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March 27, 2008

Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs
U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007

Dear Chief Judge Jacobs,

Last February 9, I addressed to you, as member of the Judicial Conference, a letter requesting that you cause the Conference to take cognizance at its March 11 meeting of my comment¹ on the proposed Rules Governing Judicial Misconduct and Disability Proceedings. As expected, it adopted the Rules². In my comment, I demonstrated that they are not different from the current ones that they replace. Hence, their application will have the same result as the official statistics show the current rules had from 1997 to 2006: Out of 7,462 complaints, the judges investigated only 7 and disciplined only 9 of their peers³. They systematically dismissed out of hand 99.88% of all complaints! Thereby the Judiciary self-exempted from any discipline and in effect abrogated an Act of Congress, i.e. the one enabling the making of those rules⁴. This presents you with the opportunity to do the right thing and be rewarded for it.

Indeed, how would you feel if the Chief Justice could do to you whatever he felt like it because he knew that he would reach his retirement before any of your complaints was investigated and led to his being disciplined, let alone his impeachment and removal? Your likely feeling of betrayal of trust, abuse, and impotence is shared by all those that complain in vain. They are left at the mercy of judges that can abuse their power to dispose of people's property, liberty, and even life secure in the knowledge that their peers will protect them from any adverse consequences. As you would, they need a Champion for Justice. The latter would ensure that all of you received the "Equal Justice Under Law" that has been denied them by 'Unpunishable Judges Above Law'. Their enormous and uncontrolled power is in effect absolute power, the kind that corrupts absolutely. It turns a judgeship into a safe haven for coordinated judicial wrongdoing⁵.

You can be the reluctant hero, who confronted with both the legal duty to safeguard the integrity of judicial process and the moral one of your oath 'to do equal justice to the litigant and to the judge', turns away from the comfort of complicit silence or willful ignorance and takes on the arduous task of denouncing judicial wrongdoing. A risky one, no doubt, which offers a commensurable reward: That of making a name for yourself, as Thurgood Marshall did when he championed societal equality in cases such as *Brown v Board of Education* and was eventually rewarded with a justiceship, like the one to be left open by JJ. Stevens, 88, Ginsburg, 75, or Scalia and Kennedy, 72, or by the whole Court that for decades has tolerated its peers' wrongdoing⁶.

Therefore, I respectfully request that you denounce the judges' coordinated wrongdoing operated with impunity through their systematic dismissal of complaints against them. Your denunciation can become known as Judge Jacobs' *I Accuse*, the equivalent of Emile Zola's exposure of abuse of power by government officials in the Dreyfus Affair⁷. Your moral courage can be that of Prometheus, who took the secrets of corruption from the judges to give our nation the fire of justice. Meantime, I look forward to hearing from you.

sincerely yours, *Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.*

How The Rules For Processing Misconduct and Disability Complaints Do Not Differ From the Current Rules and Will Continue To Allow The Judges To Self-Exempt From Any Discipline Through The Systematic Dismissal of Complaints Without Investigation

(excerpt from the analysis in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_revised_rules.pdf)

by Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.

The Rules adopted last March 11 by the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr., presiding, do not differ from the current ones that they replace because they:

1. Do not change the procedure or participants in the judicial complaint system.
2. Do not change the judge-protective secrecy that turns a complaint into a non-public document and prohibits even the judge's name to be written on the envelope of the complaint, Rule 6(e), and the disclosure of the complaint's existence. Rules 23(a); 18(b); 19(d).
3. Do not change the scope of discretion to dismiss complaints without investigation. R11.
4. Do not change the lack of a requirement for the judge to respond to the complaint, so he or she does not even have to bother reading it, nor do they make any response filed by a judge available to the complainant. Rules 11(f), Commentary p31:L21-30; 19(a)
5. Do not change the inaccessibility to special investigative committee reports to even the complainant, let alone the public. Rule 16(a) and (e).
6. Do not change the review-seeking discretion of circuit councils, which the councils have abused by not submitting their decisions to the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, so that in the 28 years since the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, the Committee has issued only 18 decisions⁸.
7. Do not change the indifference of the Judicial Conference, the last appellate body under the complaint procedure, which in the Act's 28-year history has not reviewed any decision of a judicial council or the Committee, let alone issued a single opinion, if only to resolve a dispute about the scope of its own jurisdiction⁹.
8. Do not change the unlawful practice of preventing complainants from appealing to the Judicial Conference despite the Act's clear provision allowing "A complainant or judge aggrieved by an action of [a] judicial council" to do so. (28 U.S.C. §357(a))¹⁰; Rule 21(a)

Since the substance of the adopted Rules is the same as that of the replaced ones, their revised wording will make no difference in their application. Judges that are able to apply the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes and handle the intricacies of shareholders derivative suits and patent law, did not fail to apply correctly the current rules because they simply were overwhelmed by their language. Rather, they realized that they can benefit from lifelong exercise of vast power over people's property, liberty, and even life subject to no control and causing no harm to them for its abuse if only they cover for each other. Indeed, although over 10,000 judges have served in the 219 years since the creation of the Federal Judiciary in 1789, the number of those who have been impeached and removed is 7!¹¹ It is simply inconceivable that ordinary men and women became incorruptible because precisely in a political process they were nominated and confirmed to a judgeship. If the DoJ Bureau of Justice Statistics' ratio of 1 in every 31 adults in the U.S. population is either in prison or jail or on probation or parole¹² were applied to the 2,184 federal judges¹³, 70 of them should be correctional supervisees. But none is. The Rules will not change the judges' need for abusive self-exemption from discipline for their coordinated wrongdoing.⁵

The Abuse of Uncontrolled Judicial Power in The *DeLano* Case showing a coordinated wrongdoing in the form of a bankruptcy fraud scheme

by Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.

(The documents referenced by **D:** and **§#** are in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLano_docs.pdf.)

DeLano is a federal bankruptcy fraud case. As part of 12 such cases, it reveals fraud conducted through coordinated wrongdoing that is so egregious as to betray overconfidence born of a long standing practice: Fraud has been organized into a bankruptcy fraud scheme¹⁴. This case was commenced by a bankruptcy petition filed with Schedules A-J and a Statement of Financial Affairs on January 27, 2004, by the DeLano couple. (04-20280, WBNY (**§V**)) Mr. DeLano, however, is a most unlikely candidate for bankruptcy, for at the time of filing he was a 39-year veteran of the banking and financing industry and was and continued to be employed by M&T Bank precisely as a bankruptcy officer. He and his wife, a Xerox technician, declared:

1. that they had in cash and on account only \$535 (**D:31**), although they had declared that their monthly excess income was \$1,940 (**D:45**); and in the FA Statement (**D:47**) and their 1040 IRS forms (**D:186**) that they had earned \$291,470 in just the three years prior to their filing;
2. that their only real property was their home (**D:30**), bought in 1975 (**D:342**) and appraised in November 2003 at \$98,500, as to which their mortgage was still \$77,084 and their equity only \$21,416 (**D:30**)...after making mortgage payments for 30 years! and receiving during that period at least \$382,187...through a string of eight mortgages! (**D:341**) *Mind-boggling!*¹⁵
3. that they owed \$98,092 –spread over 18 credit cards (**D:38**)- while they valued their household goods at only \$2,810 (**D:31**), less than 1% of their earnings in the previous 3 years and their excess income for 2 months! Even couples in urban ghettos end up with goods in their homes of greater value after having accumulated them over their worklives of more than 30 years.
4. Theirs is one of the trustee's 3,907 *open* cases¹⁶ and their lawyer's 525¹⁷ before the same judge.

These facts show that this was a scheme-insider offloading more than 78% of his and his wife's debts (**D:58**) in preparation for traveling light into a golden retirement. They felt confident that they could make such incongruous, implausible, and suspicious declarations in the schedules and that neither the schemers would discharge their duty nor the creditors exercise their right to require that bankrupts prove their petition's good faith by providing supporting documents. Moreover, they had spread their debts thinly enough among their 20 institutional creditors (**D:38**) to ensure that the latter would find a write-off more cost-effective than litigation to challenge their petition. So they assumed that the sole individual creditor, who in addition lives hundreds of miles from the court, would not be able to afford to challenge their good faith either. But he did! The Creditor analyzed their petition and documents and estimated that the DeLano Debtors had concealed assets worth at least \$673,657!(**§II**)

The Creditor requested that the DeLano Debtors produce financial documents as obviously pertinent to prove the good faith of any debtors' bankruptcy petition as their bank account statements. Yet the trustee, who is supposed to represent the creditors' interests, tried to prevent the Creditor from even meeting with the DeLanos. After the latter denied *every single document* requested by the Creditor, he moved for orders of production. Contrary to their duty to determine whether the Debtors had engaged in bankruptcy fraud by concealing assets, the bankruptcy judge, the district judge, and the Court of Appeals also denied *every single document* requested¹⁸. Then they eliminated the Creditor by disallowing his claim in a sham evidentiary hearing. Revealing how incriminating these documents are, to oppose their production the DeLanos, with the trustee's recommendation and the bankruptcy judge's approval, have been allowed to pay their lawyers \$27,953 in legal fees (**§XI**)...although they had declared only \$535 in cash and on account! To date \$673,657 is still unaccounted for. Where did it go and for whose benefit?

The Dismissal of the *DeLano* Case

How a Court of Appeals compromised its integrity to protect a bankruptcy fraud scheme as part of coordinated judicial wrongdoing thus complementing its systematic dismissal of complaints against its peers

by Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.

(Summary of the analysis and ¶# in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/enbanc_14mar8.pdf)

The *DeLano* case was filed voluntarily by a bankruptcy officer of a bank with 39 years' experience in the banking and financing industries and his wife, a Xerox specialist, in the Bankruptcy Court, WBNY¹⁹, and from there it was appealed by a creditor to the District Court²⁰, WDNY, and then to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, CA2. There the question presented on appeal explicitly stated that it had one unifying issue, namely, the existence and means of operation of a judicially supported bankruptcy fraud scheme²¹.

From the start of the appeal, the creditor moved CA2 to enable itself to ascertain the facts as a prerequisite to applying the law by ordering the debtors to produce documents as necessary to establish the good faith of any bankruptcy petition (11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(3))²² as their bank account statements. The need for them was all the more obvious because the debtors had claimed that in hand and on account they only had \$535, yet they had a regular income and after deduction of generous living expenses their stated disposable income to apply to their proposed debt repayment plan was \$1,940! Despite this and similar blatantly suspicious incongruities in the debtors' petition (¶¶2a-3), the Court did exactly the same as had done the debtors, the bankruptcy panel and U.S. assistant and regional trustees, and the judges below¹⁸: CA2 denied him not once, or twice, but five times every single document that he requested.(¶2) Thereby the Court condoned and even joined in the unlawful denial of the creditor's right to discovery and disregarded its duty to know the facts to which to apply the law. So it left the whereabouts of at least \$673,657 of the debtors' assets unaccounted for²³...in just one of the trustee's 3,909 *open* cases!¹⁶ Worse still, it abused in self-interest its power by covering up the fraud of the debtors and the support of its bankruptcy judge appointee and district judge peer for the bankruptcy fraud scheme.

Indeed, if the debtors had been ordered to produce supporting documents, they would have been proved to have filed a fraudulent bankruptcy petition that contained false statements to conceal assets in preparation for traveling debt-free into their golden retirement. As a result, they would face up to 20 years imprisonment and devastating fines of up to \$500,000 each. Therefore, they would have an incentive to enter into a plea bargain whereby in exchange for a reduction of the criminal charges against them, Mr. DeLano would have traded up: Drawing from his by now longer than 39 year long career as a banker and bankruptcy officer, he would provide testimony incriminating the trustees, the judges, and other court officers. In turn, those judges would enter into their own plea bargains where they would agree to disclose their evidence that CA2 judges have known about the bankruptcy fraud scheme for years, since before the reappointment of the bankruptcy judge to a second term in office²⁴, and have likewise supported or tolerated it.

Having placed itself in a conflict of interests between safeguarding due process and ensuring its survival, CA2 proceeded in its own and its collegial interest. Since it could not grant the creditor's incessant motions for the debtors' incriminating documents and thus, could not decide the case on the merits, CA2 resorted to the expediency of a summary order:

[This] appeal is subject to dismissal under this Court's sua sponte authority. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the appeal is DISMISSED as equitably moot. See *In*

re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005)²⁶; *In re Chateaugay Corp.*, 988 F.2d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1993)²⁷. See *In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.*, 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) *In re Chateaugay Corp.*, 988 F.2d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1993).

The Court disregarded the law and the facts by invoking for its dismissal the doctrine of equitable mootness. To begin with, neither of those cases even hinted its availability to cure bankruptcy fraud, much less a bankruptcy fraud scheme. In fact, neither deals with fraud at all. Nor do they deal with bankruptcies under 11 U.S.C. Chapter 13 and its simple “adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income”²² to creditors under a plan of cents on the dollar repayment.

Rather, those two cases dealt with Chapter 11 bankruptcies and the complex reorganization of bankrupt companies. Actually, they were even more complex, for they involved third companies and individuals that were not even parties to the bankruptcy cases! In fact, those cases dealt with the release of debt owed by non-party companies to the reorganizing debtor company in exchange for a substantial contribution to its reorganization plan and a challenge after the completion of the arrangement by a creditor, to whom giving relief would have required “unraveling the Plan”. To avoid such dire consequence, the courts in those cases applied:

Equitable mootness [] a prudential doctrine that is invoked to avoid disturbing a reorganization plan once implemented. [E]quitable mootness is a pragmatic principle, grounded in the notion that, with the passage of time after a judgment in equity and implementation of that judgment, effective relief on appeal becomes impractical, imprudent, and therefore inequitable. The doctrine [is] merely an application of the age-old principle that in formulating equitable relief a court must consider the effects of the relief on innocent third parties. *Metromedia*, §III.


By contrast, deciding *DeLano* on its merits by ordering document production and finding out that the debtors engaged in fraudulent concealment of assets would not disturb their completed debt repayment plan in any way. There would be no “recoupment of these funds ‘already paid from non-parties, and the continued payment to creditors would be neither impracticable nor’ “impose an unfair hardship on faultless beneficiaries who are not parties to this appeal”, *Chateaugay*, §II. Instead of making token repayment and evading over 78% of their debts, the DeLanos would have to keep paying the rest of what they owe the only innocent parties here: those who in good faith became their creditors and to whom it would be inequitable to deprive of what is owed them in order to allow the DeLanos to benefit from their participation in the bankruptcy fraud scheme.

Equity was farthest from all concerns of CA2. It was faced with a conflict of interests between its duty to impartially apply the law to the facts and its interest in self-preservation. It compromised and chose to protect itself by not giving its judicial appointee and peer cause to incriminate it for supporting their bankruptcy fraud scheme. To that end, it simply fetched equitable mootness and two citations and slapped them on an order form and without ascertaining whether any was even applicable, dismissed *DeLano*. Thereby it committed an inequity against the creditor, an innocent party, by depriving him of his claim against the debtors, the fraudsters, and his day in court; worse, it undermined the integrity of judicial process by dispensing with discovery and the facts and ruling in its own favor. Nothing extraordinary for CA2, just another dismissal with the same willful ignorance of the facts and the law as when judges systematically dismiss complaints against their own without investigation regardless of the gravity of the allegations²⁸. As for the creditor, he moved for panel rehearing and hearing en banc. Will any judge vote that determining his or her CA’s integrity “involves a question of exceptional importance” (FRAP 35(a)(2)) or is covering up a bankruptcy fraud scheme routine coordinated judicial wrongdoing?

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- ¹[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_revised_rules.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_revised_rules.pdf).
- ²[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/adopted_rules_11mar8.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/adopted_rules_11mar8.pdf).
- ³Official statistics of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, collected with links to the originals at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/complaint_tables.pdf. Their data is graphically presented at: http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_CJRoberts_8feb8.pdf.
- ⁴Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §358; <http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/28usc351-364.pdf>.
- ⁵[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Dynamics_of_corruption.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Dynamics_of_corruption.pdf).
- ⁶[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/SCT_knows_of_dismissals.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/SCT_knows_of_dismissals.pdf).
- ⁷[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Emile_Zola_I_accuse.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Emile_Zola_I_accuse.pdf).
- ⁸[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/1Comm_JCond_decisions.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/1Comm_JCond_decisions.pdf) and http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/2Comm_JCond_decisions.pdf.
- ⁹[Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_to_Jud_Conference_18nov4.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_to_Jud_Conference_18nov4.pdf).
- ¹⁰ See link in footnote 4, supra.
- ¹¹ [Http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf](http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf) >Judges of the U.S. Courts>Impeachments of Federal Judges.
- ¹² [Http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf) in box on p.2.
- ¹³ [Http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table101.pdf](http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table101.pdf); also at http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_discipline/judicial_officers.pdf. To the number of judges and magistrates must be added the nine justices of the Supreme Court.
- ¹⁴ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/how_fraud_scheme_works.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/how_fraud_scheme_works.pdf).
- ¹⁵ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Penfield_homesale.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/Penfield_homesale.pdf).
- ¹⁶ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Trustee_Reiber_3909_cases.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Trustee_Reiber_3909_cases.pdf).
- ¹⁷ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Werner_525_before_Ninfo.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Werner_525_before_Ninfo.pdf).
- ¹⁸ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/docs_denied.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/docs_denied.pdf).
- ¹⁹ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLano_docs.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/DeLano_docs.pdf), §V.
- ²⁰ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_DeLano_WDNY_21dec5.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_DeLano_WDNY_21dec5.pdf).
- ²¹ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_v_DeLano_06_4780_CA2.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_v_DeLano_06_4780_CA2.pdf) at 19§V.
- ²² [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/11usc_Bkr_Code_2005.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/11usc_Bkr_Code_2005.pdf).
- ²³ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DeLanos_income.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DeLanos_income.pdf).
- ²⁴ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/motion_en_banc.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/motion_en_banc.pdf) at CA:1978.
- ²⁵ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/CA2_dismissal_7feb8.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/Follow_money/CA2_dismissal_7feb8.pdf).
- ²⁶ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Metromedia_416f3d136.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Metromedia_416f3d136.pdf).
- ²⁷ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Chateaugay_988f2d322.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/Chateaugay_988f2d322.pdf) at 1963§III.
- ²⁸ [Http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrRCordero_v_JJNinfo_WBNY.pdf](http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrRCordero_v_JJNinfo_WBNY.pdf) and http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/docs/DrCordero_v_CJWalker_CA2_19mar4.pdf.

Number of Complaints Filed by Complainants and Systematically Dismissed by Chief Judges and Judicial Councils Between '97 and '06


Number of complaints:



	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06
— filed by complainants	678	1,049	781	695	766	656	835	712	642	555
— filed by chief judges	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	88
— dismissed by chief judges & judicial councils	477	995	820	710	663	770	673	781	661	609
— referred to Judicial Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
— special investigating committees appointed[†]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7

Judicial Councils' Action Against Complained-about Judges From 1997-2006

Number of complaints




	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06
— filed by chief judges	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	88
— directed chief district judge to take action (magistrate judges only)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
— certified disability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
— requested voluntary retirement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
— ordered temporary suspension of case assignment	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
— privately censured	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
— publicly censured	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
— ordered other appropriate action	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
— referred complaint to Judicial Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
— special investigating committees appointed[†]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7


Source: Tables of the Adm. Off. of the U.S. Courts; collected in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_revised_rules.pdf

Graphs prepared by Dr.Richard.Cordero.Esq@Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org


Cases Filed in the Supreme Court Between 93-06 showing a 33% increase




Cases Filed in the Court of Appeals Between 90-06 Showing a 63% Increase



Cases Filed in Bankruptcy Courts Between 90-06 Showing a 138% Increase at Peak



Complaints Filed Between 97-06 Showing a *Decrease of 5%*



[Footnotes in the originals]

NOTE: EXCLUDES COMPLAINTS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE CIRCUITS BECAUSE THEY DUPLICATED PREVIOUS FILINGS OR WERE OTHERWISE INVALID FILINGS.

* REVISED. [regarding complaints pending]

** EACH COMPLAINT MAY INVOLVE MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NUMEROUS JUDGES. NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS IS COUNTED WHEN A COMPLAINT IS CONCLUDED.

Source: For Tables 1, 2, and 6, Judicial Business of U.S. Courts, 1997-2006 Annual Reports of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

For Tables 3, 4, 5, 2005-2006 Judicial Facts and Figures, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

The original Tables are collected and reproduced in http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/judicial_complaints/DrCordero_revised_rules.pdf, wherein they are accompanied by links to the originals.

Tables 1, 2, and 6, supra, report on complaints filed and processed in the Federal Circuit, the District of Columbia, the 1st-11th circuits, the U.S. Claims Court, and the Court of International Trade. (Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§351(d)(1) and 363)

†The category “Special Investigating Committees Appointed” first appears in the 2006 Table.

The number of cases in Tables 3-5 do not even include cases filed with Article I courts, which are part of the Executive, not the Judicial, Branch, such as the U.S. Tax Court, established in 1969 (after it was created as the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924 and its name was first changed to Tax Court of the U.S. in 1942). Another such court is the U.S. Claims Court, established as an Article I court in 1982, and renamed U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1992. Likewise, the U.S. Court of Veterans' Appeals was established as an Article I court in 1989 and then renamed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 1998.

They too support the conclusion to be drawn from these statistics: The significant increase in cases filed with these courts every year attests to the litigiousness of the American society. They belie the judges' report that in the '97-'06 decade Americans have filed a steady number of complaints against them hovering around the average (after eliminating the outlier) of only 712 complaints. The explanation lies in the first footnote in the originals, above: Judges have arbitrarily excluded an undetermined number of complaints. The fact that they have manipulated these statistics is also revealed by the first table above: After 9 years during which the judges filed less than one complaint a year, they jumped to 88 in 2006...and that same year it just so happened that complainants filed the lowest number of complaints ever, 555! *Implausible!* Yet, the judges did not discipline a single peer, just one magistrate.