.

(f) Substitute for Disqualified Chief Circuit Judge.

If the chief circuit judge is disqualified from participating in consideration of the complaint, the duties and responsibilities of the chief circuit judge under these rules must be assigned to the circuit judge in regular active service who is the most senior in date of commission of those who are not disqualified. If all circuit judges in regular active service are disqualified, the judicial council may determine whether to request a transfer under Rule 26, or whether, in the interest of sound judicial administration, to permit the chief circuit judge to dispose of the complaint on the merits. Members of the judicial council who are named in the complaint may participate in this determination if necessary to obtain a quorum of the judicial council.

(g) Judicial Council Action where Multiple Judges are Disqualified.

Notwithstanding any other provision in these rules to the contrary, a member of the judicial council who is a subject of the complaint may participate in the disposition thereof if:

- (1) participation by subject judge(s) is necessary to obtain a quorum of the judicial council;
- (2) the judicial council finds that the lack of a quorum is due to the naming of one or more judges in the complaint for the purpose of disqualifying that judge or judges or to the naming of one or more judges based on their participation in a decision excluded from the definition of misconduct under Rule 3(b)(1)(A); and
 - (3) the judicial council votes that it is necessary, appropriate and in the interest of sound judicial administration that such subject judges be eligible to act.

Commentary on Rule 25

Rule 25 is adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

Rule 25(e) makes it clear that the disqualification of the subject judge relates only to the subject judge's participation in any proceeding arising under the Act or these Rules as a member of a special committee, judicial council, Judicial Conference, or the Judicial Conference committee. The Illustrative Rule, based on Section 359(a), was ambiguous and could have been read to disqualify a subject judge from any service of any kind on each of the bodies mentioned. This was undoubtedly not the intent of the Act. Such a disqualification would be anomalous in

light of the Act's allowing a subject judge to continue to decide cases and to continue to exercise the powers of chief circuit or district judge. It would also create a substantial deterrence to the appointment of special committees, particularly where a special committee is needed solely because the chief circuit judge may not decide matters of credibility in his or her review under Rule 11. The subject judge is barred by Rule 25(b) from participating in the disposition of that complaint. Rule 25(e) recognizes that participation in proceedings arising under the Act or these Rules by a judge who is the subject of a special committee investigation may lead to an appearance of self-interest in creating substantive and procedural precedents governing such proceedings, and Rule 25 (e) bars such participation.

Under the Act, a complaint against the chief circuit judge is to be handled by "that circuit judge in regular active service next senior in date of commission." 28 U.S.C. § 351(c). Rule 25(f) provides that seniority among judges other than the chief is to be determined by date of commission, with the result that complaints against the chief circuit judge may be routed to a former chief circuit judge or other judge who was appointed earlier than the chief circuit judge. The rules do not purport to prescribe who is to preside over meetings of the judicial council. Consequently, where the presiding member of the judicial council is disqualified from participating under these rules, the order of precedence prescribed by Rule 25(f) for performing "the duties and responsibilities of the chief circuit judge under these rules" does not apply to determine the acting presiding member of the judicial council. That is a matter left to the internal rules or operating practices of each judicial council. In most cases the most senior active circuit judge who is a member of the judicial council and who is not disqualified will preside.

 Sometimes a single complaint is filed against a large group of judges. If the normal disqualification rules are observed in such a case, no court of appeals judge can serve as acting chief circuit judge of the circuit, and the judicial council will be without appellate members. Where the complaint is against all circuit and district judges, no member of the judicial council can perform the duties assigned to the council under the statute.

A similar problem is created by successive complaints arising out of the same underlying grievance. For example, a complainant files a complaint against a district judge based on alleged misconduct, and the complaint is dismissed by the chief circuit judge under the statute. The complainant may then file a complaint against the chief circuit judge for dismissing the first complaint, and when that complaint is dismissed by the next senior judge, still a third complaint is filed. The threat is that the complainant will bump down the seniority ladder until, once again, there is no member of the court of appeals who can serve as acting chief circuit judge for the purpose of the next complaint. Similarly, complaints involving the merits of litigation may involve a series of decisions in which many judges participated or in which a rehearing in banc was denied by the court of appeals, and the complaint may name a majority of the judicial council as subject judges.

In recognition that these multiple-judge complaints are virtually always meritless, the

judicial council should be given discretion to determine (1) whether it is necessary, appropriate, and in the interest of sound judicial administration to permit the chief circuit judge to dispose of a complaint where it would otherwise be impossible for any active circuit judge in the circuit to act, and (2) whether it is necessary, appropriate, and in the interest of sound judicial administration, after appropriate findings as to need and justification are made, to permit complained-against members of the judicial council to participate in the disposition of a petition for review where it would otherwise be impossible to obtain a quorum.

Applying a rule of necessity in these situations is consistent with the appearance of justice. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Doe, 2 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. Jud. Council 1993) (invoking the rule of necessity); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 91-80464 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 6/24/92) (same). There is no unfairness in permitting the chief circuit judge to dispose of a patently insubstantial complaint that names all active circuit judges in the circuit.

Similarly, there is no unfairness in permitting subject judges, in these circumstances, to participate in the review of a chief circuit judge's dismissal of an insubstantial complaint. The remaining option is to assign the matter to another body. Among other alternatives, the council may request a transfer of the petition under Rule 26. Given the administrative inconvenience and delay involved in these alternatives, it is desirable to request a transfer only if the judicial council determines that the petition is substantial enough to warrant such action.

In the unlikely event that a quorum of the judicial council cannot be obtained to consider the report of a special committee, it would normally be necessary to request a transfer under Rule 26

Rule 26. Transfer to Another Judicial Council.

(a) Transfer of a Proceeding.

In exceptional circumstances, a chief circuit judge or a judicial council may request the Chief Justice to transfer a proceeding based on a complaint identified under Rule 5 or filed under Rule 6 to the judicial council of another circuit. The request for a transfer may be made at any stage of the proceeding before a reference to the Judicial Conference pursuant to Rule 20(b)(3) or a petition for review filed under Rule 22. Upon receiving such a request, the Chief Justice may refuse the request or select the transferee judicial council, which may then exercise the powers of a judicial council under these Rules.

Commentary to Rule 26

Rule 26 is new but implements the Breyer Committee's recommended use of transfers. Breyer Report, 239 F.R.D. at 214-15.

Rule 26 authorizes the transfer of a complaint proceeding to another judicial council

selected by the Chief Justice. Such transfers may be appropriate, for example, in the case of a serious complaint where there are multiple disqualifications among the original council; where the issues are highly visible and a local disposition may weaken public confidence in the process; where internal tensions arising in the council as a result of the complaint render disposition by a less involved council appropriate, or where a complaint calls into question policies or governance of the home court of appeals. The power to effect a transfer is lodged in the Chief Justice to avoid disputes in a council over where to transfer a sensitive matter and to ensure that the transferee council accepts the matter.

Upon receipt of a transferred proceeding, the transferee council shall determine the proper stage at which to begin consideration of the complaint, i.e., reference to the transferee chief circuit judge, appointment of a special committee, etc.

Rule 27. Withdrawal of Complaints and Petitions for Review.

(a) Complaint Pending Before Chief Circuit Judge.

A complaint that is before the chief circuit judge for a decision under Rule 11 may be withdrawn by the complainant with the consent of the chief circuit judge. The withdrawal of a complaint will not prevent a chief circuit judge from identifying, or reduce the chief circuit judge's duty to identify, a complaint under Rule 5 based on the withdrawn complaint.

(b) Complaint Pending before Special Committee or Judicial Council.

 After a complaint has been referred to a special committee for investigation, the complaint may be withdrawn by the complainant only with the consent of both the subject judge and either the special committee (before its report has been filed) or the judicial council.

(c) Petitions for Review.

A petition for review addressed to a judicial council under Rule 18 or to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability under Rule 22, pursuant to Rule 21(b)(1), may be withdrawn by the petitioner at any time before action has been taken on the petition.

Commentary on Rule 27

Rule 27 is adapted from the Illustrative Rules.

 Rule 27 treats the complaint proceeding, once begun, as a matter of public business rather than as the property of the complainant. Accordingly, the chief circuit judge or the judicial council remains responsible for addressing any complaint under the Act, even a complaint that has been formally withdrawn by the complainant.

Under Rule 27(a), a complaint pending before the chief circuit judge may be withdrawn if

the chief circuit judge consents. Where the complaint clearly lacked merit, the chief circuit judge may accordingly be saved the burden of preparing a formal order and supporting memorandum. However, the chief circuit judge may, or be obligated under Rule 5 to, identify a complaint based on allegations in a withdrawn complaint.

If the chief circuit judge appoints a special committee, Rule 27(b) provides that the complaint may be withdrawn only with the consent of both the body before which it is pending (the special committee or the judicial council) and the subject judge. Once a complaint has reached the stage of appointment of a special committee, a resolution of the issues may be necessary to preserve public confidence. Moreover, the subject judge is given the right to insist that the matter be resolved on the merits, thereby eliminating any ambiguity that might remain if the proceeding were terminated by withdrawal of the complaint.

With regard to all petitions for review, Rule 27(c) grants the petitioner unrestricted authority to withdraw the petition. It is thought that the public's interest in the proceeding is adequately protected, because there will necessarily have been a decision by the chief circuit judge and often by the judicial council as well in such a case.

Rule 28. Availability of Rules and Forms.

These rules and copies of the complaint form as provided in Rule 6(b) must be available without charge in the office of the clerk of each court of appeals, district court, bankruptcy court, or other federal court whose judges are subject to the Act. Each court must also make these rules and the complaint form available on the court's website, or provide an internet link to the rules and complaint form that are available on the judiciary's national website, www.uscourts.gov.

Rule 29. Effective Date.

These rules will become effective 30 days after promulgation by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

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3	APPENDIX: COMPLAINT FORM
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5	JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE
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8	COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY
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2	NOTE: MARK THE ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR
13	"JUDICIAL DISABILITY COMPLAINT." DO NOT PUT THE NAME OF THE SUBJECT
4	JUDGE(S) ON THE ENVELOPE.
5 6	SEE RULE 6 FOR INFORMATION ON WHAT TO INCLUDE IN A COMPLAINT.
17	SEE RULE 0 FOR INFORMATION ON WHAT TO INCLUDE IN A COMPLAINT.
8	SEE RULE 7 FOR INFORMATION ON WHERE TO FILE A COMPLAINT.
9	
20	SEE RULE 6(c) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED.
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22	
23 24	1.Complainant's name:
25	Address:
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	
28 99	Daytime telephone:()
<u> </u>	Baytime telephone.()
81 82	
33	2.Subject Judge(s):
84 85	Name:
88	Court:
39 10	
86 87 88 89 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge(s) in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?
12 13	[] Yes[] No
14 15	
15 16	If "yes," give the following information about each lawsuit: Court:
17	

and;

DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT - 6/13/07

Case Number:
Docket numbers of any appeals to theth Circuit:
Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?
[] Party[] Lawyer[] Neither
If a party, give the name, address, and telephone number of your lawyer:
4. Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge?
[] Yes[] No
If "yes," give the following information about each lawsuit:
Court:
Docket Number:
Present status of suit:
Name, address, and telephone number of your lawyer:
Court to which any appeal has been taken:
Docket number of the appeal:
Present status of appeal:
5.On separate sheets of paper, please provide a statement of the facts that the claim of misconduct or disability is based on. The statement should not be longer than five standard
pages. For further information about what to include in your statement of facts, see Rule 6(a).
Declaration and signature:
I declare under penalty of perjury that:
(1) I have reviewed the Rules Governing Judicial Misconduct and Disability Proceedings,

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1	(2) The statements made in this complaint are true and correct to the best of my
2	knowledge.
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4	
5	(Signature)
5	
7	(Date)
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(as of April 17, 2007)

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